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Since 1996, Congress has included charitable choice 
provisions in several social welfare statutes to encourage the 
participation of religious organizations in administering gov-
ernment-funded social service programs. The current admini-
stration has proposed expanding charitable choice programs to 
allow even greater public funding of private social service pro-
viders. In this Article, Professor Michele Gilman discusses the 
lack of accountability to beneficiaries that occurs when public 
funds are given to religious organizations for secular pro-
grams, and she proposes solutions to this problem. As Profes-
sor Gilman explains, doctrines that constrain abuses of gov-
ernmental discretion, such as administrative procedure acts 
and constitutional restrictions, generally do not apply when 
public programs are privatized. Moreover, religious organiza-
tions are often insulated from public scrutiny by First Amend-
ment concerns about entangling government in religion, as 
well as by special immunities from tort liability and limited 
fiduciary duties for directors. The mechanisms of privatiza-
tion, such as contracts and vouchers, also fail to ensure that 
beneficiaries receive quality services. 
To ensure that beneficiaries are receiving effective ser-
vices, Professor Gilman proposes that charitable choice pro-
grams be required to adopt a set of measures to improve ac-
countability. These measures enhance accountability by involv-
ing beneficiaries in setting clear standards, evaluating out-
comes, and enforcing rights to quality services. Finally, Profes-
sor Gilman analyzes current Supreme Court case law on pro-
viding public funding to religious entities, and explains why 
requiring charitable choice programs to implement account-
ability measures does not violate the First Amendment Relig-
ion Clauses. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Charitable choice, or the use of federal money to fund social 
services provided by religious organizations, has engendered con-
troversy and confusion since its inception in the 1996 welfare re-
form legislation. Under the welfare reform statute, entitled the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
("PRA"), states may contract out administration of their welfare 
programs to private entities, including houses of worship.l Presi-
dent Bush is promoting the expansion of charitable choice into 
other federal social service programs as a major policy initiative of 
his administration.2 Federal funding of faith-based organizations 
has supporters and opponents on both the left and the right.3 Sup-
porters argue that charitable choice ends discrimination against 
religious organizations in competing for federal funds, and that re-
ligious organizations provide more effective social services than 
governments because of the spiritual and moral guidance the reli-
gious organizations provide.4 Opponents on the right counter that 
charitable choice will destroy the unique nature of religious organi-
zations, make churches overly reliant on federal funds, and result 
in federal funding of objectionable groups.5 Opponents on the left 
charge that charitable choice violates the separation of church and 
1. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 104, 110 Stat. 2105, 2161-63 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 604a 
(Supp. III 1997». There are also charitable choice provisions in the Welfare·to·Work block grant 
program, Community Services Block Grant ("CSBG") programs, and some Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration ("SAMHSA") drug treatment funding. See 
http://www.welfareinfo.org/faithbase.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2002). In this Article, the term 
"church" is used to refer to all types of houses of worship, such as synagogues, mosques, and the 
like. 
2. Dana Milbank, Bush Unveils 'Faith·Based' Initiative; Effort Will Team Agencies, Non· 
profits on Social Issues, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2001, at A1. 
3. See, e.g., Henry G. Brinton, It's Tempting, But My Church Says No Thanks, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 10, 2000, at B1; Dana Milbank, Senators Slow Action on 'Faith-Based' Aid, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 14, 2001, at Al (summarizing arguments for and against charitable choice); see also 
http://www.cpjustice.org/charitablechoice.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2002) (promoting charitable 
choice and providing guidance on the law's interpretation). 
4. See generally CHARLES L. GLENN, THE AMBIGUOUS EMBRACE: GOVERNMENT AND FAITH-
BASED SCHOOLS AND SOCIAL AGENCIES (2000) (presenting a study of faith-based organizations 
and arguing in favor of charitable' choice). 
5. See, e.g., BAPTIST JOINT COMM. ON PUB. AFFAIRS & THE INTERFAITH ALLIANCE FOUND., 
KEEPING THE FAITH: THE PROMISE OF COOPERATION, THE PERILS OF GOVERNMENT FUNDING: A 
GUIDE FOR HOUSES OF WORSHIP 4, 6 (2001) (counseling against houses of worship accepting 
government funds for social services and listing arguments against charitable choice), at 
http://www.interfaithalliance.orglInitiativeslktf.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2002); Melissa Rogers, 
The Wrong Way to Do Right: Charitable Choice and Churches, in WELFARE REFORM & FAITH· 
BASED ORGANIZATIONS 61 (Derek Davis & Barry Hankins eds., 1999); Caryle Murphy, Religious 
Leaders Cautious on Bush Plan: Some Fear Dependency and Too Much Scrutiny, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 1, 2001, at B1. 
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state and federally subsidizes discrimination, because religious or-
ganizations are exempt from some antidiscrimination employment 
laws.6 
Yet these arguments miss an equally vexing problem arising 
under charitable choice: How can government ensure accountability 
from its sectarian contracting partners? This has profound ramifi-
cations for all of the constituents involved, including government 
funding agencies, the tax-paying public, social service providers, 
program beneficiaries, elected officials, advocacy groups, founda-
tions, agency administrators, and others affected by, or interested 
in, a particular human services program. 7 
The PRA aims to move welfare recipients into the workforce. 
Rather than handing out welfare checks, welfare administrators-
whether public or private-are charged with putting people to 
work. As a result, under the PRA's charitable choice provision, 
faith-based organizations are providing a variety of social services 
designed to move welfare recipients towards self-sufficiency, includ-
ing child care, substance abuse treatment, homeless services, Eng-
lish courses, parenting classes, mentoring, job training, mental 
health counseling, life skills training, affordable housing, domestic 
violence shelters, transportation to job sites, and fatherhood pro-
grams.8 With President Bush's proposed expansion of charitable 
choice into other federally funded programs, churches can be ex-
pected to provide an even greater array of social services. Despite 
this proposed expansion, there is scant empirical evidence as to the 
effectiveness of the faith-based approach.9 The existing anecdotal 
6. See, e.g., DANIEL E. KATZ & JULIE A. SEGAL, CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY PROBLEMS 
WITH SENATOR AsHCROFT'S 'CHARITABLE CHOICE' PROVISIONS (1996), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/congress/ashcrft.btml (last visited Feb. 1,2002). 
7. LAWRENCE L. MARTIN & PETER M. KETTNER, MEASURING THE PERFORMANCE OF HUMAN 
SERVICE PROGRAMS 2 (1996) (listing the various stakeholders in human service programs). 
8. AMY L. SHERMAN, THE GROWING IMPACT OF CHARITABLE CHOICE: A CATALOGUE OF NEW 
COLLABORATIONS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS IN NINE STATES 25-
83 (2000) (cataloging the types of services being provided by faith-based organizations under 
contract with government); see also Rebecca Brown, Emerging Issues and Opportunities for 
Community Based Organization Involvement in Welfare Reform, WELFARE INFO. NETWORK ISSUE 
NOTES (Welfare Info. Network, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2001, at 
http://www.welfareinfo.org/cboinvolve-mentinwelfarereformissuenote.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 
2002). 
9. President Bush's first head of the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, 
John J. DiIulio, Jr., acknowledged as much in a 1997 article: "[W]e remain a long way from a 
definitive body of research evidence on the actual extent and the efficacy of church-anchored and 
faith-based social programs." John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Lord's Work: The Church and the "Civil 
Society Sector," BROOKINGS REV., Fall 1997, at 27, 27-30. See generally Martin Davis, Faith, 
Hope, and Charity, 33 NAT'L J. 1228 (2001) (discussing origins of Present Bush's charitable 
choice initiative in similar Texas program); Susan Hogan, Scholars: Plan Relies on Faith, Not 
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evidence points in both directions. For every claimed success story, 
such as the eighty-five percent drug rehabilitation success rate of a 
Christian treatment program called Teen Challenge,10 there is a 
horror story, such as the alleged child abuse that occurred at Roloff 
Homes in Texas, a church-run home for troubled youths. ll Given 
the lack of empirical evidence, ensuring accountability should be a 
paramount concern. Currently, it is not. To the contrary, several 
charitable choice proponents, including President Bush, advocate 
removing regulatory burdens from faith-based providers altogether 
to encourage their participation in federally funded programs. 12 
When government provides social services,13 a mix of laws 
and legal doctrines operate to constrain official discretion and to 
provide openness and participation in the administrative process. 
For instance, under federal and state administrative procedure 
Facts: Standards Are Sought for Bush Aid Program, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 4, 2001, at 1A 
(discussing need to study performance of faith-based charities in social services); Eyal Press, 
Lead Us Not into Temptation, AM. PROSPECT, Apr. 9, 2001 (discussing lack of evidence to support 
assertion that faith-based groups perform social services best), available at 
http://www.prospect.org/printJv12/6/press-e.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2002); see also Lewis D. 
Solomon & Matthew J. Vlissades, Faith Based Charities and the Quest to Solve America's Social 
Ills: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'y, 265, 289-97 (2001) (reviewing 
empirical studies and concluding that religion can lessen deviant behavior where individuals 
have a structured environment, but that structure is lacking in many poor communities). 
One of the few comprehensive studies on this issue found that people who consider religion 
and spirituality important are less likely than nonbelievers to abuse alcohol and drugs. See 
NAT'L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ADUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIV., So HELP ME GOD: 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE, RELIGION AND SPIRITUALITY (2001), available at 
http://www.casacolumbia.org/publications/456/publications-show.htm?docid=91513 (last visited 
Feb. 1, 2002). However, this study did not address whether secular or sectarian treatment pro-
grams are more effective, and it is not clear whether religion or other independent factors, such 
as family support, decrease socially undesirable behaviors. 
10. See NAT'L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIV., supra note 9, at 
26 (describing the claimed success rate of Teen Challenge and the critiques of the underlying 
study). 
11. See John Gibeaut, 'Welcome to Hell', AB.A. J., Aug. 2001, at 44. 
12. See John Gibeaut, A Question of Faith, Bush Considers Licensing Exemption for Reli-
gious-Based Social Services, AB.A J., Aug. 2001, at 46. In an Executive Order issued on Janu-
ary 29, 2001, creating the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, Bush 
asked five federal agencies to identify and propose reforms to eliminate regulatory barriers that 
discourage faith-based providers from seeking federal funds. Exec. Order No. 13,198, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 8,497 (Jan. 31, 2001). The departments include: Health and Human Services, Housing and 
Urban Development, Justice, Labor, and Education. Id. 
13. The term "social services" is usually defined in this country to mean "agencies that pro-
vide direct income and other material support, individual and family services, day care, residen-
tial care (except for nursing homes), job training, mental health and addiction services, nonhos-
pital health care, as well as agencies that engage in community organizing, advocacy, or commu-
nity development, including research and public education." Lester M. Salamon, Social Services, 
in WHO BENEFITS FROM THE NONPROFIT SECTOR? 134, 136 (Charles T. Clotfelter ed., 1992). 
Hospitals, schools, and arts, culture, and recreation organizations are excluded from this 
definition. Id. 
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acts, agencies must provide opportunities for notice and comment in 
issuing regulatory policies and must provide fair procedures before 
depriving persons of benefits. In addition, freedom of information 
acts and open meeting laws at both the federal and state levels 
open government decisionmaking to public review. Further, the 
government cannot violate the constitutional rights of social service 
beneficiaries, including their free speech rights, their rights against 
unlawful search and seizure, and their due process rights. By con-
trast, when private entities deliver social services, these doctrines 
generally do not apply. Simply put, the law has not caught up with 
the modern reality of public and private interconnectedness and 
interdependence that marks our social welfare state. 14 
Moreover, religious organizations are generally shielded 
from public review by First Amendment interpretations that protect 
religion from government interference. Like other nonprofits, most 
churches are organized as corporations, and thus, are run by boards 
of directors. While nonprofit directors owe fiduciary duties to the 
corporation, there are no teeth behind these requirements. Re-
source limitations also mean that state and federal officials do little 
to ensure that nonprofits are acting in accord with their purported 
charitable purposes. At the same time, many states provide chari-
ties, including churches, with some level of immunity from their 
torts, further insulating them from accountability. In brief, the law 
governing nonprofit organizations and churches tends to take a 
hands-off approach towards these entities, which provides scant 
accountability towards donors, funders, members, service benefici-
aries, and other affected parties. When a charity is operating in the 
purely private sphere, these various constituents generally have a 
choice whether to donate to, volunteer for, or accept services from 
the charity. Yet when the charity is expending federal funds, tax-
payers and beneficiaries do not always have the choice to opt out. 
Accountability in the social service arena is essential. Not 
only are public dollars at stake, but the beneficiaries of these pro-
grams are some of our neediest and most vulnerable populations, 
including children, the disabled, and the elderly. Nevertheless, cur-
rent accountability mechanisms are insufficient to ensure that ser-
vice delivery goals are met. This Article describes the lack of ac-
countability that accompanies the transfer of charitable choice dol-
lars, and provides a proposal for remedying this gap. This Article 
14. LESTER M. SALAMON, PARTNERS IN PUBLIC SERVICE: GOVERNMENT-NONPROFIT 
RELATIONS IN THE MODERN WELFARE STATE 15 (1995) (describing the interdependent relation-
ship between private sector and government in delivering human services). 
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urges state and local governments to put a variety of measures in 
place to prevent abuses by private social service providers, to moni-
tor the performance of providers based on clearly articulated out-
comes, and, as a last resort, to allow beneficiaries to enforce quality 
standards through legal remedies. These standards should apply to 
all social service providers, not just churches. Regulation of 
churches, however, raises First Amendment concerns not impli-
cated by regulation of governmental and secular providers. Al-
though the proposed measures may seem almost painfully obvious, 
few jurisdictions are implementing anything like them. To the con-
trary, most jurisdictions enter into boilerplate contracts with social 
service providers and lack the expertise, resources, or desire to 
monitor the actual services for which they have contracted. 
Despite their common sense nature, the quality assurance 
proposals in this Article raise profound questions under the First 
Amendment's Religion Clauses, which mandate that "Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise th~r~of."15 $pecifically, the constitutional 
question arises: How far may government go in ensuring account-
ability from its sectarian contracting partners? Under the Religion 
Clauses, government can neither impose religion nor interfere with 
religious practices. Government regulation of charitable choice 
funds brings these two proscriptions into conflict. Some religious 
organizations argue that government oversight of their charitable 
choice programs will result in. excessive entanglement between 
church and state and will cause them to lose their unique character. 
Accordingly, they seek exemption from otherwise generally applica-
ble regulations-such as those proposed in this Article. This line of 
argument implicates both Free Exercise and Establishment Clause 
rights. Yet if government exempts religious organizations from 
regulations that apply to secular providers, the government may 
violate the Establishment Clause by favoring religion over nonre-
ligion. The Supreme Court has never clarified where the tipping 
points lie between acceptable and unacceptable regulation, and be-
tween acceptable and unacceptable accommodation of religious 
practices. This Article attempts to clarify these battle lines and ar-
gues that regulating churches to ensure their accountability in de-
livering government-funded social services is not only necessary but 
also constitutionally permissible. 
15. u.s. CONST. amend. I. 
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Part I explains the charitable choice legislation, its history, 
and how it differs from prior federal welfare funding schemes. Part 
II compares accountability mechanisms in government-run pro-
grams with those in nonprofit and religious organizations. This part 
also explains why contracting law and practice, as well as voucher 
programs, fail to ensure quality delivery of social services. This part 
concludes that there is a lack of meaningful protections for social 
service beneficiaries in privatized jurisdictions under current con-
ceptions of corporate and contract law. Part III thus proposes a 
framework for increasing accountability in privatized social service 
programs, focusing on the inclusion of beneficiaries in the contract-
ing and regulatory process. Finally, Part IV addresses the constitu-
tional questions that inevitably arise when church and state join 
forces to solve social problems. Specifically, this part analyzes the 
First Amendment limitations on government's ability to regulate 
social service ministries and assesses whether the proposed ac-
countability mechanisms would survive constitutional review. The 
Article concludes that not only are accountability measures sorely 
needed, but that they are also constitutional. 
I. CHARITABLE CHOICE IN CONTEXT 
The term "charitable choice" first entered the national lexi-
con in 1996, when it was enacted as part of the massive reform of 
the federal welfare system, entitled the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act.16 The Act eliminates open-
ended federal welfare funding and the guarantee of assistance to all 
eligible personsI7 and adopts instead a capped block grant to the 
states called Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF"). 
The PRA also restructures the delivery of welfare benefits by de-
volving authority over welfare administration to the states and giv-
ing them the option to contract with private entities for service de-
livery or to provide vouchers for beneficiaries to redeem for welfare 
services at private entities. 18 Although state and local governments 
have long purchased discrete social services from nonprofit provid-
ers, the PRA expands this relationship by allowing governments to 
contract out the administration of entire welfare programs, includ-
16. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 104, 110 Stat. 2105, 2161-63 (1996) (codified at 42 u.S.C. § 604a 
(Supp. III 1997» 
17. The prior welfare law was called Aid to Families with Dependent Children. 42 U.S.C. § 
601 (repealed 1996). 
18. § 104, 110 Stat. at 2161-63. 
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ing eligibility determinations. Since enactment of the PRA, both 
nonprofit and for-profit social service providers have competed vig-
orously for these government funds. I9 Charitable choice is one com-
ponent of this privatization initiative. 
Under charitable choice, faith-based organizations can vie 
with other private entities for government contracts to deliver wel-
fare benefits and related services such as eligibility determinations, 
job training, employment placement, emergency housing, parenting 
classes, life skills training, substance abuse treatment, and child 
care.20 Then-Senator Ashcroft, the chief sponsor of charitable 
choice, argued that inclusion of religious groups was necessary to 
combat the "miserable failure" of governmental programs.21 As one 
supporter defined the need for charitable choice: 
People and communities in crisis need assistance that is challenging and inspiring, 
that connects them to social networks and resources, that invites them to examine 
their approach to life and if necessary to cast away attitudes and patterns that are 
unproductive. Such relational, morally compelling, and even openly religious help 
is not the province of government's own programs.22 
The charitable choice provision contains several require-
ments designed to ease First Amendment church-state separation 
concerns while simultaneously preserving the religious character of 
19. The PRA has spurred the large·scale entry of for-profit competition into the welfare 
field. See DEMETRA SMITH NIGHTINGALE & NANCY M. PINDUS, URBAN INST., PRIVATIZATION OF 
PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES: A BACKGROUND PAPER 5 (1997), available at http://www.urhan.org 
(last visited Feh. 1, 2002); WELFARE LAw CTR., THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN SECURING WELFARE 
RIGHTS AND lMPROVEMENTS IN WELFARE AND RELATED PROGRAMS 56 (1999), available at 
http://www.welfarelaw.org/welfare.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2002); Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal 
Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REV. 569, 591-94 (2001). 
20. See Gretchen M. Griener, Charitable Choice and Welfare Reform: Collaboration Between 
State and Local Governments and Faith-Based Organizations, WELFARE INFO. NETWORK ISSUE 
NOTES (Welfare Info. Network, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 2000, at 
http://www.welfareinfo.org/issuenotecharitablechoice.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2002). 
21. Ashcroft stated: 
There is a real reason to employ the services of nongovernmental charitable or-
ganizations in delivering the needs of individuals who require the welfare state. 
Despite our good intentions, our welfare program and delivery system have 
been a miserable failure. Yet, America's faith·based charities and nongovern-
mental organizations, from the Salvation Army to the Boys and Girls Clubs of 
the United States have been very successful in moving people from welfare de· 
pendency to the independence of work and the dignity of self-reliance. 
142 CONGo REC. S8507 (daily ed. July 23, 1996) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft); see also 141 CONGo 
REC. S13500-02 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1995) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft) (discussing the problems 
of the welfare system and the benefits offaith-based charities); 141 CONGo REC. S12924-25 (daily 
ed. Sept. 8, 1995) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft) (same). 
22. Stanley Carlson-Thies, Faith-Based Institutions Cooperating with Public Welfare: The 
Promise of the Charitable Choice Provision, in WELFARE REFORM & FAITH-BASED ORGAN-
IZATIONS, supra note 5, at 29, 30. 
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the grante'es.23 Religious organizations have several rights under 
the statute. First, governmental entities cannot discriminate 
against religious organizations in awarding contracts,24 nor can 
they interfere with the religious organization's "control over the 
definition, development, practice, and expression of its religious 
beliefs."25 In addition, religious organizations receiving charitable 
choice funds need not alter their internal governance structures or 
remove religious art, icons, or other symbols from their premises. 26 
Finally, religious organizations are exempt from Title VII's nondis-
crimination in employment requirements. 27 
Beneficiaries also have defined rights. States must provide 
nonsectarian alternatives for beneficiaries who object to the reli-
gious character of their provider,28 although they are not required 
to provide notice informing beneficiaries of this right.29 Moreover, 
religious o~ganizations cannot discriminate against beneficiaries on 
the basis of religion or religious beliefs.30 In addition, religious or-
ganizations cannot use charitable choice funds for proselytizing or 
worship.3! With regard to accountability, the statute provides that 
religious organizations are subject to the same regulations as other 
contractors "to account in accord with generally accepted auditing 
principles for the use of such funds," although the organization can 
segregate federal funds into separate accounts and limit any audit 
to those accounts.32 Finally, the statute provides that any party 
23. The provision states: 
The purpose of this section is to allow States to contract with religious organi-
zations, or to allow religious organizations to accept certificates, vouchers, or 
dther forms of disbursement under any program described in subsection (a)(2), 
on the same basis as any other nongovernmental provider without impairing 
the religious character of such organizations, and without diminishing the, reli-
gious freedom of beneficiaries of assistance funded under such program. 
§ 104(b), 110 Stat. at 2162 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 604a (Supp. III 1997». 
24. Id. § 104(c). ' 
25. Id. § 104(d)(1). 
26. Id. § 104(d)(2). 
27. Id. § 104(f). 
28. Id. § 104(e)(1). 
29. The lack of a notice requirement has been criticized. "As a class, welfare beneficiaries 
are not the most legally empowered group of people. Legislation that gives them rights without 
notifying them makes these rights virtually useless." Julie A. Segal, A 'Holy Mistaken Zeal': 
The Legislative History and Future of Charitable Choice, in WELFARE REFORM & FAITH-BASED 
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 5, at 9, 15. 
30. § 104(g), 110 Stat. at 2163. 
31. Id. § 104(j). 
32. Id. § 104(h). 
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seeking to enforce its rights under section 104 may file a civil suit 
for injunctive relief in state court.33 
Despite the constitutional issues arising under charitable 
choice and despite the fact that the PRA marked the first major 
governmental initiative for direct funding of churches, charitable 
choice received scant attention in either the legislative process or in 
the media. Rather, most of the debate over the PRA focused on the 
lifetime limits on the receipt of welfare benefits (no one can get wel-
fare benefits for more than five years) and other provisions de-
signed to alter the perceived behavior of welfare recipients.34 Yet 
attention has subsequently turned to charitable choice for two main 
reasons. First, a scattering of lawsuits has challenged various as-
pects of charitable choice. For instance, a therapist who was fired 
by a government-funded, religiously affiliated charity after it be-
came public that she was homosexual is suing her former employer, 
alleging that government-funded charitable organizations cannot 
engage in religious discrimination.35 In January 2002, a federal dis-
trict court struck down a Wisconsin funding program that awarded 
grants to a nonprofit organization called Faithworks, which pro-
vided long-term residential treatment to male drug and alcohol ad-
dicts. 36 The court concluded that the sectarian and secular aspects 
of the program could not be separated and that, therefore, the pro-
gram violated the Establishment Clause. 37 Second, during the 2000 
presidential campaign, both candidates, then-Vice President Gore 
and then-Governor Bush, endorsed the charitable choice concept 
and argued for its expansion into other government programs.38 
Once he became President, Bush quickly announced the formation 
of the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, designed to 
33. Id. § 104(i). This is the only express right of enforcement for beneficiaries in the entire 
PRA. Thus, while the statute claims to provide fair procedures and objective standards for eligi-
bility, these provisions are likely unenforceable. See Gilman, supra note 19, at 625-3l. 
34. See GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE'S END 103-08 (1998); Tonya L. Brito, The Welfariza-
tion of Family Law, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 229, 234-35 (2000). 
35. The lawsuit brought by Alicia Pedreira, Pedreira v. Kentucky Baptist Homes for Chil-
dren, No. 3:00CV-210-S, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10283 (W.D. Ky. Jui. 23, 2001), is described in 
detail in Eyal Press, Faith-Based Furor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2001, § 6 (Magazine), at 62. The 
status of other lawsuits is described in Elbert Lin et aI., Note, Faith in the Courts? The Legal and 
Political Furture of Federally-Funded Faith-Based Initiatives, 20 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 183, 191 
n.54 (2002). 
36. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950, 954 (W.D. Wis. 
2002). This case is discussed in greater detail infra note 342. 
37. Freedom from Religion Found., 179 F. Supp. 2d at 978. 
38. See e.g., Ceci Connolly, Gore Urges Role for 'Faith-Based' Groups, WASH. POST, May 25, 
1999, at A4; E.J. Dionne, Jr., A Shift Looms: The President Sees Consensus, While Religious 
Leaders Disagree About the Church-State Divide, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1999, at Bl. 
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expand charitable choice into other federal programs by boosting 
funding and eliminating federal regulations that inhibit the par-
ticipation of religious groups.39 Shortly thereafter, several members 
of the House and Senate drafted legislation designed to expand 
charitable choice into more than 100 programs in the Departments 
of Labor, Justice, Education, and Housing and Urban Develop-
ment.40 
Almost immediately, the proposed legislation attracted con-
troversy. Voices that had been silent during the 1996 enactment of 
the PRA quickly raised concerns about church-state separation, the 
potential bureaucratization and co-optation of religious organiza-
tions, federally funded discrimination, and the funding of objection-
able sects. Most surprisingly to the administration, heated opposi-
tion to the program was spearheaded by various evangelical organi-
zations that feared they would be discriminated against in favor of 
more mainstream religions. 41 Facing the maelstrom of objections, 
the Senate responded by delaying introduction of the legislation for 
up to a year while program kinks were worked out.42 A House bill 
was subsequently passed on July 19, 2001, with some changes de-
signed to meet public objections. 43 Nevertheless, the bill remained 
mired in debates over the proposed exemption of faith-based pro-
viders from nondiscrimination laws. Late in 2001, Senators Lie-
berman and Santo rum began to work with the White House on 
compromise legislation that focuses on improving tax incentives for 
charitable giving rather than on expanding charitable choice.44 Yet 
even if charitable choice is not expanded through the legislative 
process, President Bush has stated that he will pursue identical 
goals through executive orders and administrative changes.45 
39. Exec. Order No. 13,198, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,497 (Jan. 31, 2001). 
40. H.R. 7, lO7th Congo (2001); see also Dana Milbank & Thomas B. Edsall, Faith Initiative 
May Be Revised; Criticism Surprises Administration, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2001, at AI. 
41. Milbank & Edsall, supra note 40. At the same time, some religious groups opposed po-
tential funding of nonmainstream religions. Don Lattin, Bush Courts Right to Back Program: 
But Falwell Urges President to Withhold Social Service Funding from Islamic Groups, S.F. 
CHRON., Mar. 8, 2001, at A4. 
42. See Elizabeth Becker, Senate Delays Legislation on Aid to Church Charities, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 24, 2001, at A22; Richard Benedetto, Bush's 'Faith-Based' Initiative Draws Foes from Sev-
eral Sides, USA TODAY, May 8, 2001, at A9. 
43. H.R. 7; see Juliet Eilperin, Faith-Based Initiative Wins House Approval, WASH. POST, 
July 20, 2001, at AI. 
44. Mary Leonard, Faith Bill Advances Amid Religious Mood; Administration Yields on Ex-
panding Grants, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 18, 2001, at AI. 
45. Mike Allen, 'Faith Based' Backup Plan; Agencies to Lower Barriers to Social Services 
Contracts, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2001, at A2; Dana Milbank, Bush Urges Senators to Act on 
Faith Bill, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2001, at A4. 
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The idea of relying on religious groups to alleviate poverty 
and other social problems is not new. Religious groups have a long 
history of aiding the disadvantaged, and their efforts have shaped 
modern bureaucratic notions of relief for the poor.46 In addition, 
throughout Western history, governments and private entities, in-
cluding religious groups, have had an intertwined, and sometimes 
collaborative, relationship in providing social welfare.47 In the 
twentieth century, government has extensively funded religiously 
affiliated nonprofit groups, as long as those groups were not "perva-
sively sectarian."48 For instance, government funding accounts for 
39% of the budget of Lutheran Services, 62% of Catholic Charities, 
and 18% of the Salvation Army.49 Indeed, government relies on pri-
vate entities of all types to deliver the bulk of this country's human 
services.50 However, charitable choice takes this public/private rela-
tionship to a new level by allowing direct government funding of 
sectarian organizations. 51 That is, religious organizations no longer 
need to set up separate, secular nonprofits to receive federal funds. 
Churches, synagogues, mosques, and the like can receive funds di-
rectly.52 
46. See STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR MIX 7·9 (1996) ("Religiously mo· 
tivated and religiously based organizations have historically played a vital role in one area of 
public service after another."); Donald T. Critchlow & Charles H. Parker, Introduction to WITH 
Us ALWAYS: A HISTORY OF PRIVATE CHARITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE 2 (Donald T. Critchlow & 
Charles H. Parker eds., 1998) ("Despite all the waves of welfare reform in Europe from the six· 
teenth century to the present day, religious charity has continued to play an important role in 
social provision for the poor. Even though the aim of helping the poor move out of poverty is often 
expressed today as a moral (if not religious) obligation, this ideal comes from a long tradition of 
Christian religious charity."). 
47. See SALAMON, supra note 14, at 33·34; Critchlow & Parker, supra note 46, at 3 (noting 
that "a strict dichotomy between public assistance and private charity is far too simplistic"). 
48. See Griener, supra note 20, at 1-2; Murphy, supra note 5. The "pervasively sectarian" 
standard is discussed infra notes 321-29 and accompanying text. 
49. See MONSMA, supra note 46, at 1; Mark Silk, Old Alliance, New Ground Rules, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 18, 2001, at B3. 
50. SALAMON, supra note 14, at 15, 41-43. 
51. Historically, churches and other religious congregations have not been eligible to pro-
vide federally funded welfare services. See Griener, supra note 20, at 1-2. As of 1998, the Na-
tional Congregations Study found that only three percent of the country's 300,000 congregations 
run government-funded programs, although almost all of them provide some form of social ser-
vice such as feeding the hungry or building houses for the poor. Silk, supra note 49. However, in 
the wake of cllaritable choice, many churches have expressed interest in applying for government 
funds, and several states and cities have begun aggressive campaigns to educate religious groups 
about available government funds. States with particularly active collaborations with faith-based 
organizations include Indiana, Texas, and Wisconsin. Griener, supra note 20, at 3. 
52. Prior to the PRA, there were some federal programs with charitable choice-type provi-
sions, i.e., provisions that allowed for federal funding without requiring the grantee to alter its 
religious character. For instance, since 1990, houses of worship have been eligible to accept fed-
eral funds to provide day care to low-income children. The federal refugee settlement program 
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Charitable choice is the result of several converging trends, 
all of which are breaking down the already blurry boundaries be-
tween public and private, religious and secular. As already noted, 
government funding of private entities to provide social services has 
been a dominant model in this country since at least the 1960s. Re-
ligious organizations, with their long history of charitable works, 
are demanding equal treatment and equal access to government 
funds. Their demands fit within the Supreme Court's recent doc-
trinal shift towards equal treatment of sectarian and nonsectarian 
groups in interpreting the First Amendment's Religion Clauses. 53 In 
addition, America is a religious country. Over ninety percent of 
Americans say they pray at least once a week, and forty percent 
attend church weekly.54 The public thus views religious organiza-
tions as viable mechanisms for creating social change.55 
Layered on top of these trends is the burgeoning privatiza-
tion movement,56 which promises lower costs and greater efficien-
cies57 and which has become an increasingly popular method of 
state and local governance. Privatization is controversial and 
marked by sharp philosophical differences over the proper scope 
and role of government. 58 Privatization advocates claim that in ad-
dition to cost savings, contracting out social services puts services 
closer to the people served and allows private providers to act as 
and the overseas emergency relief and development assistance program also have provided funds 
to religious organizations. Carlson-Thies, supra note 22, at 47. 
53. See infra Part IV. 
54. NAT'L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIV., supra note 9, at 6. 
55. Nevertheless, a poll of the public about charitable choice revealed that while Americans 
favor the idea of charitable choice, they are opposed to specific portions of the plan, including 
allowing funding of nonmainstream religions and permissible hiring discrimination on the basis 
of religion. Laurie Goodstein, Support for Religion-Based Plan Is Hedged, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 
2001, at A14. 
56. The term "privatization" can have many meanings, from complete load-shedding, in 
which a government divests itself completely from performing a service, to contracting out, in 
which the government pays a private provider to provide a former government function. In this 
Article, privatization is used in the latter sense. Other types of privatization initiatives include 
long-term leases, franchises, joint ventures, vouchers, and volunteerism. See Adrian Moore & 
Wade Hudson, The Evolution of Privatization Practices and Strategies, in LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
INNOVATION: ISSUES AND TRENDS IN PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGED COMPETITION 17, 18-20 
(Robin A. Johnson & Norman Walzer eds., 2000). 
57. See, e.g., EMMANUEL SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION 288 (1987) (arguing that privatization satis-
fies "society's needs ... more effectively, and equitably"). 
58. See, e.g., Paul Starr, The Meaning of Privatization, in PRIVATIZATION AND THE WELFARE 
STATE 15, 42-44 (Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn eds., 1989) (arguing that privatization 
proponents "call into doubt the nation's capacity and will for collective provision"). 
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mediating forces between government and citizens.59 Especially 
with regard to faith-based organizations, advocates contend that 
"congregations are value-generating and value-maintaining ... be-
cause they foster strong supportive affiliations and networks within 
communities across the nation."60 Opponents challenge these em-
pirical notions about cost and efficiency and question whether the 
government should contract out services for its most vulnerable and 
voiceless citizens.61 For the actual state and local officials making 
the decisions to privatize, the issues are less philosophical and fo-
cus more on pragmatic concerns such as the cost pressures engen-
dered by shrinking municipal budgets.62 
Social service privatization has boomed since the 1960s, 
when federal funds for poor relief programs bega.n to bypass state 
and local governments and go directly to private providers.63 Later, 
in the late 1970s and the 1980s, state and local governments be-
came interested in contracting out their own functions in response 
to shrinking budgets.64 They started by privatizing various munici-
pal services such as trash hauling, asphalt paving, and road con-
struction, but soon privatized various health and human services, 
as they gained comfort with this form of management.65 The in-
crease in privatization initiatives, coupled with a growing sense 
59. Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn, Continuing the Discussion and Taking a Stand, 
in PRIVATIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE, supra note 58, at 261, 261-62 (summarizing view of 
privatization proponents); Starr, supra note 58, at 26 (same). 
60. Greiner, supra note 20, at 2. 
61. Kamerman & Kahn, supra note 59, at 262-65. 
62. Ruth Hoogland DeHoog & Lana Stein, Municipal Contracting in the 1980s: Tinkering or 
Reinventing Government, in CONTRACTING OUT GOVERNMENT SERVICES 26, 32 (Paul Seidenstat 
ed., 1999). 
63. SALAMON, supra note 14, at 221-22; see also MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE 
POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 267 (1996) (describing the federal gov-
ernment's "community action" strategy of bypassing local politicians and funding community 
agencies directly). Starting with the New Deal, the federal government began to fund massive 
social programs, but largely contracted with the states to carry them out. Funding of private 
entities began in earnest in the 1960s. SALAMON, supra note 14, at 223; Arnold Gurin, Govern-
mental Responsibility and Privatization: Examples from Four Social Services, in PRIVATIZATION 
AND THE WELFARE STATE, supra note 58, at 179, 180-81. 
64. Robin A. Johnson & Norman Walzer, Introduction and Overview, in LoCAL 
GOVERNMENT INNOVATION: ISSUES AND TRENDS IN PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGED COMPETITION, 
supra note 56, at I, 5. "Among cities reporting a study of the feasibility of privatization in the 
past five years, 90.7% said internal attempts to decrease costs of service delivery was the main 
factor causing them to consider. privatization. The second most important factor, reported by 
49.6% of respondents, is external fiscal pressures such as restrictions placed on the ability to 
raise taxes." Robin A. Johnson & Norman Walzer, Privatization and Managed Competition: 
Management Fad or Long-Term Systemic Change for Cities?, in LoCAL GOVERNMENT 
INNOVATION: ISSUES AND TRENDS IN PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGED COMPETITION, supra note 56, 
at 169, 177. 
65. Moore & Hudson, supra note 56, at 17-18. 
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that religious groups have valuable resources to offer in solving 
human and public crises, have converged in the push for expanding 
charitable choice throughout government programs. . 
II. ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNMENT, NONPROFIT, AND 
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 
Accountability is generally understood to mean that one en-
tity has the power to reward or punish another entity for the lat-
ter's performance.66 In the social service context, the vast number of 
stakeholders results in a complex web of interrelationships, with 
each stakeholder demanding fealty to differing goals. In the welfare 
context, the rhetoric of accountability usually centers on holding 
welfare recipients accountable to the taxpaying public that supports 
them. That is, clients are expected to work and are denied welfare 
benefits if they fail to do so. The government and direct service pro-
viders are also deemed accountable to the public for achieving "re-
sults" in the form of lower welfare rolls. There is far less focus on 
holding government and providers accountable to recipients to en-
sure that these "clients" receive quality services, whether they be 
job training services, mental health counseling, or the like. How-
ever, without quality social services, the underlying goals of the 
PRA and other social welfare statutes cannot be achieved. Thus, it 
is imperative that social service providers be held accountable to 
clients and the public for delivering meaningful and effective ser-
vices. 
As a matter of law, the legal tools that can be used to im-
prove service quality differ radically based on whether the provider 
is a government agency, for-profit corporation, nonprofit entity, or 
religious organization. The mission of administrative law is to hold 
government agencies accountable to the public, given that agencies 
are not democratically elected bodies. Thus, administrative law cen-
ters on limiting agency discretion by enforcing norms of fairness, 
openness, and judicial review. By contrast, corporate law has never 
embodied these norms because corporations have never been 
deemed accountable to the public at large, but rather, only to their 
own shareholders. In corporate law, accountability comes largely 
66. See William S. Koski, Educational Opportunity and Accountability in an Era of Stan-
dards-Based School Reform, 12 STAN. L. & POL'y REV. 301, 301-02 (2001) (proposing a strategy 
to hold states and schools accountable to communities, parents, and students for achieving the 
goals of standards-based reform). "[A]n accountability system must answer the question of 'ac-
countability of whom to whom for what and how.' .. Id. at 303. 
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through a fiduciary model. .The law governing nonprofits is based 
on the corporate law model, even though nonprofits do not share 
the hallmark of ownership interests. This inexact fit is one reason 
why nonprofits have long faced an accountability challenge. Reli-
gious organizations have even fewer external and internal con-
straints on their discretion. This is particularly troubling when re-
ligious organizations are managing public funds. 
As described in the remainder of this part, different account-
ability mechanisms apply to government agencies, nonprofits and 
religious organizations. This part concludes that no one legal form 
is a guarantee of quality service delivery, although there are more 
avenues of recourse for wronged beneficiaries of governmental pro-
grams and fewer for beneficiaries of church-based programs. Thus, 
as this part demonstrates, in spending public money, governments 
need to put in place measures to promote accountability regardless 
of who is delivering the services. 
A. Holding Government Agencies Accountable 
The law treats public and private actors differently, as the 
two following cases illustrate. In Boulet v. Cellucci, a proposed class 
of mentally retarded persons sued Massachusetts state officials 
charged with administering the Medicaid program.67 The plaintiffs 
alleged that the officials had failed to provide them with statutorily 
required residential habilitation services, for which the plaintiffs 
had been on a waiting list for as many as ten years, in violation of 
the Medicaid statute's "reasonable promptness" requirement. The 
court certified the class and ordered the state to provide the class 
members with the required services within ninety days. 
In Graves v. Narcotics Service Counsel, Inc., the plaintiff 
sued a nonprofit halfway house and its employees for failing to 
properly treat him for his drug addiction and for prematurely re-
leasing him from a drug detoxification program. 68 The court held 
that the suit could not go forward because the defendants were not 
state actors and thus could not be charged with any constitutional 
or federal statutory violations. Even though federal and state fund-
ing supported the nonprofit, and even though the state regulated 
the nonprofit, these connections were insufficient to deem the non-
profit's actions as having arisen "under color oflaw." 
67. 107 F. Supp. 2d 61,82 (D. Mass. 2000). 
68. 605 F. Supp. 1285, 1287 (E.D. Mo. 1985). 
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The results in these two cases hinged solely on the fact that 
government actors were the defendants in the first case, while os-
tensibly private actors were the defendants in the second. This pub-
lic/private distinction drives the analysis not only in the area of al-
leged constitutional and federal statutory violations, but also in the 
application of administrative laws and other doctrines designed to 
constrain official discretion. As a result, when private actors admin-
ister public funds, they face far fewer constraints upon their discre-
tion than do their governmental counterparts. As this section ex-
plains, the public/private divide is built upon a fiction that is no 
longer appropriate in today's mixed social service delivery network. 
1. Section 1983: Holding Government Accountable to Constitutional 
Norms and Statutory Requirements 
Section 1983,69 the statute invoked in both Boulet and 
Graves, protects individuals from violations of constitutional and 
federal statutory rights committed by state actors. It reaches only 
those deprivations of federal rights that occur "under color of law," 
and excludes" 'inerely private conduct no matter how discrimina-
tory or wrongful.' "70 Under current Supreme Court doctrine, 
private actors are rarely deemed to be acting under color of state 
law. In analyzing alleged state action, the Supreme Court primar-
ily considers two factors: the degree of state involvement with the 
challenged private action and whether the private actor is carrying 
out a public function. Thus, state action exists where the state 
" 'has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant en-
couragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be 
deemed to be that of the State'''71 (the nexus analysis) or where a 
private entity is carrying out a function traditionally and exclu-
sively performed by the state (the public function analysis).72 
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). 
70. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 
(1948». The Court has justified the state action requirement as necessary to preserve a sphere of 
individual freedom and to avoid holding states liable for conduct "for whicb they cannot fairly be 
hlamed." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982). 
71. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. 
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974». 
72. [d. at 55-56. More recently, the Court announced yet another possible avenue for finding 
state action--entwineme·nt. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 
288, 303 (2001) (holding that state interscholastic athletic association whose members are mostly 
public school personnel and that is governed by board consisting of state officials is state actor 
because "relevant facts show pervasive entwinement to the point of largely overlapping iden-
tity"). The Court, however, distinguished the facts of the case from those involving "mere public 
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With regard to the nexus question, the courts have long held 
that not only is government regulation insufficient to convert pri-
vate action into public action, but also that "the mere existence of a 
contract between a governmental agency and a private party is in-
sufficient to create state action."73 Indeed, two Supreme Court cases 
in which state and. local government agencies contracted with pri-
vate providers to offer educational or health services held that state 
action did not exist even where the government extensively regu-
lated and almost exclusively funded the private entities. 74 As a re-
sult, for state action to arise in a contracting scheme, the govern-
ment agency essentially must direct a specific course of action from 
the private provider. Yet because social service privatization is de-
signed to increase .innovation and efficiency, government agencies 
generally have a hands-off approach, which allows for substantial 
independence by front-line workers. 75 Thus, the nexus test is 
unlikely to provide relief for plaintiffs wronged by violations of fed-
eral statutory or constitutional law committed by private, govern-
ment-funded social service entities. As for the public function test, 
the Court has held that the function at issue must be one tradition-
ally and exclusively performed by government. 76 In the social ser-
vices area, an intertwined network of governmental, nonprofit, and 
religious providers has long provided benefits,77 thus seemingly 
foreclosing this avenue for finding state action. In sum, private so-
buyers of contract services, whose payments for services rendered do not convert the service 
providers into public actors." Id. at 299. Thus, it is unlikely an entwinement analysis would 
apply to a contracting scenario. See infra note 74. 
73. Dobyns v. E-Systems, Inc., 667 F.2d 1219, 1227 (5th Cir. 1982); Simescu v. Emmet 
County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 942 F.2d 372, 375 (6th Cir. 1991). 
74. Blum, 457 U.s. at 1002; Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 831-34 (1982). In Blum, 
the Court held that nursing homes that accepted Medicaid funding were not state actors, even 
though the state subsidized the costs of the nursing homes, extensively regulated the operation 
of the nursing homes, required the nursing homes to periodically assess the appropriate level of 
care for residents, paid the medical expenses of more than ninety percent of the patients, and 
licensed the facilities. 457 U.S. at 1004-09. The Court reasoned that the state could not be liable 
for the independent, professional judgments of the nursing home doctors. Id. at 1008. In Rendell-
Baker, the Court held that a private, nonprofit school which served special needs students under 
contract with the local public school district was not a state actor even where public funds ac-
counted for ninety percent of the school's funding, the school was regulated by the state and local 
school districts, and the school operated pursuant to a written contract with the local school 
system and state agencies. 457 U.S. at 831-34. 
75. This devolution of discretion to front-line workers is a hallmark of the PRA, regardless 
of whether the front-line workers are public or private. See Matthew Diller, The Revolution in 
Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1121, 1126-27 (2000); Gilman, supra note 19, at 579-8l. 
76. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 526 U.S. at 55-56; Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842. 
77. See infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
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cial service contractors are unlikely to be deemed state actors under 
current contracting arrangements. 78 
2. Holding Government Agencies Accountable Through 
Administrative Law 
Administrative law doctrines are also of limited help to so-
cial service beneficiaries in privatized jurisdictions. The bulk of our 
administrative law is focused on restraining abuses of the discre-
tionary power held by administrative agencies, in recognition of the 
fact that agencies are run by nonelected officials who are not di-
rectly accountable to citizens. 79 Thus, the federal Administrative 
Procedure Act80 and its state counterparts81 (an "APA") focus on en-
suring that government decisions are fairly and consistently made, 
with opportunities for public input-whether these decisions are 
implemented through individualized hearings or broad regulatory 
provisions.82 However, APAs generally apply only to agencies, and 
the definitions of "agency" do not include private entities.83 
78. For some criticisms of the Court's state action doctrine-and there are many-see gen-
erally Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization, 45 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 1169 (1995); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 503 (1985); 
Gilman, supra note 19, at 614-20; Robert J. Glennon, Jr. & John E. Nowak, A Functional Analy-
sis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 221; Ronald J. 
Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of Constitutional Meta-Analysis 
in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV. 302, 318 (1995); Jerre S. Williams, The Twi-
light of State Action, 41 TEX. L. REV. 347 (1963). 
79. See 3 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 17.1, at 1231 (4th ed. 
1994) ("Much of administrative law is a response to the existence of broad discretionary power in 
government officials."); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
543, 546 (2000) ("Unsurprisingly, administrative law scholarship has organized itself largely 
around the need to defend the administrative state against accusations of illegitimacy, princi-
pally by emphasizing mechanisms that render agencies indirectly accountable to the electorate, 
such as legislative and executive oversight and judicial review."). 
80. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994). 
81. 1 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND PRACTICE § 2.31(2) (2d ed. 1997) 
("Today every state has a body of legislation dealing with administrative procedure and con-
trol."). 
82. Diller, supra note 75, at 1189. 
83. The definition of agency in the federal APA is "each authority of the Government of the 
United States." § 551(1). The definitions of "agency" in the various state APAs also have been 
interpreted not to include private entities. See, e.g., Graham v. Baker, 447 N.W.2d 397, 399 (Iowa 
1989) (holding that a nonprofit organization that contracted with state to perform farm media-
tion services was not an agency); League Gen. Ins. v. Catastrophic Claims, 458 N.W.2d 632, 639 
(Mich. 1990) (holding that an unincorporated, nonprofit association of private insurers was not 
an agency under state's APA); Dorris v. Mo. Substance Abuse Counselors' Certification Bd., Inc., 
10 SW.3d 557, 560-61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a private substance abuse counselors' 
certification organization was not an agency under state Administrative Procedures Act); Ins. 
Premium Fin. Assoc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Ins., 668 N.E.2d 399, 403 (N.Y. 1996) (holding that a 
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Thus, when a private contractor conducts individualized 
hearings or establishes generally applicable policies, the contractor 
need not abide by administrative law requirements for notice, 
comment, or hearings in the absence of contrary statutory or con-
tractuallanguage. In addition, when government agencies choose to 
contract out services, that decision itself is usually exempted from 
review, as is any regulatory guidance or contract terms governing 
the private contractors.B4 In short, contracting out has long been 
viewed as an internal, housekeeping matter with few ramifications 
on the public at large. While this rationale may have had validity 
when governments were buying paper clips or copy machine main-
tenance contracts, it lacks legitimacy when governments are buying 
complex social services. Nevertheless, it is the governing paradigm 
in this area. Additionally, even if contracting fell within the scope 
of state APA laws, most local governments-the locus of most social 
service contracting-do not have APA equivalents and are not sub-
ject to state APA laws.B5 Thus, even a more expansive conception of 
"agency" in state APA law would play little role in social service 
privatization. 
In addition to the AP As, a variety of other administrative 
law statutes ensure openness in the government decisionmaking 
privately operated automobile insurance plan was not a state agency); cf. MeriWeather Inc. v. 
Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 778 A.2d 1038 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000), (holding that a nonprofit com-
munity economic development corporation was an agency because it was the alter ego of a public 
agency), affd, 778 A.2d 1006 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001); Bruggeman v. S.D. Chem. Dependency 
Counselor Certification Bd., 571 N,W.2d 851, 853 (S.D. 1997) (holding that a nonprofit certifica-
tion board was an agency where state APA defined "agency" as including an "agent of the state 
vested with the authority to exercise any portion of the state's sovereignty"). 
84. This is because the contracts themselves are not treated as "rules" under the APAs. The 
federal APA broadly defines a "rule" as an "agency statement of general or particular applicabil-
ity and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the 
organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency .... " § 551(4). Rules are subject 
to public notice and consideration of public comment. ld. § 553. However, the federal APA ex-
empts all matters "relating to agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, 
grants, benefits or contracts," from notice and comment requirements. ld. § 553(a)(2). 
The 1981 Model State APA has a similar definition of "rule." MODEL STATE ADMIN. 
PROCEDURE ACT § 1-102(10) (1981) ("[T]he whole or a part of an agency statement of general 
applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes (i) law or policy, or (ii) the organization, 
procedure, or practice requirements of an agency."). The Model State APA also exempts from 
notice and comment requirements those rules relating solely to agency internal management, id. 
§ 3-116(1), and rules for establishing criteria for negotiating commercial arrangements. ld. § 3-
116(2). 
85. 1 KOCH, supra note 81, § 2.32(3) (stating that local government agencies have both legis-
lative and administrative characteristics). 
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process. These include freedom of information acts,86 which require 
governments to make their files available to the public, and sun-
shine laws,87 which open agency meetings to the public. Here too, 
however, private entities rarely fall within the definition of 
"agency."88 To the contrary, "[i]n most situations, private economic 
or social conduct is not subject to procedural or substantive con-
straint akin to the procedural due process norms and the arbitrary 
and capricious standards that apply to government action."89 
Clearly, the divide in administrative and constitutional law 
between public and private bears little resemblance to the reality of 
modern governance. Boundaries between public and private are 
quickly disappearing as a result of current market-oriented reforms 
in which the "private sector [is substituted] for regulatory regimes" 
and "public agencies use market approaches, structures and incen-
tives to achieve their regulatory goals."90 Welfare reform, prison 
privatization, charter schools, and privatized child welfare services 
are only some of the more high-profile delegations of public func-
tions to the private sector.91 Particularly in the social services field, 
the government relies more on private entities to carry out publicly 
86. The federal Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") is at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994). There are 
nine statutory exemptions to the open records requirement. Id. § 553(b). All states and the Dis· 
trict of Columbia also have open records statutes. 1 KOCH, supra note 81, § 3.40. 
87. The federal law is called the Government in the Sunshine Act, and is found at 5 U.S.C. § 
552b (1994). It gives the public access to observe agency meetings, although it does not provide a 
basis for public participation in those meetings. Every state also has a similar law. See 1 KOCH, 
supra note 81, § 3.61(1). 
88. The FOIA definition of "agency" is found in the APA at 5 U.S.C. § 551(1). The definition 
of agency in the "Government in the Sunshine Act" is found at 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(1). In Forsham 
v. Harris, the Court held that the definition of agency under ForA did not include private parties 
contracting with the government. Federal grants "generally do not create a partnership or joint 
venture with the recipient, nor do they serve to convert the acts of the recipient from private acts 
to governmental acts absent extensive, detailed, and virtually day-to-day supervision." 445 U.S. 
169, 180 (1980). See generally Craig D. Feiser, Privatization and the Freedom of Information Act: 
An Analysis of Public Access to Private Entities Under Federal Law, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 21 
(1999) (discussing the impact of ForA on private entities and the public's ability to gather infor-
mation from them). 
89. Jack Beerman, The Reach of Administrative Law in the United States, in THE PROVINCE 
OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 171, 186 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997). 
90. See Alfred C. Arnan, Jr., Administrative Law for a New Century, in THE PROVINCE OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, supra note 89, at 90, 90. For an example of the attempts of public agencies 
to adopt market-oriented strategies to improve accountability, see the Gore Commission's Na-
tional Performance Review published in September 1993. VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE, FROM RED 
TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER & COSTS LESS (Report of the 
National Performance Review, 1993). 
91. See generally Susan Vivian Mangold, Protections, Privatization, and Profit in the Foster 
Care System, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1295 (1999) (discussing the need for regulatory reform for private 
foster care); Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 
531 (1989) (discussing legal issues in the incarceration area). 
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funded programs than it directly provides itself, and these private 
entities rely more on government funds than monies from any other 
source.92 Moreover, lines are not only blurring between private and 
public, but also between for-profit and nonprofit, and religious and 
secular.93 The law, however, remains steadfastly committed to out-
dated boundaries. 
3. The Effectiveness of Expanding Government-Constraining 
Doctrines to Private Parties 
The question obviously arises whether constitutional and 
administrative law constraints should be extended to private enti-
ties. Preliminarily, it should be noted that even in the purely public 
sphere, the discretion-constraining mechanisms provided by § 1983 
enforcement and administrative law are far from foolproof. The case 
law analyzing § 1983 is riddled with often-insurmountable hurdles 
for plaintiffs. For instance, in § 1983 law, there is no respondeat 
superior liability,94 negligence is not grounds for liability,95 govern-
mental officials have various immunities from suit,96 and states 
cannot be sued. 97 In addition, the Constitution only protects indi-
viduals from affirmative governmental acts, while governmental 
negligence that results in private harm is not actionable.98 More-
over, while state action doctrine can enforce constitutional proce-
dural due process norms agairtst state actors, it does not reach sub-
stantive issues of service quality.99 
92. SALAMON, supra note 14, at 15. "Indeed, piecing together research on the private role in 
social service provision as well as private contributions to standard setting and to implementa-
tion and enforcement produces a picture of governance strikingly at odds with the hierarchical, 
agency centered model of decision making that now dominates administrative law." Freeman, 
supra note 79, at 592-93. 
93. See generally Martha Minow, Lecture: Partners, Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Be-
tween Public and Private, Non-Profit and Profit, and Secular and Religious, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061 
(2000) (discussing the ever-shifting lines between private and nonprofit prganizations). For a 
description of the increasing ties between the nonprofit and for-profit sectors, see generally To 
PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR (Bur-
ton A. Weisbrod ed., 2000). 
94. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). 
95. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (holding that negligence is not enough for 
deprivation of property claim). 
96. See generally SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE 
LAw OF SECTION 1983 chs. 7 & 8 (4th ed. 1999). 
97. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989). 
98. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201-02 (1989). 
99. Freeman, supra note 79, at 602. 
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Likewise, the utility of APAs to constrain the discretion of 
governmental actors is lessened in the current social service envi-
ronment, in which discretion is pushed downward to front-line 
workers.lOO Regulations are playing less of a role in defining sub-
stantive program standards and, as a result, individualized hear-
ings have less force because standards are not clearly articulated. 
Further, while APAs open the door for the public to participate in 
decisionmaking processes, they do not encourage participation. 
That is, they provide no incentives or assistance for the public to 
participate. lOl Thus, extension of these doctrines to private entities 
would not necessarily solve the accountability challenge.l°2 How-
ever, the basic principles underlying these doctrines-fairness, 
equality, openness, and consistency-are surely principles we want 
in a social service delivery system, regardless of the legal form of 
the entity providing the service. 
B. The Limited Accountability Inherent in Nonprofit Organizations 
In analyzing the accountability dilemma, it is not sufficient 
simply to note the lack of government-constraining doctrines in pri-
vatized social service systems. Rather, it is essential to analyze 
what, if any, accountability mechanisms inhere in the various legal 
structures of private entities. Just as government entities are sub-
ject to various public-ordering doctrines, private entities are subject 
to their own doctrinal constraints. Accordingly, this part explores 
the legal and nonlegal constraints on nonprofit entities in general, 
and religious organizations in particular, to examine the account-
ability mechanisms that apply to these organizations and to gauge 
their effectiveness. This part concludes that nonprofits and, to even 
a greater degree, religious organizations operate with a remarkable 
100. Under the PRA, states are expressly granting front·line workers increased discretion in 
awarding benefits. Diller, supra note 75, at 1147-48. "Under the administrative framework 
emerging today, many important policy determinations are not embodied in written rules of 
general applicability" and thus "notice and comment requirements do not provide an effective 
avenue for public input." Id. at 1196. 
101. See Nancy Perkins Spyke, Public Participation in Environmental Decisionmaking at the 
New Millennium: Structuring New Spheres of Public Influence, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 263, 
269 (1999) ("[The APA) was conservative in that it forced the public to take steps to become in-
volved in the decisionmaking process."). 
102. Extension of APA requirements to private parties might end up being so costly as to 
eliminate any of the supposed benefits of privatization in the first place. "On a more philosophi-
cal level, the question that also arises is whether the kinds of values protected by public law are 
capable of being translated primarily into an efficiency discourse." Aman, supra note 90, at 100. 
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degree of freedom that comes at a cost to public accountability, es-
pecially when these entities are providing publicly-funded services. 
1. The Scope of the Nonprofit Sector 
The nonprofit sector is huge. There are over one million non-
profit organizations in this country, more than 700,000 of which are 
classified by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") as religious or 
charitable. 103 Their annual aggregate revenues constitute about 
15% of the nation's gross national product, and they employ 6.9% of 
/, 
the work force. 104 In the social service arena, nonprofits and gov-
ernment are intertwined and interdependent. Social service non-
profits, which constitute the largest component of the nonprofit sec-
tor, "deliver a larger share of the services government finances than 
do government agencies themselves."!05 Indeed, government is not, 
and never has been, the primary deliverer of social services, despite 
the rhetoric of government downsizing. Rather, there is an "exten-
sive pattern of government-nonprofit cooperation in the delivery of 
human services, with government functioning as the financier and 
the nonprofit sector as the deliverers of the services."!06 
What does "nonprofit" mean? While nonprofits are allowed to 
make money, they are bound by the nondistribution constraint: 
they must use any profits for their charitable purposes and may not 
distribute profits to their members or other individuals with control 
over the organization. 107 Not all nonprofits are exempt from federal 
income taxes; rather, tax exemption is a determination made by the 
IRS under federal tax law. lOB In addition to exemptions from federal 
income taxes, tax-exempt charities are also usually exempt from 
various state and local income, property, sales, use, excise, payroll, 
103. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, u.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, PuB. No. 55B, INDEPENDENT 
SECTOR, THE NEW NONPROFIT ALMANAC IN BRIEF: FACTS AND FIGURES ON THE INDEPENDENT 
SECTOR (2001); NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE: THE EXECUTIVE'S GUIDE, at vii (Victor Futter & 
George W. Overton eds., 1997). 
104. See NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE: THE EXECUTIVE'S GUIDE, supra note 103, at vii; LESTER 
M. SALAMON & HELMUT K. ANHEIER, THE EMERGING NONPROFIT SECTOR 34 (1996). 
105. SALAMON, supra note 14, at 134. Social service organizations make up the largest com-
ponent of the nonprofit sector at fifty-two percent. See Salamon, supra note 13, at 136-37. 
106. Salamon, supra note 13, at 141; see also STEVEN RATHGEB SMITH & MICHAEL LIPSKY, 
NONPROFITS FOR HIRE: THE WELFARE STATE IN THE AGE OF CONTRACTING 4 (1993) ("[M]ost non-
profit service organizations depend on government support for over half of their revenues: for 
many, government support comprises their entire budget."). 
107. Henry B. Hansma,nn, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980). 
108. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAw OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 3-4 (7th ed. 1998). 
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and other forms of taxation. I09 Also, contributions to many types of 
tax-exempt organizations are themselves deductible by donors, thus 
fueling much of the financing of nonprofit work. l1° 
In light of their favored status, nonprofits have long had to 
account to the public for their conduct. During the 1990s, account-
ability concerns increased following a string of high-profile scandals 
within the nonprofit community. For instance, in 1991, William 
Aramony, the head of the United Way, was convicted of theft after 
the press revealed that he used United Way funds for his personal 
benefit, including renting limousines and flying on the Concorde. 
He was also accused of rewarding friends and family members with 
jobs, board memberships, and consulting contracts.111 Similarly, in 
1997, the New York State Board of Regents removed eighteen of 
nineteen trustees of Adelphi University for unreasonably compen-
sating the University's president; he earned $523,000 and was 
given trips abroad and the use of a Manhattan apartment. 112 
Most recently, the Red Cross faced intense public criticism in 
the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon. Following the attacks, the Red 
Cross collected over $543 million from donors who intended that the 
funds be used for victim relief.113 However, the Red Cross decided to 
reserve a large portion of the funds for future emergencies.114 In 
addition, the Red Cross refused to participate in a computerized 
database established to coordinate charitable efforts, moved slowly 
to disburse funds to victims, and was forced to destroy part of its 
109. Bazil Facchina et aI., Privileges and Exemptions Enjoyed by Nonprofit Organizations, 28 
U.S.F. L. REV. 85, 85-86 (1993). Other benefits include: exemptions in trade regulation laws that 
permit nonprofits to purchase goods on terms not available to others; exemptions from Federal 
Trade Commission scrutiny; exemptions from certain labor regulations concerning collective 
bargaining and workers' compensation; and preferred postal rates. Id. In addition, bankruptcy, 
copyright, civil rights, and criminal laws allow nonprofits to engage in certain forms of conduct 
prohibited for others. Id. at 86. 
110. However, the major sources of nonprofit funding (for nonmembership charities) are 
funds derived from fees, dues, and charges for services provided. JAMES J. FlSHMAN & STEPHEN 
SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANlZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 11 (2d ed. 2000). Government 
funding is the next major source, with private funding third. Id. 
111. Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law, 
and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593, 593-94 (1999); Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary 
Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. 
CORP. L. 631, 633 (1998). 
112. Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400, 1401 (1998); 
Gary, supra note 111, at 593-94. 
113. Diana B. Henriques & David Barstow, A Nation Challenged: The Red Cross; Red Cross 
Pledges Entire Terror Fund to Sept. 11 Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, at AI. 
114.Id. 
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blood bank after overcollecting blood donations.1I5 On top of this, 
the media was awash in stories of victims' families being forced to 
navigate an unwieldy maze of relief efforts.1I6 Public scrutiny and 
threats from the New York Attorney General resulted in the resig-
nation of the charity's chief executive officer, a decision to partici-
pate in the computer database, a recommitment of funds for direct 
assistance to victims, and a frenzied public relations campaign to 
repair the charity's tattered image.ll7 
Some religious organizations have been rocked by scandals 
as well. Pat Robertson was accused of improperly using funds from 
his Christian Broadcast Network to promote his 1988 bid for the 
presidency.1I8 Jim and Tammy Bakker were ordered to repay the 
PTL Club for several million dollars they misappropriated and 
spent on excessive saiaries.l I9 The Christian Science Church lost 
$325 million in a misguided attempt to diversify, prompting calls 
for the board's resignation.l20 Given that most nonprofits enjoy ex-
emption from federal and state income and other taxes, and given 
that they are the recipients of vast sums of monetary donations and 
volunteer services, pressure has mounted on nonprofits to justify 
their favored status in light of these and other serious fiduciary 
breaches. I2I 
115. Katharine Q. Seelye & Diana B. Henriques, A Nation Challenged: The Charity; Red 
Cross President Quits, Saying that the Board Left Her No Other Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 
2001, at B9; Lena H. Sun, Red Cross to Give All Funds to Victims; Contrite Charity Changes 
Course on Sept. 11 Donations, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2001, at AI. 
116. David Barstow & Diana B. Henriques, A Nation Challenged: The Charities; Charity 
Abundant, But So Is Red Tape, After Terror Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2001, at AI. 
117. David France & David Noonan, Blood and Money, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 17, 2001, at 52,53; 
Sun, supra note 115, at AI. 
118. Nina J. Crimm, Why All Is Not Quiet on the 'Home Front' for Charitable Organizations, 
29 N.M. L. REV. 1, 26 (1999). 
119. In re Heritage Vill. Church & Missionary Fellowship, 92 B.R. 1000, 1010-11, 1016-22 
(Bankr. D.S.C. 1988). 
120. Regina E. Herzlinger, Effective Oversight: A Guide for Nonprofit Directors, in 
NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE: THE EXECUTIVE'S GUIDE, supra note 103, at 13, 13. 
121. Crimm, supra note 118, at 1-4. Two other constituencies challenging the favored status 
of nonprofits are state and local governments and small businesses. Local governments are look-
ing at nonprofits as potential revenue sources and are considering eliminating their exemptions 
from a variety of taxes. Id. at 2-3. Also, small businesses who often compete directly with non-
profits for customers are also seeking to revoke some of the tax advantages of nonprofit status. 
To PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, 
supra note 93, at 4. 
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2. Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors 
Most nonprofits organize under state law as corporations in 
order to gain the benefits of corporate status, such as limited liabil-
ity and flexible governance.122 Like for-profit corporations, charita-
ble corporations are typically governed by a board of directors and 
managed on a day-to-day basis by officers. 123 In addition, the twin 
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty that govern for-profit corporate 
decisionmakers also govern nonprofit corporate decisionmakers. 124 
The duty of care concerns director and officer competence. 125 
Pursuant to the duty of care, directors and officers must act (1) in 
good faith; (2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like 
position would exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) in a 
manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interest of 
122. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 110, at 60, 63. The corporate form is also preferred be-
cause it is recognized as an acceptable legal form by the IRS for tax-exempt status. [d. at 60. The 
state laws governing the formation of nonprofit corporations vary widely. [d. at 65-66. For in-
stance, some states set up specific categories of nonprofits, and others subsume nonprofits into 
their general corporate law. [d. The nondistribution constraint, however, remains the defining 
feature of nonprofits. [d. at 63. 
123. All boards, both for-profit and nonprofit, have six principal purposes: 
(1) to select, encourage, advise, evaluate and, if need be, replace the chief ex-
ecutive officer; (2) to review and adopt long-term strategic directions and to ap-
prove specific objectives, financial and other, such as reviewing the basic mis-
sion of the organization in light of changed circumstances; (3) to ensure to the 
extent possible that the necessary resources, including human resources, will 
be available to pursue the strategies and achieve the organization's objectives; 
(4) to monitor the performance of management; (5) to ensure that the organiza-
tion operates responsibly as well as effectively; and (6) to nominate suitable 
candidates for election to the board, and to establish and carry out an effective 
system of governance at the board level, including evaluation of board perform-
ance. 
[d. at 145-46. 
124. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT ("RMNCA") introductory cmt. at xxxv (1987). 
Fiduciary duties are governed by state law. In general, the fiduciary duties of nonprofits are 
derived from corporate principles rather than trust principles. GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF 
NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS 21 (George W. Overton ed., 1993) ("The Duties of Care and Loyalty 
are the common terms for the standards which guide all actions a director takes. These stan-
dards are derived from a century of litigation principally involving business corporations and are 
equally applicable to nonprofit corporations."); Brody, supra note 112, at 1426-27. 
However, some have argued that these corporate doctrines do not fit the nonprofit world. See, 
e.g., Avner Ben-Ner, Who Benefits from the Nonprofit Sector? Reforming Law and Public Policy 
Towards Nonprofit Organizations, 104 YALE L.J. 731, 756 (1994). This is because for-profit board 
members have a defined goal of maximizing shareholder profits, whereas in the nonprofit world, 
it is far less clear "whose objectives they should pursue [and] whom they should represent." [d. at 
756-57. 
125. RMNCA, supra note 124, §§ 8.30, 8.42 & cmts. These fiduciary duties also apply to offi-
cers, those individuals who carry out the day-to-day missions of the organization. [d. § 8.42 & 
cmt. 
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the corporation. 126 A director "need not exhaustively research every 
issue personally" to meet this standard. 127 Rather, directors may 
rely on information, opinions, reports, or statements of other board 
members, employees, and legal counsel as long as the directors be-
lieve the source to be reliable and competent.l28 Moreover, directors 
are protected from honest mistakes of judgment. Pursuant to the 
business judgment rule (sometimes called the best judgment rule in 
the nonprofit context), directors are protected from liability for de-
cisions that are rational, without a conflict of interest, and rea-
sonably informed. 129 As a result, "[i]f a director acts in good faith, 
with the requisite degree of care, and within her authority, a court 
will not review the action, even if it proves disastrous to the organi-
zation."130 Thus, the duty of care encourages attention to decision-
making processes, but it does nothing to ensure the substantive 
quality of the resulting decision. While it may serve to check seri-
ous financial abuses such as improper loans or distribution of cor-
porate assets,l3l it has little role in ensuring that the delivery of 
social services is held to any measurable quality standard or that 
employee abuses do not occur.l32 Moreover, in the nonprofit context, 
courts apply the standard with particular leniency, fearing that too 
tough a standard will deter volunteers from serving on nonprofit 
boards. 133 
The duty of loyalty is designed to ensure that directors serve 
the interests of the organization rather than personal or other in-
126. Id. § 8.30. The comment notes that directors of a nonprofit organization have different 
goals and resources than directors of a business corporation. Id. § 8.30 cmt. Thus, the drafters 
intend that the fiduciary duties imposed on nonprofit directors be applied in a manner that con-
siders the differences between non profits and business corporations as well as the variations 
within the nonprofit sector. Id. 
127. DANIEL L. KURTZ, BOARD LlABiLlTY: GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 29 (1988). 
128. RMNCA, supra note 124, § 8.30. 
129. Id. § 8.30 cmt. The business judgment rule thus supposedly "encourages rational risk 
taking and innovation, limits litigation and unfair exposure, encourages service by quality direc-
tors, and limits judicial intrusiveness." Goldschmid, supra note 111, at 644. The business judg-
ment rule does not apply to instances involving bad faith, criminal activity, fraud, or willful and 
wanton misconduct. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 110, at 178. 
130. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ; supra note 110, at 155. The authors call the duty of care standard 
"quite low," and note that it makes "liability improbable except in the most egregious cases such 
as improper loans or distribution of corporate assets." Id. at 179. However, Harvey Goldschmid 
argues not that the standards are low, but rather that enforcement efforts are meager. Gold-
schmid, supra note 111, at 643. Enforcement is discussed infra at notes 141-55 and accompany-
ing text. 
131. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 110, at 179. 
132. In fact, directors are not personally liable for their agents' acts or omissions. GUIDEBOOK 
FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, supra note 124, at 24-25. 
133. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 110, at 161. Moreover, many nonprofit board members 
are inattentive and play only a figurehead role in management. Id. at 180. 
828 VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 54:799 
terests. It requires directors to avoid obtaining more favorable fi-
nancial benefits than they would in an open market or as against 
competitors134 and from usurping corporate opportunities. 135 Never-
theless, directors may engage in self-interested or conflict of inter-
est transactions if the transaction is fair, the conflict is disclosed to 
other board members, and the board approves the transaction upon 
a "reasonable belief' of its fairness. However, "given the structure 
of many charitable boards and the lack of attentiveness of the direc-
tors, disinterested directors may be unlikely to challenge the inter-
ested director's characterization that the transaction is fair."136 In 
addition, directors can reasonably believe that a conflict of interest 
transaction is fair without subjecting it to detailed scrutiny and 
without choosing instead to approve a superior option. 137 As with 
the duty of care, the duty of loyalty focuses on ensuring 
accountability to the nonprofits' bottom line. It does little to prevent 
poor performance of the nonprofits' goals and mission. 
The duty of obedience is a third fiduciary duty, related to the 
duty of care, which has occasionally arisen in connection with non-
profits. It requires directors to abide by the purposes and powers of 
the charity as expressed in its organizing documents, such as the 
articles of incorporation.138 Directors cannot act outside of the or-
ganization's permissible purposes; that is, they cannot engage in 
ultra vires acts. This protects donors from unforeseen uses of con-
tributed donations, and thus, limits how the purposes of the 
organization can be modified.139 Such a duty would ensure that 
directors of a social services nonprofit devoted to homeless ness 
could not simply change its mission to serving another population 
without notifying the appropriate state officials and amending its 
organizational documents. Yet the duty does not address the means 
by which the nonprofit delivers services that are within the broad 
scope of its defined purposes. Thus, from a programmatic perspec-
tive, this doctrine has limit'ed utility in increasing accountability. 
In sum, nonprofit corporate management has vast discretion to 
134. Id. at 190. 
135. Id. at 217. 
136. Gary, supra note 111, at 614. 
137.Id. 
138. Jaclyn A. Cherry, Update: The Current State of Nonprofit Director Liability, 37 DUQ. L. 
REV. 557, 562 (1999). 
139.Id. 
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structure and manage operations without independent oversight, 
well above and beyond that allowed in administrative law. 140 
3. Enforcement of Nonprofit Director Fiduciary Duties 
Regardless of the standards set by nonprofit fiduciary duties, 
these duties have only a limited role in policing charitable organi-
zations for abuses because they are rarely enforced. Historically, 
state attorneys general have' been responsible for monitoring chari-
table organizations. 141 In all states, the attorney general has the 
authority to bring civil actions "to remove directors and officers for 
self-dealing, waste, diversion of a charitable organization's assets, 
or other breaches of fiduciary duty."142 However, personnel and 
budgetary constraints have limited the effectiveness of the attor-
neys general, as have informational deficiencies, the lack of public 
complaints, and political pressures to focus on more "politically re-
munerative areas of law enforcement."143 Even if they were well 
staffed and funded, the, attorneys general have no power or ability 
to exercise day-to-day control over charitable organizations, or to 
question their contractual undertakings. 144 
Directors are the only group other than the attorneys gen-
eral with acknowledged standing to challenge fiduciary abuses-yet 
they are usually reluctant to sue one another.145 In some states, 
members of nonprofits have the right to bring a derivative suit to 
enforce the purposes of the organization,146 but most nonprofits do 
not have members; rather, they have self-perpetuating boards. 
140. "There is no general corporate law standard for evaluating whether corporate action is 
in the puhlic interest the way that agency action is tested under the arbitrary and capricious 
standards." Beerman, supra note 89, at 180. "[T]he level of deference in administrative law does 
not approach the level of deference afforded directors' decisions in corporate law." [d. at 181. 
141. Mary Grace Blasko et al:, Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 
37, 38 (1993). "State enforcement of charities is based upon the role of the Crown (or, in America, 
the state) as parens patriae, imposing an exclusive duty to enforce charitable trusts." [d. at 40. 
142. Crimm, supra note 118, at 2 n.3. 
143. [d. at 24-25; Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organiza-
tions, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 227, 251. 
144. Blasko et aI., supra note 141, at 47; Manne, supra note 143, at 251. Some states allow 
relator actions, in which persons can proceed in the name of the attorney general with the attor-
ney general's permission. Blasko et aI., supra note 141, at 49. The relators bear the costs of the 
proceeding while the attorney general retains control of the action. [d. Not surprisingly, such 
actions are rare. Manne, supra note 143, at 250. 
145. Gary, supra note 111, at 625. 
146. The RMNCA provides that directors may bring derivative suits. RMNCA, supra note 
124, § 6.30: In addition, "any member or members having five percent or more of the voting 
power or ... fifty members, whichever is less," may also bring a derivative suit. [d. "Derivative 
suits allow a member to protect these interests [in the purposes of the corporation as set forth in 
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As for beneficiaries, courts rarely grant them standing to 
sue, because of concerns over charities having to fend off expensive 
and vexatious litigation. 147 There have been a few exceptions to this 
no standing rule in cases where the courts have found beneficiaries 
to have "special interests."148 These special interests are most likely 
to be found in cases complaining of extraordinary acts, where there 
is the presence of fraud or misconduct by directors, and in jurisdic-
tions with minimal attorney general oversight.149 Yet a court is 
unlikely to find that day-to-day quality-of-service issues amount to 
extraordinary acts implicating fraud. Rather, extraordinary acts 
generally arise only with violations of a charity's express philan-
thropic purpose. 150 Moreover, the remedy in such cases is a benefit 
to the charity itself, and not monetary damages to the beneficiaries. 
Thus, the limited standing rules for charities and the lack of effec-
tive state enforcement mean that "the law plays little role, other 
than aspirational, in assuring accountability in the nonprofit sec-
tor."151 
Clearly, the fiduciary standards governing nonprofits, devel-
oped in the for-profit realm, are not an effective constraint. In for-
profit corporations, directors are judged by their ability to maximize 
shareholder profits. There are thus observable yardsticks by which 
to evaluate the effectiveness of directors' decisions. Moreover, vari-
ous forces keep for-profit directors focused on their mission, includ-
its charterJ and to enforce the charity's purpose." Blasko et ai., supra note 141, at 55. For in-
stance, in Cross v. Midtown Club, Inc., the court ruled that members of a nonprofit club had 
standing to sue the club over its refusal to admit women, in violation of its charter. 365 A.2d 
1227, 1230 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1976). However, the right to bring derivative suits may be limited 
in case of religious organizations. RMNCA, supra note 124, § 6.30 cmt. 8. 
147. Blasko et ai., supra note 141, at 42. 
148. Compare Hooker v. Edes Home, 579 A.2d 608, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that resi-
dents of free home for elderly indigent widows were members of identifiable beneficiary class 
with standing to challenge decision of trustees to close home), with Russell v. Yale Univ., 737 
A.2d 941, 946 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that alumni donors and students did not have 
standing to contest reorganization of Yale's divinity school). 
149. Blasko et ai., supra note 141, at 61-78. 
150. See, e.g., Alco Gravure, Inc. v. Knapp Found., 479 N.E.2d 752, 755-56 (N.Y. 1985) (hold-
ing that employees had standing to challenge drastic change in the nature of a foundation whose 
original purpose was to aid them); Valley Forge Historical Soc'y v. Wash. Mem'l Chapel, 426 A.2d 
1123, 1127-28 (Pa. 1981) (holding that historical society had standing to challenge trustee's at-
tempt to evict them in alleged violation of trust instrument). 
151. Goldschmid, supra note 111, at 632; see also Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: 
The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. 
L. REV. 457, 467 (1996) ("[FJiduciary duty is really a legal obligation without a legal sanction."). 
Rob Atkinson points out that the degree to which standing rules to sue charities should expand 
hinges on one's theory of the purposes of charities and what one wants them to be. Rob Atkinson, 
Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of Charitable Fiduciaries?, 23 J. CORP. 
L. 655 (1998). 
2002] "CHARITABLE CHOICE" 831 
ing the threat of shareholder derivative suits, the easy public access 
to corporate information under the securities reporting laws,152 
global competition, increased activity by institutional investors, 
financial press coverage, and hostile takeover attempts. 153 By con-
trast, in the nonprofit sector, the organization's goals are more 
amorphous, and directors are accountable to a broader set of con-
stituencies, including the public, members, donors, customers, 
beneficiaries, and other directors. 154 Yet these constituents gener-
ally lack the ability or incentive to enforce the fiduciary duties of 
directors and officers. Simply put, in the nonprofit realm, there is 
"no clear category of principals" and thus the nonprofit firm, as the 
agent, has no clear entity to whom it owes accountability.155 
This is not to say that for-profit entities provide greater ac-
countability to beneficiaries in social service programs. They do not. 
For the reasons noted above, in for-profit firms there is adequate 
enforcement of fiduciary duties vis-a.-vis profit maximization goals. 
However, social service beneficiaries of for-profit firms have no 
standing to enforce these fiduciary duties (even if those duties ap-
plied for their benefit, which they largely do not), and unlike most 
consumers, they cannot pick up and take their money elsewhere. 
While corporate management may consider the interests of indi-
viduals affected by corporate decisions, "they owe fiduciary duties of 
care and loyalty only to shareholders."156 Moreover, the profit-
maximization goal is often inconsistent with the goals of social ser-
vice programs, where costs are often high while budgets are low.157 
Thus, the shareholder profit-maximization goal is often inconsistent 
with the goals of social service programs, but the former goal must 
take precedence under corporate law. 
152. Cherry, supra note 138, at 571. 
153. Ben-Ner, supra note 124, at 754; Gary, supra note 111, at 595-96; Goldschmid, supra 
note 111, at 636; Manne, supra note 143, at 238. 
154. Manne, supra note 143, at 227-28. In the nonprofit world, "[t]here is no market for cor-
porate control; there are no proxy battles, no shareholder derivative suits, and there is very little 
market competition." Id. at 228. 
155. Brody, supra note 151, at 465. 
156. Cheryl L. Wade, For-Profit Corporations that Perform Public Functions: Politics, Profit, 
and Poverty, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 323, 324 (1999). She notes that while several states have en-
acted corporate constituency statutes that allow corporate decisionmakers to consider nonshare-
holder interests affected when a takeover is threatened, these statutes do not cover social service 
beneficiaries. Id. at 334-35, 350-51. Rather, they are focused on employees, creditors, and other 
constituencies. Id. 
157. Aman, supra note 90, at 102 ("[T]here will be problems of translation when one balances 
the needs of our poorest individuals with the efficiency concerns of a private firm whose primary 
task is to determine the eligibility of welfare applicants as efficiently as possible and within the 
constraints of a relatively small budget."); see also Wade, supra note 156, at 327-30 (explaining 
the incompatibility between maximizing shareholder profits and serving poor populations). 
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4. Open Records Requirements Applicable to Nonprofits 
Nonprofits have a duty to keep accurate financial records 
and share them with the public. Any tax-exempt charity with an-
nual gross receipts normally over $25,000 is required to file an an-
nual financial disclosure form, called a Form 990, with the IRS.15s 
Form 990 requests information concerning the organization's ex-
empt activities, its income-producing activities, its payments, gross 
income, expenses, disbursements for exempt purposes, assets and 
liabilities, net worth, contributions, and compensation paid to cer-
tain employees.159 State agencies also require various tax reports, 
which usually entail attaching a copy of Form 990, and failure to 
file these reports is subject to a penalty.160 
Yet the use of Form 990 as an accountability tool is limited. 
The form asks for financial data and responses to yes or no ques-
tions that are targeted at ensuring compliance with the tax-exempt 
laws. However, "when trying to measure or evaluate how successful 
an organization has been in achieving its substantive program 
goals, it is doubtful whether any kind of a report which relies on 
text can be useful."16I Moreover, even if Form 990 can alert officials 
of financial wrongdoing, neither the state iIor federal enforcement 
agencies have the resources to fully analyze these filings to identify 
abuses.162 At most, Form 990 can be helpful when independent 
sources call official attention to alleged abuses.163 Thus, the open 
records requirements may put an interested person in a position to 
spot abuses and, report them to officials, but it is unlikely that so-
cial service beneficiaries would have the interest, background, or 
ability to analyze the reports to spot abuses in the first place. Bene-
ficiaries would likely be more interested in obtaining quality ser-
158. LR.C. § 6033(a) (1994); Internal Revenue Service, 2001 Instructions for Form 990 and 
Form 990·EZ, at http://www.irs.gov. 
159. Internal Revenue Service, 2001 Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income 
Tax, at http://www.irs.gov. The charity must make its three most recent Form 990s, along with 
its tax· exempt application, available to anyone requesting the information. 26 C.F.R. § 
301.6104(d)·1 (2001). 
160. Peter Swords, The Form 990 as an Accountability Tool for 501(c)(3) Nonprofits, 51 TAX 
LAw. 571, 576·78 (1998). 
161. Id. at 575. Burton Weisbrod proposes that the form eliminate questions that have 
proven to be of little use and focus instead on "outputs" to aid in assessment of nonprofits' effi· 
ciency and social contribution. Burton A. Weisbrod, Conclusions and Public-Policy Issues: Com-
mercialism and the Road Ahead, in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 93, at 287, 301-02. 
162. Swords, supra note 160, at 578-79. 
163. Id. at 578. 
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vices than in monitoring financial dealings between the organiza-
tion and its insiders, and federal tax laws give them no standing to 
challenge those aspects of an organization's program. 
5. Federal Fiduciary Requirements Imposed on Nonprofits 
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") also 
imposes fiduciary duties on board members, and thus the IRS plays 
a role in policing self-dealing in charitable organizations. To qualify 
for tax exemption, an organization must be organized and operated 
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, educational, or other 
purposes specified in the IRC.164 Under the IRC, a 501(c)(3) organi-
zation is absolutely banned from allowing net earnings to inure to 
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.I65 Accordingly, 
excessive salaries or self-dealing transactions can result in the IRS 
revoking an organization's tax-exempt status. This remedy, how-
ever, is rarely imposed for fear of penalizing an entire organization 
for the misdeeds of a single actor. 166 
In 1996, in an effort to modify this extreme penalty, Con-
gress enacted an "intermediate sanction" scheme that imposes an 
excise tax penalty on "excess benefit transactions" between the ex-
empt organization and a "disqualified person," or insider. 167 A "dis-
qualified person" is someone in a position to exercise substantial 
influence over the affairs of the organization,168 and an excess bene-
fit transaction is one in which the value of the economic benefit con-
ferred exceeds the value of the consideration received. Under this 
scheme, the penalty starts at twenty-five percent of the excess 
benefit and falls on the insider, rather than the organization.169 
Thus, the intermediate sanctions regime attempts to ensure that 
the exempt organization's assets are used for public purposes 
rather than for private benefits, but without the harsh penalty of 
164. I.R.C. § 501 (1994). 
165. Id. § 501(c)(3); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a), (b), (c) (2001). Section 501(c)(3) or-
ganizations are also limited in the amount of lobbying they can conduct, and they are barred 
from participating in political campaigns. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
166. Gary, supra note Ill, at 630. 
167. I.R.C. § 4958(a), (c) (1994). 
168. The "substantial influence" category is potentially broad and includes persons without 
formal titles within the organization. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 110, at 513. 
169. Violations that are not remedied result in increased penalties of 200% of the excess 
benefit. I.R.C. § 4958(b). Managers who knowingly permit the organization to engage in an ex-
cess benefit transaction face lesser penalties. Id. § 4958(a)(2), (d)(2). The penalty is a tax equal to 
ten percent of the excess benefit, with the tax capped at $10,000. 
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revocation.170 Again, however, this scheme is aimed at protecting 
the charity from unscrupulous insiders and bad deals, but it plays 
scant role in policing the substantive work of the charity. 
6. Tort Immunities of Nonprofits and Their Agents 
Part of organizational accountability derives from an entity's 
exposure to liability for the negligence or wrongdoing of its agents. 
Thus, tort liability plays a role in deterring firms from taking ac-
tions that create costlier risks than benefits.171 However, because 
nonprofits generally receive preferential treatment in the area of 
tort liability, they may be underdeterred from engaging in risky 
behavior. This could affect social service beneficiaries in several 
ways. Beneficiaries are relying on nonprofits to provide them with 
services ranging from job training to addiction counseling to life 
skills trainingJ72 Given the intense interpersonal aspects of these 
services, beneficiaries could be subject not only to garden variety 
personal injuries sustained from unsafe premises, but also to torts 
such as negligent counseling, infliction of emotional distress, and 
defamation. 
Courts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
awarded charities full immunity from tort liability for the acts of 
their members, directors, or employees.173 However, by the 1940s, 
courts were quickly eroding the charitable immunity doctrine in 
order to broaden tort recovery to compensate victims for harm.174 By 
170. As a result, revocation is likely only in the extreme circumstance in which the organiza-
tion can no longer be considered charitable. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note no, at 513. 
171. See Charles Robert Tremper, Compensation for Harm from Charitable Activity, 76 
CORNELL L. REV. 401, 425 (1991). Tort law serves other purposes as well. "Tort liability rules 
seek to deter injurious behavior, compensate victims, and spread an activity's losses among the 
beneficiaries of that activity. In addition, the tort system manifests societal judgments about the 
value of various types of activity, the acceptability of causing injury, and the nature of obliga-
tions to assist those who suffer harm, thereby manifesting fundamental principles of justice." Id. 
at 422-23. 
172. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
173. There were four main rationales for this charitable immunity. Courts reasoned that (1) 
applying charitable trust assets to damage awards would divert them from the donor's purposes; 
(2) respondeat superior should not apply because charities did not profit from their employees' 
work; (3) charitable beneficiaries assumed the risk of harm because they did not pay considera-
tion for services received; and (4) imposing liability on charities could result in their bankruptcy 
and a loss of donors and volunteers. Paul T. O'Neill, Charitable Immunity: The Time to End 
Laissez-Faire Health Care in Massachusetts Has Come, 82 MAss. L. REV. 223, 227-30 (1997). 
174. Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations: Special Treatment and Tort Law, 
lO5 HARV. L. REV. 1581, 1680 (1992) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]. The wall began to 
crumble with the decision in President of Georgetown College v. Hughes, in which the court re-
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the 1980s, the doctrine was either fully or partially abolished in 
almost every state, either by case law or by statute.175 Yet the pen-
dulum soon began to swing back towards providing some protection 
for charities, because of a series of large monetary judgments 
awarded against some charities,176 the lack of available insurance 
liability coverage,177 and the increase in personal liability for those 
working in the nonprofit sector.178 
The resulting protections vary widely from state to state. To 
protect organizations, several states provide partial immunity or 
limited liability for charitable organizations through statutory 
damage caps, caps on recovery to insurance coverage limits, or 
complete protection of certain assets. A few states have even re-
tained some form of common law charitable immunity for organiza-
tions. To protect individuals, most states have enacted legislation 
that protects a variety of charitable actors, such as volunteers and 
unpaid directors, and even employees.179 In general, these statutes 
protect charitable actors from personal liability for negligent acts, 
but do not immunize them for liability for actions which are "willful 
and wanton," ultra vires, or taken in bad faith.180 In light of the 
lack of state uniformity, Congress passed the Federal Volunteer 
Protection Act of 1997 ("FVPA").181 This Act protects charitable vol-
jected the charitable immunity of a hospital sued for negligence of a hospital employee. 130 F.2d 
810, 823-25 (D.C. Cir. 1942). 
175. Developments in the Law, supra note 174, at 1680. 
176. See, e.g., Daniel L. Kurtz, Protecting Your Volunteer: The Efficacy of Volunteer Protec-
tion Statutes and Other Liability Limiting Devices, in NOT-FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: THE 
CHALLENGE OF GOVERNANCE IN AN ERA OF RETRENCHMENT 263, 269 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, 
1992), WL C726 ALI-ABA 263 (citing Thomas Heath, $45,000 Award to Molested Va. Youth 
Hailed as Victory by Scouts, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1989, at D1; Lisa Green Markoff, A Volunteer's 
Thankless Task, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 19, 1988, at 1; Gary Taylor, Goodwill Must Pay $5M in Murder 
by Parolee-Employee, NAT'L L.J., June 8, 1987, at 22.) 
177. David O. Weber, A Thousand Points of Fright?, INS. REV., Feb. 1991, at 40, 40 (stating 
that between 1984 and 1989 "the cost of liability coverage for local [little league] programs shot 
up from $75 to $795 a year"). 
178. Developments in the Law, supra note 174, at 1680-82. 
179. For statutes that cover employees, see, for example, D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-301.114(b) 
(2001) (placing a statutory limit on employees' personal liability arising from acts or omissions in 
providing services or performing duties on behalf of a nonprofit corporation); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
2A:53A-7 (West 1999); and TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 84.002(7) (Vernon 1997) (estab-
lishing that charitable immunity extends to employees). 
180. Kurtz, supra note 176, at 270-71. However, these laws are complex, confusing, and there 
is a paucity of cases interpreting them. As a result, this patchwork of protections "creates grave 
uncertainty for insurance underwriters, ... and, therefore, vitiat[es] the certainty of reduced 
liability that leads to reduced rates and wider availability of D&O insurance." Id. at 289. For a 
discussion of the various state laws, see id. at 279-89. 
181. Kenneth W. Biedzynski, The Federal Volunteer Protection Act: Does Congress Want to 
Play Ball?, 23 SETON HALL LEGlS. J. 319, 335 (1999) (discussing legislative history of the Act). 
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unteers from liability "for harm caused by an act or omission of the 
volunteer on behalf of the organization or entity."182 
The various immunities that result from state and federal 
law encourage volunteerism, a worthy goal, but put the costs of neg-
ligent conduct on the victims of negligent behavior. Because chari-
table organizations do not have to internalize certain accident costs, 
they have less incentive than for-profit entities to prevent or moni-
tor negligent behavior.l83 Some might argue that having victims 
carry the costs of negligence is balanced by the fact that the chari-
table entity then has more resources available to assist other bene-
ficiaries. Yet the justifications for protecting charities are arguably 
lessened in the government-contracting arena where charities are 
acting in a quasi-commercial capacity and competing in an open 
market with governmental and for-profit entities. From the victims' 
perspective, they have little or no choice as to what type of entity 
delivers the needed services. While it is outside the scope of this 
Article to address what the tort liability rules should be in this con-
text-from full tort liability to full immunity to something in be-
tween184-it is important to note that tort law does treat nonprofits 
differently. This difference affects accountability and suggests that 
preventative measures need to be implemented to counterbalance 
the preferential treatment afforded to nonprofits. 
C. Religious Organizations and Accountability 
There are over 300,000 religious congregations in the United 
States,185 almost all of which are organized as nonprofit corpora-
182. 42 U.S.C. §§ 14503-14505 (Supp. IV 1998). Volunteers are entitled to protection if the 
following conditions are met: (1) "the volunteer was acting within the scope" of their responsibili-
ties; (2) "the volunteer was properly licensed ... by the appropriate authorities for the activities" 
in the state where the harm occurred; (3) the injury "was not caused by willful or criminal mis-
conduct"; and (4) the volunteer was not operating a motor vehicle or vehicle required by State 
law to carry insurance. [d. § 14503. The Act does not protect volunteers from liability for various 
crimes, including hate crimes, civil rights violations, and crimes of violence. [d. § 14503(a)(3), (f). 
Although the FVPA preempts inconsistent state law, it allows states to provide additional pro-
tection from liability for volunteers, and also permits states to opt out of the scheme altogether. 
[d. § 14502. 
183. Tremper, supra note 171, at 403-04 ("Although the approach serves the goals of reduc-
ing payments, increasing certainty, and encouraging settlements, the resultant denial of recov-
ery to negligently injured individuals cannot be justified on any principled basis."). 
184. See id. at 444-66. He advocates a system in which tort recovery would become a backup 
for individuals who would not receive compensation from first-party insurance or a proposed 
governmental assistance program. 
185. Jeff E. Biddle, Religious Organizations, in WHO BENEFITS FROM THE NONPROFIT 
SECTOR? 92, 92 (Charles T. Clotfelter ed., 1992). There are more than one thousand religious 
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tions. 186 Together, they collect and spend more than fifty billion dol-
lars each year. 187 Religious organizations have a long history of pro-
viding social services in this country, often working side by side 
with government. "Typically, religiously motivated persons have 
been the first into areas of societal need. Secular agencies and gov-
ernment have followed."188 As a subset of nonprofits, religious or-
ganizations generally share the same fiduciary obligations and im-
munities as other charitable organizations. However, lawmakers 
have long been wary of regulating religious organizations for fear of 
running afoul of the First Amendment's proscription on excessive 
entanglement with religion. 189 As a result, religious organizations 
have freedoms from regulation and, liability above and beyond that 
of other charitable organizations. This section discusses the ac-
countability doctrines that govern religious organizations. 
1. Fiduciary Duties Applicable to Religious Organizations 
The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act ("RMNCA") 
recognizes three types of nonprofit organizations: public benefit 
(corporations formed for charitable or public purposes), mutual 
benefit (member-oriented corporations such as social clubs and 
trade associations), and religious (operating primarily or exclu-
denominations in the United States. See 1 WILLIAM W. BASSE'IT, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND 
THE LAw, at xi (1999). 
186. Eighty·seven percent of religious organizations organize in the nonprofit corporate form. 
Patty Gerstenblith, Associational Structures of Religious Organizations, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
439, 441·42. Most churches incorporate for advantages of limited liability, organizational conti· 
nuity, and administrative convenience. Id. at 444; Catherine M. Knight, Comment, Must God 
Regulate Religious Corporations? A Proposal for Reform of the Religious Corporation Provisions 
of the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, 42 EMORY L.J. 721, 724 (1993). However, the 
business model of members and a board of directors does not necessarily fit the structural form of 
religious denominations. 1 BASSE'IT, supra note 185, § 1:1; Knight, supra, at 725-27 (describing 
different denominational forms of church governance). Other organizational forms a church 
might choose include an unincorporated association, a trust or foundation, a religious corpora-
tion, a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation, or a nonprofit charitable organization. 1 BASSE'IT, 
supra note 185, § 3:7. 
187. Biddle, supra note 185, at 92, 93. They receive the largest share of Americans' annual 
donations of money and volunteer labor. Ben-Ner, supra note 124, at 742-43. 
188. MONSMA, supra note 46, at 8. 
189. GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, supra note 124, at 14 ("The 
directors of religious corporations are generally subject to the foregoing considerations [concern-
ing accountability]. However, because American constitutional law generally restricts the role of 
government in dealing with religious corporations to a minimum enforcement of basic fiscal 
integrity, oversight is more limited, lest the government intrude on freedom of religion."); 
HOPKINS, supra note 108, § 8.1. 
838 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:799 
sively for religious purposes).190 Although directors and officers of 
religious organizations share the same fiduciary duties as their 
counterparts in other nonprofit corporations, the RMNCA provides 
religious organizations with greater flexibility in structure and op-
eration. 191 The comment explains, "By applying fewer rules to reli-
gious corporations, ... and limiting the attorney general's jurisdic-
tion, the Revised Act recognizes the need to avoid unconstitutional 
intrusions into the activities of religious corporations."192 Thus, for 
instance, religious organizations can remove members and directors 
with greater ease than can other nonprofits. 193 Also, with regard to 
open records, religious organizations need not provide members 
with rights to inspect membership lists or receive financial state-
ments. 194 
Given this framework, it is not surprising that external 
oversight of religious nonprofits is less rigorous than the already 
minimal oversight of other nonprofits. For instance, under the 
RMNCA, provisions allowing courts to appoint receivers and custo-
dians to dissolve nonprofits do not apply to religious organizations, 
nor do requirements that dissolving nonprofits report the names 
and addresses of individuals receiving assets to the attorney gen-
eral. The RMNCA also provides that, unlike other nonprofits, reli-
gious organizations need not notify the attorney general of any de-
rivative suits-and it cautions that constitutional provisions may in 
fact prevent courts from considering derivative suits brought on 
behalf of religious organizations in the first place. In sum, religious 
organizations have greater flexibility in structuring their form than 
do other nonprofits and less oversight from external bodies. 195 Much 
190. RMNCA, supra note 124, at xxii· xxix. AB of 1999, the RMNCA had been adopted by 
eight states, although many other states have assumed sections of the Act into their own non· 
profit corporations statutes. 1 BASSETI', supra note 185, § 3:7 & n.4. 
191. RMNCA, supra note 124, at xxx. 
192. [d. The same corporate flexibility for churches is usually found even in those states not 
using the RMNCA. Gerstenblith, supra note 186, at 447·60. It is not clear, however, that the 
Constitution actually mandates such preferential treatment. Knight, supra note 186, at 742·45. 
193. Under the RMNCA, requirements imposing fair procedures for terminating members 
are not applicable to religious organizations, and religious groups can opt out of provisions relat· 
ing to the removal of directors, including provisions allowing for court removal of directors under 
certain circumstances. RMNCA, supra note 124, §§ 8.08, 8.10. In addition, religious organiza· 
tions can define the procedures for how members call special meetings, whereas other nonprofits 
must caIl a special meeting upon the written demand of at least five percent of the voting power 
of any corporation. [d. § 7.02(a)(2). 
194. [d. § 7.20(f). 
195. In addition, religious organizations have various privileges at common law and by stat-
ute, for instance: (1) religion enjoys the favor of tbe law in interpreting wills and trusts contain-
ing bequests of private money property to charity; (2) clergy are exempt from conscription and 
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of this flexibility works to the advantage of the organization as op-
posed to its constituents. For members, who have the freedom to 
move to a new congregation, the organizational protections for 
churches may be harmless. But for social service beneficiaries, 
these protections further hinder accountability. 
2. Federal Oversight of Nonprofit Religious Organizations 
The IRC exempts from taxation corporations "organized and 
operated exclusively for religious ... purposes."196 Corporations 
within this category include churchesI97 and "conventions or asso-
ciations of churches,"198 "integrated auxiliaries of churches,"199 and 
the "exclusively religious activities" of religious orders.20o As with 
other 501(c)(3) charitable organizations, contributions to churches 
are deductible from federal income taxes.20l Yet churches and their 
integrated auxiliaries need not file an application for determination 
of tax-exempt status from the IRS to claim their exemption or to 
accept deductible donations. 202 Rather, they are presumed to be ex-
their work is exempt from government regulation such as the National Labor Relations Act; (3) 
"canvassing and door· to-door solicitation of contributions for religious societies cannot be sub-
jected to state discretionary licensing requirements, but ... [can] only be regulated as to time, 
manner, and place"; and (4) "conscience clauses to provide ethical accommodations are inserted 
into state and federal funding programs," and religious exceptions are carved out of civil rights 
legislation. See 1 BASSETI', supra noto 185, § 1:10. 
196. l.R.C. § 501(a), (c)(3) (1994). 
197. The Internal Revenue Code does not define the terms "religion" or "church." As the Su-
preme Court has stated, "[T]he great diversity in church structure and organization among reli-
gious groups in this country ... makes it impossible, as Congress perceived, to lay down a single 
rule to govern all church-related organizations." St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 
South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 782 n.12 (1981). However, the IRS looks at fourteen criteria, none of 
which are controlling, to determine whether an entity qualifies as a church: (1) a distinct legal 
existence; (2) a recognized creed and form of worship; (3) a definite and distinct ecclesiastical 
government; (4) a formal code of doctrine and discipline; (5) a distinct religious history; (6) a 
membership not associated with any other church or denomination; (7) an organization of or-
dained ministers; (8) ordained ministers selected after completing prescribed studies; (9) a litera-
ture of its own; (10) established places of worship; (11) religious congregations; (12) regular wor-
ship services; (13) Sunday schools for religious instruction of the young; and (14) schools for the 
preparation of ministers. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL 
REVENUE MANUAL § 321.3; Rev. Rul. 59-129,1959-1 C.B. 58. 
198. I.R.C. § 6033(a)(2)(A)(i) (1994). 
199. Id. Integrated auxiliaries include schools, missions societies, or youth groups that are 
afflliated with a church, internally supported, and meet one of the tests for avoiding private 
foundation status. 26 C.F.R. § 6033-2(h)(I) (2001). 
200. I.R.C. § 6033(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
201. Id. § 170(b)(I)(A)(i), (c)(2)(B). 
202. Id. § 508(a), (c)(I)(A). Nevertheless, religious groups often seek formal determinations of 
their tax-exempt status to assure donors and grantors of the deductibility of contributions. See 
FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 110, at 446. 
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empt. Moreover, churches need not file the annual financial infor-
mation return, called the Form 990, required of secular nonprof-
its,203 and they have various immunities and protections from IRS 
audits.204 Thus, under federal law, religious organizations receive 
preferential treatment not available to other nonprofits. 205 The lack 
of openness in financial records is particularly troublesome in the 
context of contracting out, as it eliminates one of the very few ways 
in which independent members of the public can get some sort of 
snapshot of what the organization is doing.206 
3. Limitations on Tort Liability of Religious Organizations and 
Their Agents 
While the tort liability of nonprofits and their agents is more 
limited than that of for-profit entities, the tort liability of religious 
organizations is even further complicated by First Amendment con-
siderations.207 The Supreme Court has long held that the First 
Amendment bars courts from adjudicating religious questions. 208 As 
203. I.R.C. §§ 508(c)(I)(A), 6033(a)(2)(A)(i), (iii). Churches must file a financial return if they 
generate unrelated husiness income tax ("UBIT"). UBIT is profits derived from commercial ac· 
tivities unrelated to the religious purpose of the organization. Id. § 511. 
204. The IRS can only audit churches and affiliated organizations if the Regional Commis· 
sioner has independent information from a third party that the church may not qualify for tax 
exemption as a church, may be carrying on an unrelated trade or business, or otherwise be en· 
gaged in taxable activities. Id. § 7611(a)(I)(A), (a)(2). Prior to starting an investigation, the IRS 
must provide written notice to the church aclvising the church of its rights. Id. § 7611(a)(1)(B), 
(a)(3). The IRS must also provide advance notice of its intent to examine church records. Id. § 
7611(b)(1), (b)(2)(A). The IRS may examine records only to the extent necessary to determine the 
tax amount. Id. § 7611(b)(I)(A). For a full description of the IRS audit procedures for churches, 
see HOPKINS, supra note 108, § 24.8(b), at 611·19. 
205. A summary of the tax rules affecting churches can be found in Richard R. Hammar, 
Federal Income Tax Issues, in RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AS NONPROFIT ENTITIES: ISSUES OF 
ACCESS, SPECIAL STATUS, AND ACCOUNTABILITY (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, The Nat'l Ctr. on Philan· 
thropy & the Law ed., 1983). 
206. For other federal statutory privileges afforded to religious organizations, see 1 BASSETT, 
supra note 185, § 1:11, at 1·42 to 1·46. 
207. As one scholar has noted, "[T]ort law and freedom of religion are in a significant way 
diametrically opposed. The former represents the enforcement of communitarian intolerance of 
antisocial acts; the latter represents the protection of unpopular, even antisocial, views and 
practices from the majority's tendency to want to squelch them." Paul T. Hayden, Religiously 
Motivated "Outrageous" Conduct: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Weapon 
Against "Other People's Faiths," 34 WM. & MARy L. REV. 579, 597·98 (1993). 
208. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709·15 (1976) (holding that 
civil courts may not review ecclesiastical decisions); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 
U.S. 1, 16 (1929) (same); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1871) (mem.) (concluding 
that courts must defer to judgment of highest religious authority in determining intrachurch 
property dispute); cf. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602·06 (1979) (concluding that courts may 
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a result, courts cannot inquire into the validity of religious beliefs, 
they cannot independently interpret religious texts, and they can~ 
not examine the internal decisionmaking of religious entities.209 
Tort claims that implicate these proscriptions are usually dis-
missed. For instance, lawsuits challenging the standard of care of a 
church's or cleric's conduct run into the courts' reluctance to devise 
an "objective" standard of care for religious leaders (the "reasonable 
bishop," the "reasonable rabbi," and so forth).210 Thus, claims of 
"clergy malpractice," such as claims that churches are responsible 
for the sexual misconduct of their clergy, have never succeeded.211 
Clearly, this reluctance to interfere with the management of reli-
gious groups raises issues in the charitable choice context because 
clergy may play an integral role in providing the contracted-for ser-
vices to extremely vulnerable populations. 
This reluctance to "embroil courts in establishing the train-
ing, skill, and standards applicable for members of the clergy in a 
diversity of religions"212 has also resulted in many courts rejecting 
other tort claims, including those for breach of fiduciary duty; neg-
ligent hiring and supervision; tortious interference with contract; 
negligent infliction of emotional distress; intentional infliction of 
emotional distress; and defamation.213 Similarly, even above and 
beyond the statutory exemptions afforded to religious organizations 
from various antidiscrimination laws,214 some courts have created 
common law exceptions that permit religious organizations to dis-
criminate on the basis of race, sex, age, or disability in their em-
ployment decisions.215 In addition, while every state regulates the 
practice of psychology and counseling, pastoral counseling within a 
church to members of the congregation does not fall within these 
adjudicate intrachurch disputes where they can be resolved on the basis of neutral principles of 
law). 
209. See Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional 
Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219, 221-23 (2000). The courts vary on whether they ground these princi-
ples in the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, or the First Amendment in general. 
[d. at 223-25. 
210. See id. at 231-34. 
211. See id. 
212. F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697,703 (N.J. 1997). 
213. See Idleman, supra note 209, at 234-37 nn.43-53. Idleman notes that while the courts 
"are far from uniform in their refusal to adjudicate tort actions against religious entities," the 
majority trend appears to be one of nonadjudicability. [d. at 239. 
214. For example, under Title VII, religious organizations can fire or refuse to hire employees 
for religious reasons. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (1994). The charitable choice legislation ex-
pressly preserves this exemption. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 104(f), 100 Stat. 2105, 2163 (1996) (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 604a (Supp. III 1997». 
215. See Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for Apply-
ing Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1079 (1996). 
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regulations.216 It is not clear whether counseling by clergy as part of 
a social services program will fall within this exception, although 
given the secular purposes underlying social welfare programs, pas-
toral counselors should be required to follow the same licensing and 
certification requirements as their secular counterparts. 
Under charitable choice, religious groups are expressly pro-
hibited from using federal funds to engage in proselytizing or wor-
ship with beneficiaries.217 As a result, it may be difficult for them to 
hide behind the religious nature of their activities in any tort suit 
arising out of social service provision under charitable choice. A se-
ries of counseling cases in which plaintiffs sued clergy for the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress demonstrates this dis-
tinction. In Destefano v. Grabrian, a husband and wife sued their 
Catholic priest and local diocese after the priest had an affair with 
the wife while he was conducting marriage counseling for the cou-
ple.218 The defendants raised the First Amendment as a barrier, 
arguing that "the performance of pastoral duties by a Catholic 
priest, including sacramental counseling of parishioners, is a mat-
ter of ecclesiastical cognizance and policy with which a civil court 
cannot interfere."219 The Colorado Supreme Court rejected this de-
fense, stating that the defendants had acknowledged that the 
priest's conduct did not fall within the practices or beliefs of the 
Catholic Church.220 The court noted, however, that it might have a 
different question had the conduct been taken in accord with the 
priest's religious practices.221 
Under this line of reasoning, the key question is whether the 
defendant's conduct is religiously motivated. An admission of reli-
gious motivation might well put a charitable choice defendant in 
the position of admitting that he or she has overstepped the stat-
ute's boundaries. Nevertheless, an argument might be made that 
any alleged tortious counseling was motivated and shaped by reli-
gious beliefs, even if it does not implicate proselytizing or wor-
ship.222 This would present a more difficult question, but a foresee-
216. See RICHARD R. HAMMAR, PASTOR, CHURCH & LAw § 4-10 (3d ed. 2000). 
217. § 104(j), no Stat. at 2162. 
218. 763 P.2d 275, 278 (Colo. 1988). 
219. Id. at 283. 
220. Id. at 284 (stating that defendants "recognize[ 1 and admit[ 1 that sexual activity by a 
priest is fundamentally antithetical to Catholic doctrine"). 
221. Id. 
222. There remain complicated questions of whether liability for tortious conduct ascends 
from the individual who committed the act to the organization itself and even to coordinate and 
superior levels of the ecclesiastical entity. See generally Mark E. Chopko, Ascending Liability of 
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able one given that charitable choice aims to preserve the religious 
nature of grantees while protecting beneficiaries from indoctrina-
tion.223 The legislation envisions that religious doctrine will moti-
vate the service strategy undertaken by charitable choice grantees. 
In turn, this is likely to create complicated questions that delve into 
the interconnection between religious beliefs and service strategies, 
an area the courts have thus far indicated they prefer to avoid. 
D. Limits on Obtaining Accountability Through Contract Law 
Charitable choice is part of a larger societal movement to-
wards privatization, or contracting out, of governmental func-
tions.224 A decision to outsource a government social service pro-
gram generally results in a contract between the government and 
the private provider. Thus, contracts could provide a key vehicle for 
enforcing accountability.225 Contract law is especially appealing for 
ensuring accountability in the charitable choice context, because 
unlike tort law and the statutes discussed previously, churches do 
not have any special immunities or other protections from contract 
claims. Rather, they are deemed to operate in the commercial world 
as any other entity. Yet legal doctrine as well as the procurement 
process fails to provide social service beneficiaries with adequate 
protections. First, contract law provides scant enforcement rights to 
third-party beneficiaries. Second, procurement processes at the 
state and local levels rarely involve beneficiaries. Third, as a prac-
tical matter, it is very difficult to monitor and measure contract 
performance in the realm of social services. Each of these current 
barriers to achieving accountability through contract is addressed 
in turn. 
Religious Entities for the Actions of Others, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 289 (1993) (examining the 
potential bases of liability of religious organizations for the actions of its members, employees, or 
agents). Religious organizations may be able to avoid certain risks by separately incorporating 
different layers of hierarchy or separable functions. See Jill S. Manny, Governance Issues for 
Non·Profit Religious Organizations, 40 CATH. LAW. 1, 1-2 (2000). 
223. Whether these goals are compatible is questionable. See Rogers, supra note 5, at 62 
("While one can separate tile sacred from the secular in a religiously affiliated organization, 
there is no good way to do so in a church or similar entity. It is like trying to take vanilla flavor· 
ing out of a cake."). 
224. See supra notes 56·65 and accompanying text. 
225. See generally Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV .. 155 (2000) 
(discussing the accountability challenges raised by contracting out and how contract law could be 
used to enforce fairness norms embodied in administrative law). 
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1. Third-Party Beneficiary Doctrine 
Contract law has the potential to promote accountability in 
an outsourcing regime, because it holds contractors to terms to 
which they have assented. For instance, participants in a drug 
treatment program run by a church under contract with a local 
municipality may want to challenge the quality of services rendered 
by the church. Perhaps an untrained volunteer conducts the coun-
seling, or the methods are unduly coercive. If the contract sets forth 
performance specifications and objectives, the participants may be 
able to argue that they are third-party beneficiaries of the contract 
with the right to enforce its terms. 
In general, third parties can enforce contracts that are "in-
tended" to benefit them. 226 The "intent to benefit" standard is a mal-
leable one, and it is difficult to say with certainty whether any par-
ticular category of beneficiaries fall within it. Clearly, if the con-
tract grants express rights of enforcement to third parties, the 
courts will honor the intent of the contracting parties. Likewise, 
where the contract expressly denies enforcement to third parties, 
that intent will also be upheld.227 Yet for contracts that do not ad-
dress the enforcement status of third parties, the law is murkier. 
Especially where government contracts are concerned, courts 
are hesitant to grant enforcement rights to the public at large, fear-
ing a limitless class of plaintiffs.228 Thus, for instance, where a pri-
226. Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, only those third parties who are "in-
tended" beneficiaries have rights under the contract. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
302 (1981). To qualify as an intended beneficiary, the third party must first show that "recogni-
tion of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the 
parties." Id. § 302(1). In addition, the party must show that (a) "the performance of the promise 
will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary" or (b) the circum-
stances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised 
performance." Id. For a history of the development of the third party beneficiary doctrine, see 
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358, 1360-74 (1992), and 
Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 
98 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1985). 
227. See, e.g., Cobos v. Dona Ana County Hous. Auth., 908 P.2d 250, 225 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1995) ("[T]he intent of the clause is clear, and our duty is to enforce the contract as written."), 
rev'd on other grounds, 970 P.2d 1143 (N.M. 1998). 
228. See Eisenberg, supra note 226, at 1407. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts ad-
dresses third-party beneficiary law in the context of government contracts. It provides that: 
(2) a promisor who contracts with a government or governmental agency to do 
an act for or render a service to the public is not subject to contractual liability 
to a member of the public for consequential damages resulting from perform-
ance or failure to perform unless (a) the terms of the promise provide for such 
liability; or (b) the promisee is subject to liability to the member of the public 
for the damages and a direct action against the promisor is consistent with the 
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vate water utility failed to supply water to a hydrant, and a private 
property owner's building was subsequently destroyed by fire, the 
court concluded that the property owner was a mere incidental, 
rather than intended, beneficiary.229 Judge Cardozo stated that "[a] 
promisor will not be deemed to have had in mind the assumption of 
a risk so overwhelming for any trivial reward."230 
By contrast, where the beneficiaries constitute a more dis-
crete and identifiable class, they have greater success in enforcing 
public contracts. For example, in Fuzie u. Manor Care, Inc., a nurs-
ing home resident was deemed, under the Medicaid rules, a third-
party beneficiary of a contract between the nursing home and the 
State of Ohio.231 The plaintiff alleged that the nursing home in-
tended to transfer or discharge her for nonmedical reasons, in viola-
tion of the Medicaid regulations.232 The Court concluded that the 
contract incorporated federal regulations and that the plaintiff was 
a member of the class intended to be benefited by the statutory 
scheme.233 Cases such as Fuzie are "an excellent example of the way 
in which plaintiffs can use the third party beneficiary rule to secure 
the private benefits of a public program."234 
Yet, at bottom, there are two profound limits on the useful-
ness of third-party beneficiary theory to protect the rights of social 
service beneficiaries. First, the contracting parties can expressly 
terms of the contract and with the policy of the law authorizing the contract 
and prescribing remedies for its breach. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313 (1981). 
In accord with the Restatement, some courts look not only at intent to benefit, but also for an 
intent to grant standing to enforce the benefit. See Robert S. Adelson, Note, Third Party Benefi· 
ciary and Implied Right of Action Analysis: The Fiction of One Governmental Intent, 94 YALE L.J. 
875, 879 (1985). Other courts reject the latter requirement. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 
1261, 1270 n.17 (7th Cir. 1981). Adelson makes the point that intent should be divined not only 
from the underlying statute, but also from the intent of the agency entering into the contract. 
Adelson, supra, at 891·92. 
229. H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 897 (N.Y. 1928). 
230. Id. at 897-98. This seminal case is used as an illustration to section 313 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts. 
231. 461 F. Supp. 689, 697-98 (N.D. Ohio 1977). 
232. Id. at 692. 
233. Id. at 697-98. 
234. Waters, supra note 226, at 1187. The third-party beneficiary theory has also had some 
success in the context of public housing programs, which generally involve a contract between 
the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (UHUD") and either a local govern-
ment or private landlord. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261,1269-76 (7th Cir. 1981) (hold-
ing that section 8 tenants were third-party beneficiaries of contracts executed between HUD and 
private landlords); Hurt v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 806 F. Supp. 515, 527 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (same); 
Henry Horner Mothers Guild v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 780 F. Supp. 511, 515-16 (N.D. Ill. 1991) 
(same); Ayala v. Boston Hous. Auth., 536 N.E.2d 1082, 1088-90 (Mass. 1989) (holding that ten-
ants were third-party beneficiaries and could recover damages flowing from housing authority's 
breach of obligations under contract to inspect for lead paint hazards). 
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disclaim any third-party enforcement rights and thereby eliminate 
this method of enforcement. Governments have some inherent in-
terest in allowing for third-party enforcement of contracts because 
it provides a "free" method of monitoring contract performance. Yet 
at the same time, both the government and the private contractors 
have strong financial incentives to limit the scope of their liability. 
Given that the program beneficiaries are not at the negotiating ta-
ble, they have no input into how these competing incentives play 
out. This raises the second shortcoming of the third-party benefici-
ary theory. Without a role in contract negotiations, beneficiaries 
have no say in the terms of the contract and thus may be left with 
boilerplate contracts that provide them with no meaningful contract 
rights even to consider enforcing. In addition, local governments 
have little experience in performance contracting and rarely draft 
contracts with detailed specifications and objectives that would en-
sure accountability from private contractors.235 Without meaning-
ful, substantive terms to enforce, being a third-party beneficiary is 
a hollow victory indeed. 
2. The Procurement Process and the Absence of Beneficiaries 
As noted above, program beneficiaries have little voice in the 
government procurement process. The contracting process is 
lengthy, highly regulated, and includes the following phases: as-
sessing needs; soliciting bids through a request for proposals; 
evaluating bids; negotiating with bidders; awarding, drafting, and 
signing a contract; and monitoring the contract. 236 This process does 
not include program beneficiaries and rarely provides for public in-
put. 237 Rather, the procurement regime focuses on the rights of bid-
ders and is aimed at ensuring a competitive, efficient, and ethical 
235. See infra notes 253·59 and accompanying text. 
236. See JOHN A. O'LOONEY, OUTSOURCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES: 
DECISION·MAKING STRATEGIES AND MANAGEMENT METHODS 14 (1998). 
237. Although the Model Procurement Code for Local and State Governments provides that 
procurement information shall he subject to a state's freedom of information act or similar open 
records law, MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE FOR LOCAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS § 1·401 (2000) 
[hereinafter MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE], it also provides that certain types of information 
solicited in the bidding process shall remain confidential. See, e.g., id. § 3-401. Similarly, al-
though the government must provide public notice of solicitations for bids and proposals, id .. §§ 
3-202(3), 3- 203(3), the purpose of these requirements is "to permit potential bidders to prepare 
and submit their bids in a timely manner," id. § 3-202(3) cmt., and not for public input into the 
terms of the solicitation or who should be awarded the solicitation. 
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selection process.238 For example, the 2000 Model Procurement Code 
for State and Local Governments provides that bid awards can be 
administratively challenged by "any actual or prospective bidder, 
offeror, or contractor who is aggrieved," but makes no provision for 
aggrieved program beneficiaries.239 Procurement law, which grew 
out of the fairly straightforward procurement of goods, is simply not 
a satisfactory model for the procurement of human services. In the 
human services arena, more stakeholders exist, and the stakes for 
these constituents are higher-often involving basic human necessi-
ties such as shelter, clothing, food, and medical care. 
3. Challenges to Defining, Monitoring, and Measuring Performance 
The final challenge to using contracts to improve account-
ability is the complex nature of social service delivery. In the social 
services field, interactions between providers and beneficiaries are 
intensely interpersonal. For instance, in the area of welfare, gov-
ernment workers previously needed only to assess objective eligibil-
ity criteria and then issue checks. However, welfare providers are 
now charged with putting people to work, and thus they engage in a 
variety of counseling tasks.240 These client assessments, "because 
238. See id. § 1-101 (stating that the purposes of the Code are, inter alia, "to ensure the fair 
and equitable treatment of all persons who deal with the procurement system of this [state] ... ; 
to foster effective broad-based competition within the free enterprise system ... ; and to provide 
safeguards for the maintenance of a procurement system of quality and integrity"); Joseph A. 
Cosentino, Jr., New York City's Procurement System: Reversing the Cycle of Corruption and Reac-
tionary Reform, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1183, 1183 (1998) (stating that the goals of government 
contracting are "efficiency, prevention of corruption, and fairness to the providers of goods and 
services"). 
239. MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE, supra note 237, § 9-101(1). The commentary provides that 
state law governs the availability of taxpayer suits. Taxpayer suits can provide a basis for citi-
zens to challenge wrongful acts committed by local governments in the contracting process. See 
Lewis J. Baker, Procurement Disputes at the State and Local Level: A Hodgepodge of Remedies, 
25 PUB. CONT. L.J. 265, 291-93 (1996). However, taxpayers generally lack standing where the 
government has wide discretion in awarding contracts. Id. at 292. Moreover, some jurisdictions 
require proof of actual pecuniary loss to the taxpayer through increased taxation before finding 
taxpayer standing. Id. Because taxpayer suits are aimed at challenging the award of a contract 
to a particular bidder, such suits are of limited utility to social service beneficiaries challenging 
the quality of services received. For a discussion of third-party standing to challenge government 
contracts at the federal level, see Daniel Guttman, Public Purpose and Private Service: The 
Twentieth Century Culture of Contracting Out and the Evolving Law of Diffused Sovereignty, 52 
ADMIN. L. REV. 859, 905-08 (2000). 
240. These include educating applicants about the TANF program; assessing their work his-
tories and attempts to obtain employment; reviewing their eligibility for entitlement benefits 
such as SSI, Medicaid, and Food Stamps; determining their eligibility for cash grants, loans, or 
other services to divert them from the TANF program; assisting them in securing child support 
from noncustodial parents; helping them with job searches; assessing their child care and trans-
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they involve direct contact with clients, . . . are at least partially 
unpredictable, largely unobservable and difficult to evaluate."241 In 
a contracting scheme based on such complex interactions, it is hard 
to define the tasks involved in advance and it is equally difficult to 
measure performance afterwards. Yet definition and measurement 
are exactly what are needed to obtain quality services. 
Recognizing this, management professionals are urging gov-
ernments to use performance contracting when privatizing social 
services. 242 Previously, social service contracts emphasized inputs; 
that is, governments evaluated performance by the procedures 
used, wages to be paid, or the amount or type of equipment or time 
and labor used.243 By contrast, performance-based contracting fo-
cuses on results.244 For instance, in the welfare context, perform-
portation needs, as well as 'domestic violence problems or alcohol or drug abuse; drafting indi-
vidualized plans to attain economic self-sufficiency; and assisting them in locating job training, 
GED, ESOL, and other skill building activities. RICHARD P. NATHAN & THOMAS L. GAlS, 
IMPLEMENTING THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1996: A FIRST LOOK 21 (1999). 
241. Marcia K. Meyers, Gaining Cooperation at the Front Lines of Service Delivery: Issues for 
the Implementation of Welfare Reform, ROCKEFELLER REP. (Nelson A. Rockefeller Inst. of Gov't), 
June 12, 1998, at 4, at http://www.rockinst.org/publications/rockefellerjeports/rr07.htmI. 
242. ELISA VINSON, GOVERNING-FOR-RESULTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY: PERFORMANCE 
CONTRACTING IN SIX STATE HUMAN SERVICES AGENCIES 1 (1999) ("Performance contracting, long 
used in such government services as highway maintenance and solid waste management, is 
becoming increasingly attractive to state human services agencies. Often frustrated by declining 
performance, rising costs, or both, they want to pay for results, not activities."). 
There is a similar movement afoot to improve federal and state government accountability 
through performance management. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, PERFORMANCE 
BASED PROCUREMENT: ANOTHER MODEL FOR CALIFORNIA 1 (1998) (describing how the California 
Franchise Tax Board adopted an alternative procurement approach for technology expenditures); 
BARBARA DYER, THE OREGON OPTION: EARLY LESSONS FROM A PERFORMANCE PARTNERSHIP ON 
BUILDING RESULTS-DRIVEN ACCOUNTABILITY (1996) (describing a results-driven partnership 
between multiple levels of government and multiple entities within each level of government), 
available at http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/progsys/oregonllessons.htm; BLAINE LINER & ELISA VINSON, 
GOVERNING-FOR-RESULTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY: WILL STATES MEET THE CHALLENGE? 1 (1999) 
("A major effort has been under way since 1993 to initiate reporting on the results of all major 
federal programs in response to the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993."); 
OUTCOME MEASUREMENT IN THE HUMAN SERVICES (Edward J. Mullen & Jenifer L. Magnabosco 
eds., 1997) (collecting essays); JESSICA YATES, PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN HUMAN SERVICES 
(1997) (describing different state initiatives in performance management in human services). 
243. See Moore & Hudson, supra note 56, at 21. 
244. Outcome measurement is one aspect of overall performance measurement under which 
a provider measures "the benefits or results it has for its customers, clients, or participants." 
Margaret C. Plantz et aI., Outcome Measurement: Showing Results in the Nonprofit Sector, in 
USING PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT TO IMPROVE PUBLIC AND NONPROFIT PROGRAMS 15, 17 
(Kathryn E. Newcomer ed., 1997). The authors state that "outputs are about the program, 
whereas outcomes are about the participants." Id. 
Welfare and related programs often have relied on measures of input (e.g., 
number of caseworkers), output (e.g., number of individuals completing job 
readiness classes or error rates in determining eligibility) and efficiency (e.g., 
program dollars spent per $1 child support collected). However, outcome meas-, 
2002] "CHARITABLE CHOICE" 849 
ance contracting might result in the provider getting paid for put-
ting someone in a job for a certain time period, but not for the time 
spent by the provider in training, counseling, and job searching.245 
In essence, performance contracting aims to measure how well the 
contractor is achieving program goals and the extent to which the 
program is alleviating the social problem at issue.246 Importantly, a 
quantifiable assessment of outcomes helps to promote meaningful 
competition among contract bidders, which, in turn, spurs account-
ability.247 
In addition to assessing efficiency and effectiveness, another 
important aspect of performance-based contracting is measuring 
the quality of the service delivery from the beneficiary's perspec-
tive. To some degree, "quality-like beauty-lies in the eye of the 
beholder."248 However, a major study of service quality indicators 
concluded that the two most important dimensions of quality from 
the customers' point of view are reliability and responsiveness. 249 In 
the social service context, reliability means "providing services in a 
consistent fashion; always being friendly, polite, and consider-
ate ... [;] always attempting to understand client needs[; and] al-
ways speaking with clients in understandable language."25o Respon-
siveness means providing services in a timely manner. 251 Ensuring 
quality delivery not only benefits clients, but also has been shown 
to improve productivity. That is, it results in fewer errors, less pa-
perwork, lower processing times, happier funding sources, lower 
costs, and a better public image. 252 
Performance contracting, however, is easier said than done. 
The greatest difficulty arises in defining the hoped-for outcomes, 
especially when the stakeholders have varying goals. "Performance-
based contracting only works when based on relevant and quantifi-
able performance measures; therefore, a first step is evaluating the 
ures (e.g., percentage of welfare caseload staying in jobs for six months) usually 
have a more direct relationship to the established performance goals. 
YATES, supra note 242, at 2. 
245. Moore & Hudson, supra note 56, at 22. 
246. See YATES, supra note 242, at 2·3; see also MARTIN & KETTNER, supra note 7, at 3 ("Per-
formance measurement combines three major accountability perspectives into one: 1. the effi-
ciency perspective, 2. the quality perspective, and 3. the effectiveness perspective."). 
247. See JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION 79-98 (1989). 
248. MARTIN & KETTNER, supra note 7, at 42. 
249. [d. at 43. Other quality factors include accessibility, assurance, communication, compe-
tency, conformity, courtesy, durability, empathy, humaneness, performance, security, and tangi-
bles. [d. at 42. 
250. [d. at 43-44. 
251. [d. 
252. [d. at 6. 
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objectives of a given service and figuring out how to assess success 
and failure. Most cities are at best still reaching that first step."253 
Not surprisingly, government managers have bemoaned the com-
plexity of this process.254 
Yet another difficulty is that the staffs that formerly pro-
vided direct services usually lack the expertise to manage complex 
social service contracts, which require "understanding competitive 
markets, knowing how to value assets, making cost comparisons, 
managing a competitive bid, and managing contracts in place-
[and] this list only scratches the surface."255 In fact, a detailed study 
of how over 100 local government managers were conducting social 
service contracting found that performance-based contracting prin-
ciples were having little effect on actual contracting practices.256 
Most of the contract managers we interviewed appeared to manage the outsourcing 
process in a "fly by the seat of your pants" manner rather in a manner that sug-
gested a scientific or systematic approach to the outsourcing process. Often we 
were told that this was the way the contract and outsourcing process had always 
been handled, and in many cases the respondents described a "one approach fits 
all contracts" method of outsourcing for services. 267 
As a result, the study concluded that "most contract management 
shops are being operated on the basis of tradition and a sort of folk 
wisdom."258 The irony of privatization is that it relies on the very 
entities deemed unfit to deliver social services to undertake the 
complex mission of performance contracting.259 
253. Moore & Hudson, supra note 56, at 22; see also O'LOONEY, supra note 236, at 220 ("The 
same things that make human-services delivery complex and difficult te measure, monitor, and 
assess will also make it difficult to link dollars to the individual contribution that a specific pro-
vider makes to the health and well-being of his or her clients."). 
254. Gov'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SERVICE PRIVATIZATION: EXPANSION POSES 
CHALLENGES IN ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PROGRAM RESULTS 14 (1997). For an enlighten-
ing description of the challenges faced by the New York Department of Homeless Services in 
shifting to outcomes-based assessments, see Gordon J. Campbell & Elizabeth McCarthy, Convey-
ing Mission Through Outcome Measurement: Services to the Homeless in New York City, 28 POL. 
STUD. J. 338 (2000). 
255. Moore & Hudson, supra note 56, at 29; see also O'LOONEY, supra note 236, at 7; Jessica 
Yates, Managing the Contracting Process for Results in Welfare Reform, WELFARE INFO. 
NETWORK ISSUE NOTES (Welfare Info. Network, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 1998, at 
http://www.welfareinfo.org/contractissue.htm ("Good contract management involves significant 
skills in program design, program planning, communications and evaluation. Federal, state and 
local policies also set an important stage for contracting, especially the degree to which funds are 
set aside for data collection, monitoring, technical assistance and evaluation."). 
256. O'LOONEY, supra note 236, at 3-4. 
257. Id. at 4. 
258. Id. Governments need to focus on payment strategies that minimize the risks of cream-
ing and churning. See id. at 73-90 (describing a multitude of payment strategies and their ef-
fects); infra note 295 (defining terms "creaming" and "churning"). 
259. O'LOONEY, supra note 236, at 31. 
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Like government agencies, nonprofit organizations also lack 
experience using outcome measurement techniques. A study of 
nonprofits found that "few organizations have been exposed to a 
significant amount of training in implementing outcome measure-
ment, analyzing it, and then using the resulting information."26o 
Thus, the study concludes that "[m]uch more in the way of training 
and technical assistance is needed."261 Religious organizations in 
particular "have paid little attention to documenting activities."262 
Accordingly, both governments and their social service contracting 
partners will need to vastly improve their sophistication in defining 
and monitoring contracts before contract law can begin to provide 
accountability in a privatization regime. 
4. The Vouchers Alternative 
Vouchers are one option that have been touted as a solution 
to the problems of defining and monitoring contracts, as well as a 
means for increasing program quality. 263 Vouchers are expressly 
approved as a charitable choice option. Under a vouchers program, 
beneficiaries are given a voucher for certain services that they can 
redeem at the provider of their choice. This is how food stamps, 
Medicaid benefits, and certain public housing programs operate.264 
260. ELAINE MORLEY ET AL., OUTCOME MEASUREMENT IN NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: 
CURRENT PRACTICES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 10 (2001). Nonprofits have traditionally focused on 
administrative factors rather than outcomes. 
Outcome measurement is new to most private nonprofit organizations. Non-
profit organizations are more often familiar with monitoring and reporting such 
information as the number of clients served, the quantity of services, programs, 
or activities provided, the number of volunteers or volunteer hours contributed, 
and the amount of donations received. These are important data, but they do 
not help nonprofit managers or constituents understand how well they are help-
ing their clients; that is, such statistics provide administrative information 
about programs, but not about the program's results. 
Id. at 5. 
261. Id. at 10. 
262. Griener, supra note 20, at 5; see also INDEPENDENT SECTOR, AMERICA'S RELIGIOUS 
CONGREGATIONS: MEASURING THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIETY 9 (2000) (noting that religious 
organizations collect data less frequently than other nonprofits, perhaps because stakeholders 
are less likely to ask congregations about accomplishments); Caryle Murphy, A Matter of Faith 
and Funds for Serving Area's Needy; Restrictions Divide Religion-Based Programs, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 18, 2001, at Al (describing faith-based programs in which the groups acknowledge that 
they "have no formal system of tracking those who have completed their missions' programs, ... 
and can offer only anecdotal evidence about the programs' effectiveness"). 
263. Vouchers are also seen as a way to avoid First Amendment entanglement problems. See 
infra Part IV.C. 
264. See Paul Posner et ai., A Survey of Voucher Use: Variations and Common Elements, in 
VOUCHERS AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES 503, 522-39 (C. Eugene Steuerle et ai. eds., 
2000) (listing voucher programs at federal, state, and local levels); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Social 
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Vouchers apply a market-based approach to social services, which 
posits that underperforming providers will be pushed out of the 
market by competitive forces. 265 Whether the market metaphor 
works in this context is not clear, however, because the beneficiar-
ies are not necessarily in a position to gain necessary information 
about available services or to evaluate services rendered. As Mar-
tha Minow explains: 
The sheer fact that the arena involves subsistence (as well as day care, substance 
abuse treatment, and other services crucial to daily survival) renders questionable 
the assertion that recipients are freely and autonomously choosing. Autonomous 
choice is in jeopardy when the individual has no money, food, or housing and is of· 
fered these necessities on conditions that she might quickly refuse under other cir· 
cumstances.266 
Moreover, a voucher-based system presumes a competitive 
market of providers. While food stamp recipients obviously have a 
bevy of food providers from which to choose, social services agencies 
are not nearly as numerous. 267 In certain jurisdictions, there may be 
only one provider, making the notion of choice meaningless. The 
voucher system, with its veneer of "choice," also poses the risk that 
governments will fail to monitor service delivery, on the theory that 
the beneficiaries are doing the job for them. 
In reality, voucher programs can never be purely market 
based and inevitably require extensive regulation to ensure quality 
control.268 Thus, to the degree vouchers can playa role in improving 
Services and the Market, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1405, 1407-09 (1983); C. Eugene Steuerle, Common 
Issues for Voucher Programs, in VOUCHERS AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES, supra, at 3, 
3-4. 
265. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 264, at 1407. 
266. Martha Minow, Choice or Commonality: Welfare and Schooling After the End of Welfare 
as We Knew It, 49 DUKE L.J. 493, 535 (1999); see also Burt S. Barnow, Vouchers for Federal Tar-
geted Training Programs, in VOUCHERS AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES, supra note 264, 
at 224, 244 (noting that "participants in training programs may lack appropriate information 
about their own skills and aptitudes as well as the characteristics of training vendors"); Steuerle, 
supra note 264, at 19-20 (describing the issues raised by voucher recipients' capability to choose 
benefits). 
267. JOEL F. HANDLER, DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY 55 (1996) ("The theory assumes that 
there is competition among suppliers or vendors and that clients, or voucher holders, are in-
formed, autonomous purchasers. In practice, such conditions rarely exist .... "). 
268. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 264, at 1409 (noting that vouchers "impose direct regu-
lations that reflect policymakers' concerns about both suppliers' monopoly power and beneficiar-
ies' limited information and scarce 'shopping time' "); Steuerle, supra note 264, at 21, 31 ("Some 
standards and regulation are inevitable. At a minimum, the government will try to ensure that 
the voucher is spent on the goods and services prescribed and not on those proscribed, and that 
only 'eligible' individuals receive the vouchers."). 
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accountability, it will have to be through oversight regulations,269 
such as those proposed in this Article. A pure voucher system is not 
only unrealistic, but it gives the veneer of accountability where 
none exists. 27o 
III. PROPOSALS FOR INCREASING ACCOUNTABILITY OF 
SOCIAL SERVICE PROVIDERS 
Currently, the federal welfare law says very little about the 
accountability of private entities. Section 104 of the PRA provides 
that religious organizations contracting to provide welfare assis-
tance are subject to the same regulations as other contractors "to 
account in accord with generally accepted auditing principles for 
the use of such funds."271 Yet a religious organization can segregate 
its fed,eral and nonfederal funds and thereby limit any audit to the 
federal funds, even when both funding streams contribute to the 
same activity.272 Also, the Act provides an enforcement mechanism 
for any party seeking to enforce its rights under section 104; 
namely, the various prOVISIOns concerning nondiscrimination 
against religious groups and beneficiaries. 273 Thus, the notion of 
accountability embodied in the charitable choice provision is limited 
to fiscal matters and enforcing the statutory balance between com-
peting First Amendment concerns. Nowhere does the PRA focus on 
ensuring that public dollars result in quality services, perhaps as-
suming that the market will impose quality results either through 
contracting or vouchers. As discussed above, however, neither con-
tracts nor vouchers alone can currently guarantee quality. 
269. Stephen Macedo argues that conditions that attach to vouchers should reflect public 
purposes: 
[I]nsofar as those private agencies voluntarily accept a share of public monies, 
we should hope that public policy tilts in favor of such public values as fairness 
among all citizens, equal access, and openness to outsiders .... If religious be-
lievers sometimes feel they are being asked to "tone down" their religiosity, 
that will often be the price of agreeing to serve as a provider of public services. 
Stephen Macedo, Constituting Civil Society: School Vouchers, Religious Nonprofit Organizations, 
and Liberal Public Values, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 417, 448 (2000). 
270. Studies of voucher-oriented job training programs show little effectiveness. Barnow, su-
pra note 266, at 244-46. The author reviewing these studies concludes that any job training 
voucher program "should include assessment and counseling to determine what training is ap-
propriate for the participants and screening of vendors for quality of training and appropriate 
placement rates." [d. at 245. 
271. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 104(h)(1), 110 Stat. 2105, 2163 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
604a (Supp. III 1997». 
272. [d. § 104(h)(2). 
273. [d. § 104(c), (g). 
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The PRA makes a nod towards procedural fairness. States 
must "set forth objective criteria for the delivery of benefits and the 
determination of eligibility and for fair and equitable treatment."274 
Presumably, private entities that contract with the state would 
have to abide by these objective criteria and fairness requirements. 
Yet there is no formal mechanism in the statute for enforcing these 
procedural due process norms.275 
In addition, the Act requires various forms of data collection 
and reporting,276 and the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices ("HHS") has issued detailed regulations governing how TANF 
funds are to be spent.277 However, the statute and the regulations 
are focused on ensuring that federal funds are spent in line with 
federal goals (to make sure that no one receives benefits for more 
than five years, to ensure that adults are participating in work ac-
tivities, and so forth).278 The regulations have little bearing on ac-
countability to the beneficiaries themselves.279 
The lack of specific accountability mechanisms at the federal 
level is largely the result of Congress's desire to give the states and 
their localities flexibility to develop their own welfare programs and 
to devolve discretion downward. However, the state and municipal 
governments have generated very little formal statutory or regula-
tory guidance with regard to accountability of private contractors. 
Thus, presumably any accountability mechanisms are being estab-
lished through the contracting process.280 Yet state and local gov-
ernments are, by and large, neither prepared nor skilled in con-
tracting for performance. 281 An in-depth study of welfare contract-
274. Id. § 402(a)(1)(B)(iii), 110 Stat. at 2114 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(B)(iii) (Supp. III 
1997». 
275. See generally Gilman, supra note 19 (detailing the lack of enforcement mechanisms to 
ensure that procedural due process norms are met). 
276. Pub. L. No. 104·193, § 411, 110 Stat. 2105, 2148 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 611 
(Supp. III 1997». 
277. See 64 Fed. Reg. 17,885 (Apr. 12, 1999). 
278. Id. ("How will we hold a State accountable for acbieving the work objectives of TANF?"); 
64 Fed. Reg. 17,890-91 (Apr. 12, 1999) (indicating that states will be penalized for failing to com-
plete timely reports, failing to get the required number of adults into work activities, failing to 
penalize noncooperative recipients, and failing to comply with the five-year limit on federal as-
sistance). See generally 64 Fed. Reg. 17,719, 17,857-878, 17,890-914 (Apr. 12, 1999) (setting forth 
regulations governing accountability ofTANF funds). 
279. The HHS has stated that states that improperly sanction welfare recipients may them-
selves be sanctioned. 64 Fed. Reg. 17,793-94 (Apr. 12, 1999). 
280. One study found that detailed charitable choice guidelines have been codified into for-
mal contracts only in Texas, Arizona, Indiana, and Wisconsin. See Griener, supra note 20, at 3-4. 
281. Barbara Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and Diminished Democracy 
in Local Government Contracts for Welfare-to- Work Services, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1559, 1603 
(2001) ("Formal contract management is largely absent in local government procurement, and 
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ing in the City of Baltimore found that the contracts contained "no 
meaningful benchmarks, outcomes, or control mechanisms" and 
that the city government was not evaluating "the vendor services 
for which it spends public funds and recipients' time-limited wel-
fare support."282 
As a result, in Baltimore and elsewhere, private entities are 
operating with very few constraints on their discretion. Moreover, 
devolution, by its very nature, makes it hard to assess the impact of 
federal policies because it creates a multitude of government fun-
ders and an even greater number of service deliverers.283 Thus, the 
current statutory regime does little to protect beneficiaries. Of even 
greater concern is President Bush's goal of easing the regulatory 
burdens for faith-based providers alone. Not only does this raise 
First Amendment issues because of the preferential treatment it 
would accord to religious providers, but it also means that churches 
could be providing services in an accountability vacuum. 
A. The Value of Citizen Participation 
By contrast, a model for accountability in social service pri-
vatization should focus on quality service delivery at three progres-
sive levels: preventing abuses; monitoring for quality; and enforcing 
quality standards. Beneficiaries should play a key role throughout 
this process as they have unique insights and information about 
"the needs, opportunities, priorities, and special dynamics at work" 
in their communities that are essential to designing a productive 
program.284 As one far-reaching study of social service privatization 
few people responsible are procurement professionals or bave any formal training in contract 
management."); see also supra notes 253-62 and accompanying text. 
282. Bezdek, supra note 281, at 1603. She writes that for "$60 million, Baltimore got 2000 
jobs for more than 10,000 [welfare) families." Id. at 1602. 
283. See Mark Greenberg, Welfare Reform and Devolution: Looking Back and Forward, 
BROOKINGS REV., Summer 2001, at 20. Greenberg concludes that when the federal law is up for 
reauthorization in 2002, legislators should improve accountability by generating better informa-
tion about what states are doing, how funds are being spent, and how beneficiaries are heing 
impacted. Id. at 24. 
284. ROBERT J. CHASKIN, THE FORD FOUNDATION'S NEIGHBORHOOD AND FAMILY INITIATIVE: 
TOWARD A MODEL OF COMPREHENSIVE, NEIGHBORHOOD-BASED DEVELOPMENT 16 (1992) (noting 
that "residents' knowledge may provide important insight into how the provision of services 
should be carried out, or where a certain facility should be placed"); see also Arthur Earl Bonfield, 
Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to Public Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits, 
or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 540 (1970) (arguing that the interested public should par-
ticipate in the rule making process). In addition, public participation can ensure that an agency is 
"prepared for certain problems that could arise from those rules' application, or the community's 
reaction to tbem." Id. at 541. 
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found, " 'Where there is a willingness on the part of contracting 
partners to involve a broad range of stakeholders in decisionmak-
ing, there is greater overall satisfaction with service delivery, the 
public policy makjng process and the contracting relationship.' "285 
Moreover, empowering beneficiaries to take control over· matters 
directly affecting them can not only lead to more efficient service 
delivery, but is also a worthy goal in itself286-and one heavily pro-
moted by privatization proponents on both the left and right of the 
political spectrum.287 Empowerment results not only when people 
are given a means to influence policies that affect them, but also 
when they gain valuable skills through the participatory process.288 
Finally, encouraging public participation fits within our democratic 
norms, under which the government derives its authority directly 
from the people. 289 
In federal law, public participation has been recognized as an integral aspect of decisionmak-
ing in the areas of environmental law, public housing, and otber programs that disproportion-
ately affect poor people. See, e.g., MARY GRISEZ KWEIT & ROBERT W. KWEIT, IMPLEMENTING 
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN A BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 5-7 (1981); Marcus E. Ethridge, Procedures 
for Citizen Involvement in Environmental Policy: An Assessment of Policy Effects, in CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC DECISION MAKING 115 (Jack DeSario & Stuart Langton eds., 1987); 
Audrey G. McFarlane, When Inclusion Leads to Exclusion: The Uncharted Terrain of Community 
Participation, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 861 (2000-2001); Resident Advisory Board and Public Partici-
pation in the PHA Plan Adoption Process, 30 HOUSING L. BULL. 173 (National Housing Law 
Center, Nov.-Dec. 2000) (describing public participation requirements in public housing pro-
grams). These norms have generally not been included in welfare delivery, likely because prior to 
the PRA, governments basically handed out checks and were not charged with changing behav-
lOr. 
285. Yates, supra note 255, at 6 (quoting JENICE L. VIEW, A MEANS TO AN END: T.HE ROLE OF 
NONPROFIT/GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING IN SUSTAINING THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1995». Likewise, 
experts in performance contracting urge that clients be a part of selecting performance meas-
ures. See MARTIN & KETTNER, supra note 7, at 102. 
286. Empowerment "involves a sense of perceived control, of competence, a critical awareness 
of one's environment, and involvement in activities that, in fact, exert contro!." HANDLER, supra 
note 267, at 122. 
Id. 
287. Id. at 5. Handler states: 
Initially, citizen empowerment was tbe program of the traditional or liberal 
Left, but that is no longer true. For a long time, conservatives have talked of 
empowering "mediating institutions" and of market-based incentives as a way 
of achieving citizen autonomy and bureaucratic accountability .... Citizen or 
community empowerment is also urged by minorities who champion the preser-
vation of cultural diversity, by activists and academics who celebrate the vi,cto-
ries of the subordinate against systems of social control, and by a wide range of 
"new" social-movement or post-modern groups under the broad labels of femi-
nism, environmentalism, and peace. 
288. See, e.g., CHASKIN, supra note 284, at 13, 17. 
289. See Bonfield, supra note 284, at 541; Spyke, supra note 101, at 267. For a thorough dis-
cussion and critique of the theories supporting citizen participation initiatives, see McFarlane, 
supra note 284, at 892-929. 
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Participation is particularly essential where administrative 
agencies are making the decisions, as they are not subject to ma-
joritarian political processes. Thus, public participation is itself an 
accountability tool,290 To be sure, public participation can be costly, 
not only in monetary terms, but also in terms of time, efficiency, 
and, sometimes, the quality of the deliberations. 291 However, in the 
context of social service contracting, the costs of non participation 
are severe-keeping beneficiaries away from the table can result in 
ineffective programs that squander public funds. Nonparticipation 
also eliminates opportunities for empowering the targeted popula-
tions, one of the goals of social service delivery. Although the popu-
lations at issue are particularly vulnerable, they can provide valu-
able insights as long as they are provided with information and re-
sources to enable their participation in the service delivery process. 
Thus, state and local governments will need to find a balance be-
tween increasing citizen participation and the competing concerns 
of cost and efficiency. Certainly, cutting back on accountability 
mechanisms is not the answer. 
When discussing the value of citizen participation, the ques-
tion inevitably arises as to how much ultimate control the citizens 
should have and what role they should play.292 Citizen participation 
290. Public participation is most effective where: (1) all affected persons are included, (2) 
procedures are open and include educational tools "to make the information usable by unsophis-
ticated participants," (3) procedures are fair, and (4) procedures result in public involvement in 
the decision. See John S. Applegate, Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizen Advisory 
Boards in Environmental Decisionmaking, 73 IND. L.J. 903, 952-53 (1998); see also Cheryl Sim-
rell King et ai., The Question of Participation: Toward Authentic Public Participation in Public 
Administration, 58 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 317 (1998) (listing barriers to participation and some ways 
to overcome them). 
291. As to the costs of mass participation, see Bonfield, supra note 284, at 543 ("There is an 
obvious need to conduct our government efficiently, expeditiously, effectively, and inexpensively. 
No rule making scheme may be considered acceptable unless it fairly reconciles these latter val-
ues with the societal interest in maximizing public participation in the development of adminis-
trative regulations."); Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for 
Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173 (1997) (exploring the costs of public 
participation). 
292. The complexities of this issue are well illustrated in ROBERT HALPERN, REBUILDING THE 
INNER CITY 167-94 (1995). Halpern discusses community involvement in neighborhood-based 
social services during the 1960s. During this era, participatory norms "meant involvement of 
community residents in program-level policy setting, as volunteers and as paid staff." Id. at 176-
77. Conflicts arose as to whether clients should rely on outside guidance or whether they could 
actually run programs themselves. Id. at 181-83. Halpern concludes that 
[n]eighborhood-based services in poor neighborhoods have helped both to sus-
tain and inadvertently to maintain those neighborhoods .... The notion of re-
building a sense of community through networks of neighborhood-based ser-
vices can only be taken so far when the majority of poor children and families 
are geographically and socially isolated from the rest of society. 
Id. at 194. 
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can mean anything from belonging to a rubber stamp advisory 
committee to having voting power on policymaking boards to out-
right citizen control-and all the gradations of power sharing along 
this spectrum.293 Mter all, simply giving people a forum to express 
their views does not mean that those views will be taken into ac-
count. To the contrary, such a strategy can be used as a political 
tool to give the appearance of participation, when in fact, there is 
none. In the context of privatization, as discussed below, represen-
tatives from the class of beneficiaries at issue should be given vot-
ing power on government bodies throughout the procurement proc-
ess (even in deciding whether privatization should be used in the 
first place) and during its monitoring phases. Voting power ensures 
that beneficiaries have a meaningful voice in shaping the services 
that affect them. 
Given the range of social services that are provided under 
contract with private entities, it is beyond the scope of this Article 
to specify detailed regulatory or contract terms that should govern 
the relationships between and among the various stakeholders. 
However, the general principles set forth here have widespread ap-
plicability and are derived from performance management litera-
ture, studies of community participation, and reports of "best prac-
tices" in the area of privatized social services. 
B. Preventing Abuses 
From the outset, a government can take several steps to en-
sure that the social services for which it contracts are delivered 
fairly, efficiently, and effectively. Governments need to use the 
techniques of performance contracting and measurement, about 
which there is substantial literature, knowledge, and training op-
portunities.294 A government agency considering privatization 
should bring the various stakeholders together to define precise 
programmatic goals, transmit those goals clearly to contractors, 
and then devise a strategy for measuring whether contractor per-
formance meets those goals. Beneficiary participation is especially 
important in performance contracting. The downside of an empha-
sis on results is that it can push providers to serve the easiest popu-
293. Sherry Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, 35 J. AM. INST. OF PLANNERS 216, 
216-24 (1969). 
294. See generally MARTIN & KETTNER, supra note 7; O'LOONEY, supra note 236; SMITH & 
LIPSKY, supra note 106; USING PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT TO IMPROVE PUBLIC AND 
NONPROFIT PROGRAMS, supra note 244. 
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lations first and/or to discourage hard-to-serve individuals from 
pursuing assistance.295 It can also affect how results are defined. 
For instance, the definition of "work" satisfying welfare reform re-
quirements could be anything from a minimum wage, menial job to 
a job with training and opportunities for advancement. For these 
reasons, it is important to involve all stakeholders, including bene-
ficiaries (or their surrogates in the case of certain populations) in 
the process of defining goals and desired outcomes. 
Despite the proven effectiveness of performance contracting, 
it is playing little role in most social service contracting schemes, in 
part because of government inexperience.296 This means that gov-
ernments are going to have to make substantial investments in in-
corporating these methods into their procurement systems. At a 
minimum, they will have to train staffs, purchase appropriate in-
formation technologies, and maintain ongoing efforts to keep up 
with developments and strategies in this burgeoning field. 297 More-
over, governments may need to include funds for contractors to en-
gage in outcome measurement.298 All of this costs money. However, 
there are significant long-term costs to the lawsuits, failed con-
tracts, and misspent funds that would otherwise occur. Accordingly, 
federal and state legislatures should consider making some chari-
table choice funds available for training in performance contracting. 
At each stage, the procurement process should involve the 
program beneficiaries. They can play valuable roles in discussing 
295. These incentives are often called "creaming" (serving only the best clients) and "churn-
ing" (discouraging harder-to· assist populations). See DIANE PAULSELL & ROBERT G. WOOD, THE 
COMMUNITY SOLUTIONS INITIATIVE: EARLY lMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCES (1999) (finding that 
contractors providing employment services to welfare recipients were implementing selective 
admissions policies), available at http://www.mathematica-mpr.comJPDFs/community.pdf; Yates, 
supra note 255, at 2 ("[C]ritics suggest that [performance contracting] encourages contractors to 
focus their resources on the easier-to-serve clients and spend less time with harder-to-serve 
ones."). 
296. See supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text. 
297. See Cheryle A. Broom & Marilyn Jackson, Performance Measurement Training, in 
USING PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT TO IMPROVE PUBLIC AND NONPROFIT PROGRAMS, supra note 
244, at 79 (describing training challenges and proposing an approach); Kathryn Newcomer, Us· 
ing Performance Measurement to Improve Programs, in USING PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT TO 
IMPROVE PUBLIC AND NONPROFIT PROGRAMS, supra note 244, at 5, 10 ("Abundant political sup-
port and resources are essential to ensure that performance measurement systems are designed 
with adequate input from key stakeholders and with technical expertise to ensure useful sys-
tems. Consultation with stakeholders in oversight bodies, service beneficiaries, and internal staff 
takes time and resource support."). 
298. See MORLEY ET AL., supra note 260, at 10; see also Harry P. Hatry, Where the Rubber 
Meets the Road: Performance Measurement for State and Local Public Agencies, in USING PER-
FORMANCE MEASUREMENT TO IMPROVE PUBLIC AND NONPROFIT PROGRAMS, supra note 297, at 31, 
37 ("Many local private nonprofit programs are quite small and without personnel experienced in 
quantitative technique and program evaluation."). 
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whether to contract out a particular service, identifying the scope of 
services needed, assisting in evaluating bids, suggesting points for 
negotiation, and selecting final bids. However, it is not enough for 
agencies to make opportunities for participation available. Rather, 
especially where disenfranchised populations are involved, agencies 
need to take affirmative steps to identify and include affected per-
sons, or their surrogates, in the case of children, mentally disabled 
persons, and other persons who lack the ability to participate mean-
ingfully.299 Such steps should include outreach efforts to local com-
munity and neighborhood leaders, scheduling meetings at times 
when working people can attend, holding meetings in the affected 
communities, and the like. 30o It is also essential to involve the pub-
lic at the start of a proposed program, rather than asking for com-
ment on an already finalized agency proposal-by that time, an 
agency has an overriding interest, driven both by efficiency con-
cerns and self-interest, to push that specific proposal through.30l 
C. Monitoring for Quality 
Once a contract has been awarded, the procurement agency 
must monitor its implementation to ensure its integrity with con-
tract terms, and, in the area of charitable choice, to ensure that 
First Amendment guidelines are being followed. Effective perform-
ance contracting requires the government to conduct data collection 
299. "When communities receive inadequate notice or receive information that they cannot 
understand the participatory nature of the decision-making processes is called into serious ques-
tion." Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, 
and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 775, 
833 (1998). Foster suggests four questions which should be asked when evaluating the legitimacy 
of a participatory decisionmaking process involving siting of environmental hazardous waste. 
The questions are just as relevant for social service delivery: 
(1) whether those most affected by the decision either have an opportunity to 
participate directly or to be represented in each phase of the decision-making 
process; (2) whether the community is informed adequately about all available 
information regarding the proposed action and whether such information is ac-
cessible; (3) whether the agency is responsive to community knowledge and con-
cerns; and (4) whether decision-making power and influence is shared between 
those asked to bear the greatest risk, those who stand to benefit the most, and 
the institutions, administrators, and technical experts responsible for the ulti-
mate decision. 
Id. at 834-35. 
300. See HANDLER, supra note 267, at 167 ("Participation on the part of the dependent per-
son is difficult, often anxiety-producing, and time-consuming."). 
301. "[Tlhe difference between reacting to amend the margins of a proposal that you had no 
part in creating, and starting from scratch to create a plan that addresses concerns you consider 
paramount, is vast." Benjamin B. Quinones, Redevelopment Redefined: Revitalizing the Central 
City with Resident Control, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 689, 698 (1994). 
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on financial spending, processes, and outcomes; to compare results 
among similarly situated providers; to evaluate the data collected; 
and to report the results of the data to all the affected stake-
holders.302 In carrying out these tasks, it would be particularly 
helpful for local and state governments to create centralized clear-
inghouses to compare such data, to gather examples of "best prac-
tices," and to serve as resource centers on performance contracting 
techniques. In addition, in selecting contractors and in monitoring 
their performance, governments may want to rely on national ac-
creditation bodies that have developed rigorous standards for 
evaluating providers and have specialized expertise in their fields. 
Beneficiaries can also assist government in monitoring ser-
vice delivery. To begin with, they should serve on reviewing panels 
in determining whether to renew existing contracts. Also, on an on-
going basis, government agencies should conduct on-site visits and 
customer interviews. Beneficiaries can be surveyed as to satisfac-
tion with services, as well as to specific aspects of service delivery 
such as timeliness, helpfulness of the staff, and comprehensibility 
of materials.303 Following up with client surveys to determine the 
status of beneficiaries during and after service delivery can also 
provide valuable information about outcomes. In certain circum-
stances, it may be appropriate for the government to use "testers" 
to get an objective view of the services being provided.304 Sharing 
the results of data collection with the general public, government 
and contractor personnel, and other stakeholders can also heighten 
accountability. Beneficiaries should have a way to voice their con-
cerns, even if surveying efforts do not cover them. Thus, govern-
ments should consider establishing an ombudsperson in an inde-
pendent agency to listen to beneficiary complaints and to assist in 
resolving them. In brief, monitoring involves casting the broadest 
net possible to gather and share information, recognizing that bene-
ficiaries are a key source of accurate information. 
302. See MORLEY ET AL., supra note 260, at 7-8. 
303. See id. at 6. Where the service beneficiary is unable to participate in monitoring due to 
youth, disability, or the like, caretakers and family members can be surveyed. Ct. Freeman, 
supra note 79, at 608 n.264 ("Indeed, third party oversight by either family members of residents 
or community groups already seems to be a crucial ingredient in the quality of nursing home 
care."). 
304. See Diller, supra note 75, at 1215. 
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D. Enforcement 
While effective prevention and monitoring will go far to en-
sure accountability, meaningful enforcement of accountability 
mechanisms is a necessary last resort. Without the threat of en-
forcement, there is little incentive for either government or its con-
tractors to implement accountability reforms. Given the reality that 
most service contracts become self-perpetuating, and that govern-
ments and their contractors develop mutually reinforcing relation-
ships,305 outside pressure is needed to counterbalance this poten-
tially static state of affairs. Express rights to enforce accountability 
mechanisms should be included in contracts and regulations gov-
erning social service programs.306 
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND REGULATING FAITH-BASED 
PROVIDERS 
Charitable choice poses a challenge to the First Amend-
ment's Religion Clauses, under which "Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free ex-
ercise thereof."307 Opponents of charitable choice charge that direct 
monetary grants to religious organizations violate the wall of sepa-
ration between church and state.30B Supporters counter that chari-
table choice fulfills the First Amendment's goal of treating religion 
and nonreligion equally.309 Not surprisingly, this issue has received 
a great deal of scholarly attention. 310 Yet given the lack of doctrinal 
305. See HANDLER, supra note 267, at 92-93. 
306. A government may wish to include some sort of administrative exhaustion, mediation, 
or negotiation requirements hefore authorizing lawsuits. 
307. U.S. CaNST. amend. 1. 
308. See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, Constitutional Questions About Charitable Choice, in 
WELFARE REFORM & FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 5, at 219, 220 (noting that 
"[b]ecause of [the] essential distinction between church and state, partnerships between religious 
organizations and government are constitutionally precarious undertakings"). 
309. See, e.g., Carl Esbeck, The Neutral Treatment of Religion and Faith-Based Social Ser-
vice Providers: Charitable Choice and Its Critics, in WELFARE REFORM & FAITH-BASED 
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 5, at 173, 175 (explaining that under cbaritable choice, social service 
providers "are to be selected only with regard to which providers can effectively deliver the con-
tract services" and thus that "religion is neither favored nor disfavored"). Supporters also con-
tend that denying religious groups access to generally available government funds is discrimina-
tion in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. See id. at 184-85. 
310. See generally Susanna Dokupil, A Sunny Dome with Caves of Ice: The Illusion of Chari-
table Choice, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 149 (2000) (arguing that charitable choice will have adverse 
consequences by increasing government regulation of religious organizations); Steven K. Green, 
The Ambiguous Embrace: Government and Faith-Based Schools and Social Agencies, 86 
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clarity in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, it is difficult to pre-
dict how the Supreme Court will rule on the constitutionality of 
charitable choice provisions, and case law supports arguments on 
both sides.311 The issue is clouded by the fact that the Religion 
Clauses serve a variety of purposes and support a variety of read-
ings.312 Moreover, an obvious tension exists between the Establish-
ment and the Free Exercise Clauses, which, if taken to their logical 
extremes, conflict with one another. 313 For instance, if government 
allows religious groups total freedom to practice their religion and 
thereby exempts them from certain types of regulation, the gov-
ernment may end up establishing a religion.314 Conversely, if the 
government cannot grant religious groups specific accommodations 
from neutral regulatory schemes, the result may be a loss of free 
exercise for those groups.315 
CORNELL L. REV. 692 (2001) (arguing that charitable choice treats religious groups more favora· 
bly than secular groups); Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: Sante Fe, 
Mitchell v. Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARy L. REV. 771 (2001) 
(explaining that neutrality rather than separationism is driving the Supreme Court's analysis of 
government funding cases); Minow, supra note 266 (concluding that partnerships between 
governmental and private groups, including religious groups, further both pluralism and 
individual freedom). 
311. As one commentator summarized Establishment Clause jurisprudence, "Few areas of 
the law today are so riven with wild generalizations and hair-splitting distinctions, so given to 
grand statements of principle and petty applications of precept, so rife with selective readings of 
history and inventive renderings of precedent." JOHN W1TTE, JR., RELlG10N AND THE AMERlCAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 182 (2000). 
312. See generally WITTE, supra note 311. In his book, Witte describes the principles underly-
ing the Religion Clauses as understood by the Founders, and how these principles have ebbed 
and flowed in the Court's jurisprudence. The six main principles are: (1) liberty of conscience; (2) 
free exercise of religion; (3) religious pluralism; (4) religious equality; (5) separation of church 
and state; and (6) disestablishment of religion. Id. at 4. He argues that all of these principles 
should inform our current understanding of the Religion Clauses. 
313. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) ("The Court has struggled to 
find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, 
and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other."). One 
commentator has explained this tension: 
Just as the Free Exercise Clause seems to be saying to avoid burdening relig-
ion, the Establishment Clause seems to be telling us not to make any special 
deals for religious groups. Because we're not sure of the proper baseline, we 
don't know when an accommodation for religion "advances" it and when it 
merely "accommodates" a burden created by the government. 
DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 281 (1998). 
314. See Reka Potgieter Hoff, The Financial Accountability of Churches for Federal Income 
Tax Purposes: Establishment or Free Exercise, 11 VA. TAX REV. 71, 116-17 (1991). 
315. See Minow, supra note 266, at 510: 
If a state cannot close schools and businesses on Sundays or Good Friday for 
fear of establishing Christianity as an official or preferred religion, that prohi-
bition burdens individuals' abilities to observe their Sabbath and their holy 
days. If the state cannot exempt a synagogue from municipal historic preserva-
tion codes, then public rules may infringe on a religious group's self-
government. 
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Even if, as is likely, some form of charitable choice survives 
constitutional challenges, the inquiry does not end there. Rather, 
there is the subsequent question, which has received far less atten-
tion, as to what lengths government may go in ensuring account-
ability from its sectarian contracting partners.316 Some religious 
organizations fear that if the expenditure of charitable choice funds 
is regulated, the government will become excessively entangled in 
their work and that they will lose their uniquely spiritual character 
as a result. This line of argument implicates both Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clause rights. At the same time, if government ex-
empts religious organizations from otherwise generally applicable 
regulations, the government may violate the Establishment Clause 
by favoring religion over nonreligion. This part considers these con-
cerns. First, this part addresses whether government can provide 
direct aid to religious organizations for social services. This issue is 
intertwined with the regulation issue and is thus a necessary predi-
cate to discussing the latter issue. Second, this part considers 
whether the government can regulate religious organizations de-
spite their special constitutional status. Third, having decisively 
answered the second question in the affirmative, this part then 
asks what the limitations on such regulation are. Fourth, this part 
considers whether legislatures may permissively choose to accom-
modate religious organizations and exempt them from regulations 
otherwise applicable to secular providers. This part concludes that 
regulating religious organizations that accept charitable choice 
funds is not only necessary to achieve program objectives but also 
constitutional. 
A. The Direct Aid Dilemma 
The direct aid question is inextricably linked with the regu-
lation question, and thus must be addressed as a preliminary mat-
ter. This is because a direct aid program can be invalidated under 
the Establishment Clause if the government heavily monitors the 
use of the aid to ensure that it is not used for religious purposes. 317 
316. One notable exception is Carl H. Esbeck, Government Regulation of Religiously Based 
Social Services: The First Amendment Considerations, 19 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 343 (1992). 
317. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997) ("Whether a government aid program reo 
suits in such an entanglement has consistently been an aspect of our Establishment Clause 
analysis. We have considered entanglement both in the course of assessing whether an aid pro-
gram has an impermissible effect of advancing religion .... "). 
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In other words, the court may strike down an aid program as exces-
sivelyentangling. 
The leading case involving government aid to religiously af-
filiated social service providers is Bowen v. Kendrick, a 1988 deci-
sion in which the Court addressed the constitutionality of the Ado-
lescent Family Life Act ("AFLA").31B Under AFLA, the federal gov-
ernment provided grants to public and nonprofit private organiza-
tions, including religious organizations, to give care, educational 
services, and counseling to pregnant teenagers. 319 However, AFLA 
funds could not be granted to programs that provided abortion ser-
vices, counseling, or referrals. 320 The Court ruled that AFLA was 
constitutional on its face, but that individual AFLA grants might 
violate the Establishment Clause as applied.321 The Court's opinion 
largely hinged on its conclusion that as long as funds were not go-
ing towards "pervasively sectarian" organizations, there was no risk 
of government advancing, inhibiting, or excessively entangling it-
self with religion. 322 At that time, the ban on direct aid to perva-
sively sectarian institutions had a long pedigree in cases involving 
aid to parochial schools. 323 Although AFLA survived facial attack, 
318. 487 u.s. 589, 593 (1988). The only other case involving government aid to social services 
is Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 297·300 (1899), in which the Court upheld a congressional 
appropriation for construction to a Catholic hospital, reasoning formalistically that the hospital 
was incorporated as a secular institution. In Bowen, the court cited to Bradfield as exemplifying 
"the long history of cooperation and interdependency between governments and charitable or 
religious organizations." 487 U.S. at 609. 
319. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 593·96. 
320. [d. at 596·97. 
321. [d. at 618·22. The Court applied the three· part, purpose·effect·entanglement test for 
analyzing Establishment Clause challenges set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612· 
13 (1971). Under Lemon, the Court asks whether the statute (1) is motivated by an impermissi· 
ble purpose; (2) has as its primary effect the advancement of religion; or (3) requires excessive 
entanglement between church and state. Failure to pass any of these prongs is fatal to the stat-
ute at issue. [d. Although the Court has never disavowed Lemon, it recently repackaged the test 
in Agostini, 521 U.S. at 218-40. The Court now puts the excessive entanglement inquiry into the 
effects test. Thus, the Court first asks whether the statute has a secular purpose, and second, 
looks to the effect of the statute by asking whether the government aid results in (1) government 
indoctrination; (2) defines its recipients by reference to religion; or (3) creates an excessive en-
tanglement. [d. at 232-34. 
322. See Bowen, 487 U.s. at 610-18. 
323. Through the 1970s and 1980s very few school aid programs survived the Lemon test. 
See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.s. 229, 255 (1977) (holding that the state cannot loan instruc-
tional materials to private schools or provide transportation for field trips by private schools), 
overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 808 (2000); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372-73 
(1975) (holding that the state may loan textbooks to religious schools, but not other school sup-
plies or film and may not fund counseling and personnel), overruled by Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 808; 
Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973) (holding that the 
state cannot give tax deductions to low-income parents who send their children to private 
schools); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 609 (holding that the state cannot reimburse religious schools for 
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the Court remanded the case back to the district court to determine 
whether AFLA was unconstitutional as applied, that is, whether 
some AFLA aid was flowing to pervasively sectarian grantees 
and/or whether the aid was used to fund specifically religious ac-
tivities. 324 The Court indicated that either of these uses would be 
unconstitutional. 325 
Bowen raises several issues for evaluating the constitutional-
ity of charitable choice. It is fair to read Bowen as approving gov-
ernment funding of religious organizations to combat social prob-
lems as long as the aid money finances only secular activities, and 
advocates have argued as much. Thus, Bowen embodies the Court's 
move away from separationist rhetoric326 toward a more neutral 
vision, under which both the secular and sectarian are entitled to 
equal treatment by government.327 However, Bowen also takes a 
strong stance against the funding of "pervasively sectarian" institu-
tions. The Court has vaguely defined pervasively sectarian organi-
zations as those in which the "secular activities cannot be separated 
from sectarian ones."328 Parochial schools and houses of worship fit 
portion of costs of teacher's salaries). By contrast, the Court upheld various government aid 
programs to religiously affiliated institutions of higher learning on the theory that college·age 
students are less subject to indoctrination and that colleges are not permeated with religion. See, 
e.g., Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 766·67 (1976) (upholding state annual grants of 
fIfteen percent per pupil); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 681·84 (1971) (holding that federal 
grants may be made for construction of college facilities for other than religious activities). 
324. See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 620·22. 
325. In dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that expecting religious organizations to refrain 
from promoting religion was unrealistic. He argued: 
There is a very real and important difference between running a soup kitchen 
or a hospital and counseling pregnant teenagers on how to make the difficult 
decisions facing them. The risk of advancing religion at public expense, and of 
creating an appearance that the government is endorsing the medium and the 
message, is much greater when the religious organization is directly engaged in 
pedagogy, with the express intent of shaping belief and changing behavior, than 
where it is neutrally dispensing medication, food, or shelter. 
[d. at 641 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
326. The Court most forcefully endorsed a separationist reading of the Religion Clauses in a 
series of cases involving aid to parochial schools in the 1970s. See infra note 323 (citing cases). 
327. For a description of the Court's move toward a neutrality theory of the Religion Clauses, 
see Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional 
Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 66·72 (2002). 
328. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 755. Various factors courts have used to dete~mine whether an en· 
tity is pervasively sectarian include whether: (1) the organization is located near houses of wor· 
ship; (2) worship or religious instruction is an important part of the organization's program; (3) 
religious symbols and activities are found in the facility; (4) operation of the institution is consid· 
ered an integral part of the sponsoring faith's religious mission; (5) staff are subject to discipline 
and control of religious authorities; (6) participants must attend religious devotions; (7) the or· 
ganization is directly funded by religious groups; and (8) the organization discriminates on the 
basis of religion with regard to clients or staff. See Brownstein, supra note 308, at 222. 
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squarely within this definition.329 Charitable choice would appear to 
violate the pervasively sectarian test, because its very purpose is to 
involve churches, synagogues, mosques, and the like in welfare de-
livery without requiring these organizations to set up affiliated, 
nonsectarian nonprofits.330 Yet since Bowen, the Court has moved 
away from the "pervasively sectarian" test. That is, a majority of 
the Court no longer considers determinative the nature of the or~ 
ganization receiving the aid. 
Most recently, in Mitchell v. Helms, six Justices upheld a 
federal program that provided educational equipment and materi-
als such as computers, software, and VCRs, to public and private 
schools, including religious schools. There was no majority opinion 
in the case.331 The plurality, consisting of Justices Thomas, 
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy, concluded that the Establishment 
Clause is not violated as long as the aid lacks religious content and 
is distributed based on neutral criteria.332 For the plurality, the ac-
tual use of the aid or character of the recipient is irrelevant.333 Al-
though the plurality cautioned that direct monetary aid to religious 
entities raises special Establishment Clause "dangers," it suggested 
that such dangers could be diminished if there are neutral criteria 
for distribution and an intervening element of private choice as to 
where the aid is used.334 The plurality was unconcerned by govern-
ment funds going to individuals who then choose where to spend 
the money, reasoning that these private decisions remove any inti-
mation of government coercion or indoctrination.335 
The Mitchell concurrence, consisting of Justices O'Connor 
and Breyer, which held the deciding votes on the aid question, con-
cluded that the government could provide religiously neutral aid to 
parochial schools as long as the aid was not in fact diverted for reli-
gious purposes.336 Echoing Bowen, the concurrence stated that from 
now on, "[t]o establish a First Amendment violation, plaintiffs must 
prove that the aid in question actually is, or has been, used for reli-
329. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 621. 
330. It is questionable whether setting up independent, but affiliated non profits eases the 
First Amendment concerns. See infra note 343. 
331. 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
332. Id. at 826. 
333. The plurality argued that the pervasively sectarian standard should be eliminated, call-
ing it offensive. Id. "[Hjostility to aid to pervasively sectarian schools has a shameful pedigree 
that we do not hesitate to disavow." Id. at 828. 
334. Id. at 818-19 & n.8. 
335. Id. at 816. 
336. Id. at 840 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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gious purposes."337 The concurrence parted company with the plu-
rality in arguing that neutrality in distribution does not, by itself, 
satisfy Establishment Clause concerns. 338 Nevertheless, the concur-
rence did suggest that while direct grants that finance religious 
practices are unconstitutional,339 the intervening element of private 
choice could support the actual diversion of funds to religious prac-
tices. 34o Moreover, the concurrence seemingly, but not explicitly, 
abandoned the pervasively sectarian standard, as the schools at 
issue were clearly "pervasively sectarian" under the Court's prior 
rulings. By contrast, the dissenting Justices, who included Souter, 
Stevens, and Ginsburg, contended that any form of government aid 
that could potentially be diverted towards religious activities vio-
lates the Establishment Clause.341 
It seems that none of the Justices is ready to uphold direct 
cash grants to houses of worship if the funds are used for religious 
purposes, at least in the absence of private choice. The charitable 
choice legislation intends to avoid this result by requiring that reli-
gious organizations not use federal funds for proselytizing or wor-
ship. In other words, charitable choice aims to fund only secular 
activities carried out by religious groups. At the same time, how-
ever, charitable choice aims to preserve the spiritual character of 
religious groups, which is, after all, the supposed source of their 
effectiveness in the social service field. However, it is hard to see 
337. Id. at 857. The concurrence concluded that any divertability that had occurred in the 
case before it was de minimis. Id. at 864. 
338. Id. at 837-39. 
339. Id. at 843. "[T]he most important reason for according special treatment to direct money 
grants is that this form of aid falls precariously close to the original object of the Establishment 
Clause's prohibition." Id. at 856. 
340. Id. at 842-44. The Court has frequently upheld aid programs to parochial schools where 
there was an intervening element of private choice. That is, where "[a]ny aid ... tbat ultimately 
flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of tbe genuinely independent and private 
choices of aid recipients." Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986) 
(upholding state grant to disabled student choosing to use his grant for training as a pastor); see 
also, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 3 (1993) (upholding special educa-
tion services to student attending parochial high school); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390-91 
(1983) (upholding state income tax deduction for tuition for parents enrolling their children in K-
12 schools, including parochial schools). However, it is not clear that private intervening choice 
truly severs the link between the state aid and the sectarian recipient. See Laura S. Underkuf-
fler, Vouchers and Beyond: The Individual as Causative Agent in Establishment Clause Juris-
prudence, 75 IND. L.J. 167, 191 (2000) ("The theory of the individual as causative agent does not 
break the connection between a state funding program and its beneficiaries when the individ-
ual's private choice simply operates, in an anticipated and authorized way, as a part of the state 
funding scheme."). 
341. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 890 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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how both objectives can be served simultaneously. As one commen-
tator has explained this tension: 
Churches and other houses of worship cannot separate the act of charity from the 
reason they feel compelled to offer the act. If houses of worship are asked to per· 
form acts of charity without communicating the underlying message of faith that 
inspires them, the act loses much of its life·changing impact. But if the religious 
message accompanies the acts-acts funded by the government's money and de· 
termined by the state's rules of eligibility-then the most basic aspects of the Es· 
tablishment Clause are impIicated.342 
Under charitable choice, which struggles to reconcile neu-
trality and religiosity, a beneficiary may well end up receiving ser-
vices from an organization with religious symbols on the walls, a 
discriminatory hiring policy, and required prayer led by an em-
ployee whose position is funded by private dollars. This likely sce-
nario links government funding to coercive and indoctrinating prac-
tices-a combination that the Court has held to violate the Estab-
lishment Clause as an advancement of religion. Simply put, while 
most would agree that worship and proselytizing are religious prac-
tices, it is not clear why permitted practices under charitable 
choice-religious symbolism, expressions of religious belief, and hir-
ing discrimination against nonbelievers-are not. These permitted 
activities pose the same risks of coercion and indoctrination as tra-
ditional religious activities such as worship and proselytizing.343 
342. Derek Davis, Right Motive, Wrong Method: Thoughts on the Constitutionality of Chari· 
table Choice, in WELFARE REFORM & FAITH· BASED ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 5, at 267, 291. 
The difficulty between separating secular goals from sectarian programs is highlighted in are· 
cent district court case, Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950, 
950 (W.D. Wis. 2002), which struck down state funding of a faith·based, long·term residential 
alcohol and drug rehabilitation program. Id. The program at issue, called Faith Works, used a 
Christian·enhanced model of the Alcoholics Anonymous twelve·step program. Id. at 951. Partici· 
pants were told during intake that the program was faith·based; spiritual matters were dis· 
cussed at mandatory meetings; counselors were available to advise participants on spiritual 
matters; and the program sponsored Bible study, chapel services, and daily prayer time. Id. at 
966. The staff encouraged participants to "integrate spirituality into their recovery program." Id. 
The court concluded that the spiritual and sectarian aspects of the program could not be sepa· 
rated. Id. Indeed, the reason that the state had chosen Faith Works as a contracting partner was 
because of its religious orientation and holistic approach. Id. at 967, 970. Thus, there was "direct 
state funding of persons who actively inculcate religious beliefs" in violation of the Establish· 
ment Clause. Id. at 965, 976. The court expressly refused to rule upon the constitutionality of the 
charitable choice legislation. Id. at 979. 
343. For this reason, it is unlikely that setting up affiliated, tax·exempt charities resolves the 
First Amendment problem. As Stephen Monsma found in his study of religiously affiliated non· 
profits, most of them freely admitted that they engaged in a range of religious activities that 
arguably offend the First Amendment, such as informally referring to religious ideas, holding 
voluntary religious activities, giving hiring preferences to coreligionists, and encouraging reli· 
gious commitments by beneficiaries. MONSMA, supra note 46, at 63·108. He concludes that "legal 
doctrines set down by the Supreme Court are simply ignored when policy elites and nonprofits 
find it convenient to do so." Id. at 109. 
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Although the Justices still appear wary of government funds going 
directly to religious purposes, they have never fully defined what 
religious purposes mean. Accordingly, charitable choice may force 
the Court to articulate more clearly what constitutes "religion." 
An even harder question is whether the Court would permit 
direct cash grants to houses of worship even if the secular and sec-
tarian components of the programs could be separated. For the 
three Mitchell dissenters, even the potential for divertibility of gov-
ernment funds is fatal,344 For the remaining six Justices, a voucher 
program may be more constitutionally palatable given the appear-
ance of intervening private choice that underlies such programs.345 
Private choice supposedly removes the specter of government en-
dorsement and indoctrination of religion. Yet, ironically, a charita-
ble choice voucher program could result in a greater degree of reli-
gious coercion and indoctrination of social service beneficiaries. As 
noted earlier, the conception of "choice" in the area of social services 
may be an illusion, given the vulnerable state of many beneficiar-
ies. Recall that the statute does not require religious organizations 
to notify beneficiaries of alternative sources for receiving bene-
fits.346 In addition, while the charitable choice provision in the PRA 
requires that there be no worship or proselytizing with government 
funds under contracting schemes, there are no such limitations in 
voucher programs. Thus, under the voucher scenario, beneficiaries 
may be directed towards religious providers, uninformed about 
available alternatives, and required to pray to receive benefits. This 
scenario raises concerns about government coercion and indoctrina-
tion not present in Mitchell; thus, charitable choice in any of its 
forms may not fit within the paradigms established in the Mitchell 
case. 
The battle lines drawn by the Justices in Mitchell will be fur-
ther tested when the Court considers the controversial issue of 
school vouchers. The Supreme Court recently agreed to review a 
school voucher case arising out of the Sixth Circuit, in which the 
court struck down a voucher program in Cleveland, Ohio as violat-
ing the Establishment Clause because the program "involves the 
grant of state aid directly and predominantly to the coffers of ... 
344. 530 U.S. at 890 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
345. Id. at 816. 
346. See supra note 29. Proposed legislation, however, does contain a notice requirement. 
H.R. 7, 107th Congo § 1991 (2001). 
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private, religious schools."347 If the Court. approves of school vouch-
ers, it will likely uphold any charitable choice program. The Court 
has indicated that government funding of religious schools raises 
greater Establishment Clause concerns than similar funding of so-
cial service programs because of the vulnerability of children and 
the unique role scho'ols play in forming moral character.348 In this 
regard, recall that the Supreme Court has upheld both of the state-
funded, religiously affiliated social service programs that have come 
before it.349 Even if the Court strikes down the Cleveland school 
voucher program, charitable choice will likely be analyzed under a 
different rubric and could well survive, particularly because the 
charitable choice legislation was specifically drafted to meet the 
Court's specific concerns about coercion and indoctrination. More-
over, given the Court's preference for a fact-based, program-specific 
inquiry in evaluating state aid programs,350 it is unlikely that the 
Court will strike down any charitable choice legislation. Rather, we 
can most likely expect that federal and state courts will spend con-
siderable time and effort in the future evaluating a wide array of 
state-funded, religiously affiliated social service programs and de-
termining the constitutionality of specific programs. 
B. Can the Government Regulate Religious Organizations? 
Assuming that some form of charitable choice survives con-
stitutional scrutiny, as is likely, the next question is whether and to 
what extent government can regulate its religious grantees. The 
term "regulate" is not used here to mean only formal regulations 
347. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 960 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 
976 (2001) (mem.). Under the Cleveland program, scholarships were targeted to low-income 
elementary school children who attended private schools that enrolled in the program. [d. at 948. 
Eighty-two percent of the schools registered to participate in the program in the 1999-2000 
school year were sectarian, and ninety-six percent of the students enrolled in the program at-
tended sectarian schools. [d. at 949. As to other leading school voucher cases, the courts have 
split. For instance, a school voucher program in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, was upheld by that 
state's highest court, Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Wis.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 
(1998), while the Vermont Supreme Court held that a school voucher program violated state 
constitutional law, Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep't of Educ., 738 A.2d 539, 542 (Vt. 1999). 
348. Also, as a result of the history of religious school funding in this country, the Court has 
always treated funding cases involving primary and secondary education as a separate class. See 
Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43, 50-53 
(1997); supra text accompanying notes 38-52. The Court may also treat school funding cases 
differently because of "the place of civic and cultural meaning that schooling" occupies. Minow, 
supra note 266, at 556. 
349. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 593 (1988); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 300 
(1899). 
350. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 857 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Bowen, 487 U.S. at 620-22. 
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issued through notice and comment procedures, but more broadly to 
include all forms of government oversight and monitoring that 
should accompany the transfer of government funds to private bod-
ies. Traditionally, religious individuals and groups have sought ex-
emptions from government regulation through the Free Exercise 
Clause, asserting that governmental involvement in their affairs 
infringes upon freedom of their religious practices. Several promi-
nent scholars currently interpret the Religion Clauses as requiring 
"positive neutrality." Under this view, government must treat secu-
lar and sectarian groups alike in distributing grants (an Establish-
ment Clause argument), but restrain from regulating sectarian 
groups once funds are distributed (a Free Exercise Clause argu-
ment).351 As to the latter point, these scholars argue that the gov-
ernment interferes the least with religion when it leaves religion 
alone, thereby securing free exercise values. However, since 1990, 
when the Court in Employment Division v. Smith held that reli-
gious groups are subject to neutral laws of general applicability, 
claims such as these for mandatory exemptions from regulation are 
unlikely to prevail. 352 A bit of background is helpful. 
Prior to Smith, the Court used a compelling interest test to 
police the boundary between permissible and unduly burdensome 
regulation.353 This test was set forth in Sherbert v. Verner. 354 The 
Court first asked whether the government had imposed any burden 
on the free exercise of religion; the Court then examined whether 
the government had a compelling state interest justifying the free 
exercise infringement and whether the regulation was narrowly 
tailored to achieve that interest with the least possible intrusion on 
free exercise rights. 355 Sherbert involved a Seventh-day Adventist 
who was denied state unemployment compensation after she re-
351. See, e.g., MONSMA, supra note 46, at 173-97; Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for 
Governmental Cooperation with Faith-Based Social Service Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. I, 21 
(1997); Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. I, 42 
(2000). Their nondiscrimination principle is built largely on Court holdings in free speech cases, 
where the Court has ruled that government may not deny religious groups access to religious 
forums. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 846 (1995) 
(disallowing university's refusal to fund student-run Christian newspaper); Capitol Square Re-
view & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995) (holding that the government may not 
forbid the Ku Klux Klan from erecting a Latin Cross in a public square). It is not clear that a 
majority of the Court is willing to go as far in endorsing government funding of the nonexpres-
sive aspects of religious groups. 
352. 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
353. It has long been acknowledged that government can regulate to prevent "immediate 
threat to public safety, peace, or order." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S 296, 308 (1940). 
354. 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). 
355. Id. at 406. 
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fused to work on Saturday because of her religious beliefs. 356 The 
Court held that the denial of benefits burdened her free exercise 
rights by forcing her to make an untenable choice between her reli-
gious beliefs and work. 357 Moreover, the state could not point to any 
compelling interest for denying her benefits, as no evidence indi-
cated that the state unemployment compensation system was or 
would be burdened by false claims.358 
Despite the compelling interest test, after Sherbert, the 
Court upheld most challenged government regulations before it, 
ruling that the neutral application of administrative systems con-
stituted a compelling state interest. 359 Thus, for instance, in United 
States v. Lee360 the Court concluded that an Amish employer had to 
pay Social Security taxes despite the employer's claim that the 
Amish believe there is a religious obligation to provide for their fel-
low members and that they therefore do not believe in the national 
Social Security system.361 The Court explained that allowing indi-
vidual exemptions from the Social Security system would result in 
an administrative quagmire, stating that "[i]t would be difficult to 
accommodate the comprehensive social security system with myriad 
exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs."362 More-
356. Id. at 399·401. 
357. Id. at 404. 
358. Id. at 407. The high·water mark for the Sherbert test was Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 
205, 207 (1972), in which the Court held that a state could not compel Amish parents to send 
their children to high school through age sixteen. Id. Again, the Court focused on the untenable 
choice posed to the Amish parents, commenting that state law "compels them, under threat of 
criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious 
beliefs." Id. at 218. 
359. Unemployment cases, however, remained as a class of cases in which the court regularly 
granted exemptions from state law. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 
136, 146 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 720 
(1981). 
360. 455 U.S. 252, 254 (1982). 
361. Id. at 257. 
362. Id. at 259·60. This neutrality rationale was also the touchstone in Lyng v. Northwest 
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 441·42, 451 (1988), in which the Court held that 
the Forest Service could construct a road through a sacred Native American site despite the 
acknowledged "devastating effects" this would have on the practice of the plaintiff tribe's relig. 
ion. Id. at 441·42, 451. Justice O'Connor stated that "government simply could not operate if it 
were required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and desires .... The First Amendment 
must apply to all citizens alike, and it can give to none of them a veto over public programs that 
do not prohibit the free exercise of religion." Id. at 452; see also Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. 
Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 389, 391·92 (1990) (holding that the state could retroactively 
impose sales and use taxes on the sale of religious articles by a religious ministry because the 
law applied "neutrally to all retail sales," and there was no evidence that collection of the taxes 
burdened the ministries' sincere religious beliefs); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 696, 712 (1986) 
(holding that the government could require a Native American parent to accede to the use of a 
Social Security number for his two·year·old daughter despite claims that the use of a numerical 
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over, the Court reasoned that if one "enter[s] into commercial activ-
ity as a matter of choice," one's religious beliefs "are not to be su-
perimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on 'others 
in th[e] activity."363 
These cases foreshadowed the Court's decision in Smith, a 5-
4 ruling in which the Court formally abandoned the compelling 
state interest requirement altogether.364 There, the Court stated 
that "the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the 
obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general appli-
cability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) con-
duct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."365 Smith involved 
two Native Americans who were fired by a private drug rehabilita-
tion organization after they used peyote at a Native American 
church ceremony.366 The state denied their unemployment compen-
sation applications pursuant to a state law that disqualified em-
ployees discharged for work-related misconduct. 367 Justice Scalia, 
writing for the majority, reasoned that if a state could criminalize 
conduct, it could also penalize the conduct in its unemployment 
scheme. 36B He stated, "We have never held that an individual's reli-
gious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid 
law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate."369 
The Smith Court, however, recognized at least two excep-
tions to its holding. First, where the free exercise claim is joined 
with another constitutional protection, that hybrid claim might be 
entitled to an exemption.370 For instance, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the 
successful claim of Amish parents for an exemption from a school 
attendance requirement involved not only the Free Exercise Clause 
but also the parents' constitutional right to direct the education of 
their children. 371 Unfortunately, the Smith Court did not address 
the level of scrutiny that applies to a hybrid claim or how strong 
each or both of the claims need to be to succeed. Second, where the 
law at issue provides for individualized determinations of exemp-
identifier would rob her spirit); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (hold-
ing that the IRS could deny tax-exempt status to a religious college that engaged in racial dis-
crimination). 
363. Lee, 455 U.S. at 261. 
364. 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990). 
365. Id. at 879 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
366. Id. at 874. 
367.Id. 
368. Id. at 872. 
369. Id. at 878-79. 
370. Id. at 881-83. 
371. 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972). 
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tion, "[the government] may not refuse to extend that system to 
cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason."372 The best 
example here is Sherbert, in which the state had the discretion to 
make individualized determinations for statutory exemptions. 373 
The Smith decision was intensely controversial, and was at-
tacked as the downfall of religious liberty.374 In 1993, Congress 
passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), the stated 
purpose of which was to "restore the compelling state interest test" 
of Sherbert. 375 RFRA was short-lived, however. In City of Boerne v. 
Flores, the Court declared RFRA unconstitutional as it applied to 
the states.376 Motivated by separation of powers and federalism con-
cerns, the Court reasoned that Congress exceeded its power under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in passing RFRA, because 
"[l]egislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause 
cannot be said to be enforcing the clause."377 However, RFRA may 
remain the standard as applied to free exercise challenges to fed-
erallaws.378 
Accordingly, at this time, neutral, generally applicable gov-
ernment regulations-even those that arguably burden religious 
groups-are presumptively constitutional. However, there are at 
least four instances in which religious groups can challenge state . 
and local government regulation: (1) when the free exercise viola-
tion is linked with another constitutional violation (a hybrid claim); 
(2) when the regulation at issue requires some form of individual-
ized determination; (3) when the law at issue is not neutral; and (4) 
372. 494 u.s. at 884. 
373. In addition, the compelling state interest test remains the test for cases involving laws 
that target religion, i.e., laws which are non· neutral. Thus, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993), the Court struck down a series of local ordi-
nances, which although facially neutral, were targeted against a religious group's use of animal 
sacrifice. The Court held that the ordinances were not "neutral and of general applicability," but 
instead were enacted with the object of "the suppression of religion." Id. at 531, 542. None of the 
charitable choice provisions or proposed accountability mechanisms in this Article implicates the 
concerns underlying Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye. 
374. See Jonathan C. Lipson, On Balance: Religious Liberty and Third-Party Harms, 84 
MINN. L. REV. 589, 643 n.279 (2000) (citing sources); Carol M. Kaplan, Note, The Devil Is in the 
Details: Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws and Exceptions from Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 
1055 n.42 (2000) (same). 
375. Pub. L. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.s.C. § 2000bb 
(1994». 
376. 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997). 
377. Id. at 519. 
378. See Gregory P. Magarian, How to Apply the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to Fed-
eral Law Without Violating the Constitution, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1903, 1915-17 (2001) (setting forth 
split in courts as to whether the RFRA applies to federal legislation and arguing in favor of such 
application). 
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when the regulation violates Establishment Clause rights by exces-
sively entangling church and state. 379 The proposed accountability 
mechanisms in this Article are unlikely to fall within any of these 
Smith exceptions. 38o 
First, the proposed quality assurance regulations do not im-
plicate the hybrid exception to Smith because they do not violate 
other constitutional guarantees. Although it is certainly easy for 
plaintiffs to allege a violation of another constitutional right such 
as the rights of association or speech, mere allegations are not suf-
ficient to garner an exemption. Rather, in cases interpreting the 
hybrid exception that have ruled in favor of the religious plaintiffs, 
the decisions generally could stand on the independent constitu-
tional right alone. 381 Such independent rights are not present in 
this context. For instance, grantees might argue that accountability 
measures force them to adapt their messages in order to achieve 
social service objectives. However, there is no free speech violation 
when the government restricts the messages it wants to accompany 
government-funded programs delivered by private entities.382 
379. State constitutional law is not a useful source for challenging regulation of charitable 
choice spending because the federal charitable choice legislation preempts state law. Although 
the statute provides: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to preempt any provision of a 
State constitution or State statute that prohibits or restricts the expenditure of state funds in or 
by religious organizations," 42 u.s.c. § 604a(k) (1994), this language references only state funds. 
Thus, it means that expenditure of federal welfare funds remains subject to federal law. Of 
course, a state-funded charitable choice program could be challenged on state constitutional 
grounds. Several states have enacted their own statutes to encourage contracts with faith-based 
organizations. , 
Also, while RFRA challenges could possibly be brought to federal accountability regulations 
should they be enacted, see supra note 378, the proposals in this Article would likely be imple-
mented on a state or local basis in keeping with the PRA's emphasis on devolving authority 
downward. 
Religious organizations might challenge the financial auditing requirements as a burden on 
free exercise. However, even under the compelling state interest test, the provision would likely 
be upheld. The state has a compelling interest in ensuring that its funds are properly spent on 
the defined statutory purposes, and the religious organizations are not excessively burdened by 
such reporting requirements-especially since the charitable choice legislation gives them a 
special accommodation that allows them to segregate charitable choice funds for accounting 
purposes. 
380. The excessive entanglement argument is addressed in detail infra Part IV.C. 
381. Kaplan, supra note 374, at 1068-69. But see Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights 
Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 709, 711 (9th Cir.) (concerning landlords who asserted "colorable claim" 
that antidiscrimination law violated their religious, free speech, and property rights), vacated, 
192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999). 
382. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 198 (1991). Rust involved a federal statute that provided 
federal funding for family planning services. The statute provided that none of the funds "shall 
be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning." [d. at 178. The implement-
ing regulations stated that grantees could not: refer women to abortion providers; engage in 
abortion rights lobbying or advocacy; and be physically or financially connected to abortion ac-
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Second, as long as quality assurance regulations do not con-
tain "hardship," "good cause," or other similar exceptions, they will 
not raise the concern that government officials could discriminate 
against or in favor of religion. Little incentive exists for govern-
ments to incorporate individualized exceptions into quality assur-
ance regulations, as such determinations are costly and inefficient. 
To the degree that a given provider would claim a hardship from 
complying with auditing requirements or the like, the provider is 
likely not a qualified candidate for service delivery and the sophis-
tication such programs require in the first place. 
Third, the proposed quality assurance regulations would be, 
and should be, neutrally applied to all providers, whether they are 
government agencies, nonprofit secular groups, or sectarian organi-
zations. The purpose of such regulations is to ensure that the gov-
ernment obtains results for its expenditures, and accordingly, the 
regulations target no particular type of group for examination. 
Thus, where states or localities seek, either by regulation or by con-
tract, to apply accountability mechanisms to religious groups ac-
cepting charitable choice funds, these methods are likely to survive 
free exercise scrutiny. Along these lines, it should be noted that so-
cial service ministries are regulated in other regards as well, and 
that challenges to such neutral regulations on the basis of religion 
generally fai1. 383 Federal laws that affect social service ministries 
include labor law and employee benefits, as well as tax and antidis-
crimination laws.384 At the state and local level, religious organiza-
tions are subject to laws relating to licensing, workers' compensa-
tion, labor relations, safety, incorporation, taxes, human rights and 
antidiscrimination, charitable solicitation, lobbying and political 
activity, zoning, health, sanitation, food handling, environmental 
tivities. Id. at 179-80. The Court held that the regulations were not an unconstitutional restric-
tion on speech, but rather that "public funds [can] be spent for the purposes for which they were 
authorized." Id. at 196. 
383. As one commentator'explained: 
The amenahility of churches to some governmental regulation is not seriously 
disputed. For example, few would protest the application to churches of laws 
prohibiting fraud in the sale of securities, requiring donated funds to be ex-
pended for the purposes represented, protecting copyright owners against in-
fringement, or prohibiting activities that cause physical harm, property dam-
age, or material disturbance to others. Similarly, churches routinely comply 
with municipal building codes and zoning regulations in the construction and 
location of worship facilities. 
Hammar, supra note 205, § 9-0l. 
384. See Esbeck, supra note 316, at 360-66; see also Rogers, supra note 5, at 64-66. Rogers be-
lieves that "most churches are not equipped to jump through the regulatory hoops necessary to 
prove compliance with such laws .... [and that] proving compliance is likely to take a large toll 
on religious autonomy." Rogers, supra note 5, at 65. 
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regulation, and building and fire codes.385 In return for their com-
pliance with this web of neutral regulations, religious organizations 
receive the benefits available to secular organizations and indi-
viduals, such as police and fire protection and access to roads, wa-
ter, and power. To be sure, quality assurance regulations probe into 
the programmatic aspects of a social service organization, but they 
do not mandate a specific course of action, and they apply equally to 
all grantees. Moreover, unlike the various federal and state stat-
utes listed above, which apply across the board, charitable choice 
regulations apply only to an entity that has chosen to participate in 
social service delivery. Thus, there is no arguable element of coer-
cion or of "untenable choice," factors which concerned the Court in 
Sherbert. 
C. How Extensively Can the Government Regulate Religious 
Organizations? 
Although government can regulate religious organizations 
through generally applicable, neutral laws, this authority is not 
boundless. At some point, government regulation of religious groups 
can become so onerous that the regulations end up violating the 
Establishment Clause's prohibition on excessive entanglement be-
tween government and religion. Identifying the boundary between 
permissible and impermissible entanglement, however, is no easy 
task. 
The notion of excessive entanglement was first articulated in 
Walz v. Tax Commission, in which the Court held that a state could 
exempt religious organizations along with other nonprofit, charita-
ble organizations from state property taxes.386 The Court reasoned 
in part that the exemption was less entangling than the alternative 
of imposing the tax, which would "tend to expand the involvement 
of government by giving rise to tax valuation of church property, 
tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and con-
flicts that follow in the train of those legal processes."387 Con-
versely, the Court has upheld laws that imposed taxes on or denied 
deductions for religious organizations, ruling that such neutral 
385. See Esbeck, supra note 316, at 381-86; Rogers, supra note 5, at 66-67. 
386. 397 U.s. 664, 674 (1970). 
387. Id. The Court ignored the fact that granting exemptions also requires the government to 
evaluate the legitimacy of the claims for exemption-a task arguably more likely to result in 
government assessments about religion. See Erika King, Tax Exemptions and the Establishment 
• Clause, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 971, 1010 (1999). 
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laws are not excessively entangling. For instance, in Hernandez u. 
Commissioner, the Court held that disallowing deductions for con-
tributions to the Church of Scientology for auditing sessions was 
not excessively entangling.388 The Court stated that "routine regula-
tory interaction which involves no inquiries into religious doctrine, 
no delegation of state power to a religious body, ... and no 'detailed 
monitoring and close administrative contact' between secular and 
religious bodies, does not of itself violate the nonentanglement 
command."389 The Court has also upheld regulations requiring reli-
gious organizations to maintain various sorts of records related to 
secular objectives.39o Taken together, these cases indicate that the 
Court tends to defer to Congress when it enacts regulations that are 
unrelated to policing the boundary between sectarian and secular. 
Mter Walz, the excessive entanglement inquiry became part 
of the Lemon test,391 under which the Court evaluates alleged Es-
tablishment Clause violations by looking to the statute's purpose, 
effect, and entanglement between church and state. Notably, this 
formulation permits some entanglement; it bars only those entan-
glements that are deemed excessive.392 In Lemon itself, the Court 
struck down a state policy that reimbursed parochial schools for 
part of the costs of teaching secular students.393 Excessive entan-
glement arose in that case because "[a] comprehensive, discriminat-
ing, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be required to 
ensure that [the restrictions on aid] are obeyed and the First 
Amendment otherwise respected."394 Thus, the Court has been most 
troubled by regulations, such as those in Lemon, which attempt to 
monitor the use of government aid to ensure that it is not spent for 
388. 490 U.S. 680, 696 (1989). 
389. Id. at 696·97 (citations omitted); see also Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equaliza· 
tion, 493 U.S. 378, 394 (1990) (rmding that the imposition of generally applicable sales and use 
tax on religious organization did not result in excessive entanglement between government and 
religion). 
390. See, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305·06 (1985) 
("The Establishment Clause does not exempt religious organizations from such secular govern· 
mental activity as flre inspections and building and zoning regulations ... and the recordkeeping 
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act, while perhaps more burdensome in terms of pa· 
perwork, are not signillcantly more intrusive into religious affairs."); cf. NLRB v. Catholic 
Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 503·07 (1979) (holding that the NLRB does not have jurisdiction over a 
Catholic school's teachers in the absence of clear congressional intent because of potential for 
entanglement). 
391. See supra note 322. 
392. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997) ("Not all entanglements, of course, have the 
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Interaction between church and state is inevitable, ... 
and we have always tolerated some level of involvement between the two."). 
393. 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971). 
394. Id. at 619. 
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religious purposes.395 But even in these sorts of cases, the Court has 
recently become more accepting of a variety of monitoring meas-
ures. 
In the 1997 case of Agostini, the Court tweaked the Lemon 
test, but Justice O'Connor confirmed that entanglement was still a 
relevant inquiry.396 
[T]he factors we use to assess whether an entanglement is "excessive" are similar 
to the factors we use to examine "effect." That is, to assess entanglement, we have 
looked to "the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the 
nature of the aid that the state provides, and the resulting relationship between 
the government and religious authority."397 
Thus, entanglement remains a basis for striking down government 
regulation, which is, of course, why it has become a popular argu-
ment for foes of regulation in the face of Smith's almost blanket ap-
proval of government regulation as consistent with the Free Exer-
cise Clause. 39B Agostini upheld a federally funded program in New 
York City that sent public school teachers into religious schools to 
provide remedial education for disadvantaged students. 399 Although 
the program called for unannounced monthly visits of public super-
visors to ensure that funds were not spent to inculcate religion, the 
Court decided that this level of monitoring did not amount to exces-
sive entanglement.4oo In fact, citing to Bowen, the Court noted that 
it had upheld far greater entanglements in the past.401 
As noted earlier, the AFLA, which was the statute involved 
in Bowen, contained various ongoing oversight mechanisms to en-
sure that funds were spent in line with congressional intent and in 
accord with the Establishment Clause.402 These mechanisms in-
cluded government evaluations of the services provided, required 
reports from grantees, and grantee disclosures on application forms 
as to the nature of the services that would be provided.403 In addi-
tion, the Court recognized that the Department of Health and Hu-
395. See id. 
396. See supra note 321. 
397. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232 (citation omitted). 
398. See Gerstenblith, supra note 186, at 472-73. 
399. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234-35. In Agostini, the Court overruled its decision twelve years 
prior in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). 
400. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234. 
401. [d. The Agostini Court rejected its prior statements that a program that might increase 
the dangers of "political divisiveness" or that requires "administrative cooperation" between 
government and parochial schools is excessively entangling. [d. at 233. 
402. 487 U.S. 589, 615 (1988). 
403. [d. 
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man Services would review AFLA-funded programs, including edu-
cational materials, and might visit program offices.404 
The Court commented on the Catch-22 nature of its empha-
sis on excessive entanglement; in some circumstances, "the very 
supervision of the aid to assure that it does not further religion 
renders the statute invalid."405 However, in the case of AFLA, be-
cause the religious organizations at issue were not pervasively sec-
tarian, there was no reason "to fear that ... the Government [will] 
intrude unduly in the day-to-day operation of the religiously affili-
ated AFLA grantees,"406 in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 
The Court thus appeared to assume that a "less" religious organiza-
tion would require less policing than a "more" religious one because 
the former is less likely to be inculcating religion.407 Now that the 
Court is leaning towards abandoning the pervasively sectarian 
standard, the Court likely will see even less need for policing proper 
First Amendment boundaries. Because the inechanisms proposed in 
this Article deal with quality issues rather than First Amendment 
issues, they should implicate constitutional concerns to an even 
lesser degree. 
The proposed accountability mechanisms are focused on 
achieving secular objectives and ensuring that public funds are 
spent on programs that deliver measurable results for beneficiaries. 
They open up all organizations to scrutiny, but they do not pro-
scribe or prescribe any particular method for delivering the services 
at issue. Accordingly, while they involve some entanglement be-
tween government and religion, the entanglement is not more ex-
cessive than that envisioned in Bowen, and it does not infringe on 
the religious character of the organizations. To the degree providers 
claim that the religious nature of their programs is compromised by 
such regulation, they are essentially admitting that they are com-
mingling government funds for religious purposes-an admission 
that is fatal under charitable choice. 
404. [d. at 616·17. 
405. [d. at 615. 
406. [d. at 616; see also Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 763-64 (1976) (finding no 
excessive entanglement where state conducts annual audits to ensure that categorical state 
grants to religious colleges are not used to teach religion). As noted previously, it appears that 
the "pervasively sectarian" limitation on government aid is no longer controlling law. See supra 
notes 333-34 and accompanying text. 
407. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 616. 
882 VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 54:799 
D. Can the Legislature Exempt Religious Organizations from 
Regulation? 
Although Smith holds that religious organizations do not 
have a constitutional right to mandatory exemptions from neutral 
government regulations, the decision expressly leaves open the pos-
sibility of legislative, or permissive, accommodations to religion. 408 
Indeed, in Smith, Justice Scalia noted that a state or federal legis-
lature could exempt sacramental drugs from its drug laws, and 
Oregon did exactly that after the Smith ruling.409 
At some point, however, an accommodation can tip over into 
favoritism towards religion in violation of the Establishment 
Clause.41o Yet the Court has not defined where this tipping point 
lies.411 This issue is significant in the charitable choice context for 
two reasons. First, the charitable choice legislation makes some 
clear accommodations to religious groups, including a tailored au-
diting provision, an exemption from nondiscrimination in employ-
ment laws, and a mandate that governments not interfere with the 
religious character of grantees. Nonsectarian groups do not have 
these "benefits." Secular groups may therefore challenge the exist-
ing accommodations. Second, a heightened accountability scheme 
such as that proposed in this Article could be subject to demands 
from religious groups for various exemptions. Indeed, many propo-
nents of charitable choice legislation, including President Bush, 
408. 494 u.s. 872, 890 (1990). 
409. Id.; see WITIE, supra note 311, at 145. Likewise, in response to a circuit court decision, 
Congress passed the Equal Access Act requiring that secondary schools with limited open forums 
permit religious groups to conduct meetings on school property, id., and Congress amended the 
military code to allow the wearing of yarmulkes after the Supreme Court held that there was no 
constitutional right to such an exemption, id. 
410. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 706 (1994) (striking down separate 
school district created for religious enclave of Satmar Hasidim and noting that "accommodation 
is not a principle without limits"). 
411. Scholars have hotly debated what the scope of permissive accommodation should be. 
See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Accommodation and Equal Liberty, 42 WM. & MARy L. REV. 
1007, 1014 (2001) (arguing that permissive accommodations should take into account principles 
of equal treatment, that is, they should be permitted as long as accommodations are extended to 
similarly situated nonreligious claimants); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The 
Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1248 (1994) (arguing that permissive accommodations should be permitted 
only where necessary to protect religious practices against discrimination); Ira C. Lupu, The 
Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743, 768 (1992) (arguing that there should 
be no permissive accommodations, in part because such accommodations tend to be religion-
specific and prefer religion over nonreligion); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: 
An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 689-93 (1992) (arguing that 
accommodations should always be permitted as they achieve purposes of both the Free Exercise 
and Establishment Clauses). 
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want to exclude religious groups from any sort of regulation what-
soever related to charitable choice. They argue that churches are 
discouraged from applying for charitable choice funds because of a 
fear of governmental intrusion. 
The Court has held that certain accommodations for reli-
gious groups are appropriate to achieve a level of neutrality be-
tween religion and nonreligion and to relieve religious practices 
from government-created burdens. Thus, in Walz, the Court ap-
proved a property tax exemption for religious and other nonprofit 
groups because historically such exemptions reflected a "kind of 
benevolent neutrality toward churches."412 Central to its holding 
was the fact that secular organizations and nonprofits were also 
entitled to the exemption, and there was thus no favoritism for re-
ligion.413 This accomodationist approach reached its zenith in Cor-
poration of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, in which the Court upheld a 1972 
amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act that exempted reli-
gious nonprofit organizations from the general prohibition against 
religious discrimination in employment.414 The Court reasoned that 
the exemption "alleviat[ed] significant governmental interference 
with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out 
their religious missions."415 The result in Amos seems to reflect not 
only the Court's desire to protect some free exercise values but also 
its long-standing discomfort with interfering in the internal opera-
tions of churches.416 Where an accommodation is not related to pro-
tecting the doctrinal aspects of a religious group's beliefs or opera-
tions, the Court is more likely to strike down the accommodation as 
pure favoritism of religion. Thus, two years after Amos, in Texas 
Monthly v. Bullock, the Court put firm limits on permissive accom-
modations, striking down a sales tax exemption for religious peri-
odicals because the benefits of the exemption flowed only to reli-
412. 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970). 
413. In a prior case, Zorach v. Clauson, the Court approved a release time program to allow 
religious students in public schools to attend off-site religious classes, calling the program a 
"suitable accommodation ... to spiritual needs." 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). The result in Zorach is 
questionable given its favoritism of religious beliefs over nonreligion. See Lupu, supra note 310, 
at 791 (explaining the result in Zorach as a result of the Cold War era in which it was decided: 
"Zorach arguably involved government resources for religion alone, symbolic government support 
for religion, and proreligious government coercion-a combination that one today would expect to 
be fatal to any government policy challenged on Establishment Clause grounds."). 
414. 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
415. ld. at 335. 
416. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text. 
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gious groups.417 In Texas Monthly, the Court identified three limits 
on permissive accommodations.418 Not only must they be designed 
to alleviate a government-created burden on religion, but they can-
not favor particular sects, favor religious groups over nonreligious 
groups, or burden nonbeneficiaries.419 
The existing charitable choice accommodations, all of which 
are designed to preserve the unique character of religious organiza-
tions, run the risk of unduly favoring religion. This is another way 
of saying that the accommodations, drafted with free exercise prin-
ciples in mind, might ultimately be invalidated under the Estab-
lishment Clause. For instance, under charitable choice, govern-
ments cannot interfere with the messages of religious groups, but 
they can restrict the messages of secular groups.420 Moreover, while 
government funds cannot be used for proselytizing or worship, pri-
vate funds may be so used as part of the same program. Courts may 
deem the special treatment for religious speech in this context a 
"statutory preference for the dissemination of religious ideas" that 
"offends our most basic understanding of what the Establishment 
Clause is all about."421 
The accommodation limiting the scope of audits for religious 
organizations might also be deemed unlawful favoritism. Religious 
groups will be able to hide how their nongovernmental funds are 
spent, and, given that private funds can be used for proselytizing 
and worship, this will make it nearly impossible to get a complete 
picture of how social services are delivered at a particular site.422 
Finally, the exemption granted to charitable choice providers from 
the federal civil rights law prohibiting discrimination on the basis 
of religion could be attacked as an unlawful accommodation given 
the overlay of government funding. In Amos, the Court viewed this 
Title VII exemption as a way to keep government from interfering 
417. 489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989). 
418. [d. at 10-13. 
419. [d. The Court has also struck down legislative attempts to provide employees with an 
absolute right not to work on their chosen Sabbath, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 
703, 710-11 (1985), and a state attempt to carve out a special school district for a particular reli-
gious sect, Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690 (1994). In the former case, 
the Court was concerned about the burden tbe accommodation would put on employers, and in 
the latter case, the Court was concerned about favoritism towards a particular religion. Caldor, 
472 U.S. at 706-09. 
420. See Brownstein, supra note 308, at 242; Green, supra note 310, at 714-15. 
421. Tex. Monthly, 489 U.S. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
422. The remedy here would be to expand the scope of audits, not to eliminate them for all 
contractors. 
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with religion in its purely private sphere.423 However, under chari-
table choice, discrimination is no longer carried on solely in the pri-
vate sphere; rather, it is government funded. Given that charitable 
choice funds are only supposed to be used for secular purposes, gov-
ernment-funded discrimination does not serve free exercise values. 
These types of accommodations should not be extended when 
it comes to quality control. That is, legislators and administrators 
should approach with caution requests for exemptions from ac-
countability mechanisms, as such exemptions may tilt over into the 
realm of government sponsorship of religion in violation of the Es-
tablishment Clause. Most importantly, becoming a charitable choice 
grantee is entirely voluntary. Thus, religious groups cannot claim 
that they are subjected to a government-created burden on their 
free exercise from which they need relief. This point was made in 
United States v. Lee, where the Court ruled that the Amish must 
pay Social Security taxes, stating that "[w]hen followers of a par-
ticular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice,"424 
they must abide by statutory schemes binding on others in the 
same activity. In a sense, this notion of voluntariness is a corollary 
to the current Court's determination that "private choice" absolves 
a program of Establishment Clause concerns. Just as private choice 
is seen to break the link between the government and the ultimate 
aid recipient, voluntariness eases any concerns of coercion that ac-
company regulatory schemes. 425 
In addition, quality assurance regulations are neutral as be-
tween religious and secular providers, and there are no questions of 
favoritism of particular sects. Indeed, favoritism for religion would 
arise by exempting religious groups from regulation while leaving 
secular groups, which hold similarly strong but nonreligious convic-
tions, more strictly accountable. Such favoritism is particularly 
troubling, and unnecessary, where there is no interference with the 
internal issues of church doctrine. The mechanisms proposed in this 
Article do not specify how a program is to achieve its goals, they 
423. 483 u.s. 327, 336 (1987). 
424. 455 u.s. 252, 261 (1982). 
425. The Court is less deferential to claims for religious exemption when the exemption could 
result in a harm to third parties, although this is not an expressly stated factor in evaluating 
claims for exemptions. See generally Lipson, supra note 374, at 615-22 ("[T]he continuum of 
deference suggests that deference declines, and judicial scrutiny increases, in proportion to the 
likelihood of third-party harm."). To exempt religious social service providers from an account-
ahility regime would likely result in harm to beneficiaries by exposing them to potentially inef-
fective services. 
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seek only to ensure that community-based goals are achieved in a 
fair and effective manner. 
Finally, granting an exemption from such regulations for re-
ligious grantees could unduly burden secular grantees and the gov-
ernment. Demanding quality from secular groups while allowing 
religious groups freedom to do as they please could result in radi-
cally different levels of services at different sites. To the degree that 
a specific religious group does not provide effective services, the 
burden falls on other providers to pick up the slack, and the harms 
fall upon beneficiaries. Thus, under the Texas Monthly tests for 
unlawful permissive exemptions, legislators and policymakers 
should not award religious groups exemptions from any quality as-
surance regulations they implement. To the contrary, the neutral 
distribution of government funds should be accompanied by the 
neutral imposition of accountability mechanisms. 
CONCLUSION 
In the heady constitutional debates over charitable choice, it 
is easy to forget that the real beneficiaries of charitable choice are 
meant to be the poor. While there has been some acknowledgement 
that charitable choice might force some beneficiaries to tolerate re-
ligious messages or even adopt religious practices in order to re-
ceive services, far less attention has been paid to the actual effec-
tiveness of those services in meeting the beneficiaries' needs. Chari-
table choice promises that a spiritual approach is more effective 
than a secular one in solving social problems. Yet at this time, no 
reliable evidence exists to make the case either way. Thus, in un-
dertaking this social experiment, we need to ensure that charitable 
choice providers are accountable to those they are serving. Regard-
less of how one feels about charitable choice or even the premises 
underlying welfare reform, it is obvious that to fulfill the legislative 
mandate, the services provided must be effectively and fairly deliv-
ered. Nevertheless, existing and proposed charitable choice legisla-
tion does little to ensure accountability to beneficiaries. 
If legislators are counting on the contracting process or a 
voucher system to provide the needed accountability, they are 
sorely misguided. Contract law grants scant rights to third-party 
beneficiaries, and procurement processes ignore beneficiaries alto-
gether. Likewise, vouchers cannot ensure accountability where con-
sumers lack the necessary choices or information to "shop" effec-
tively. In addition, a variety of immunities and limited fiduciary 
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duties generally work to insulate churches and other religious or-
ganizations from public scrutiny. 
Thus, it is time for the states and localities contracting for 
social services to take affirmative steps to ensure that they are pur-
chasing quality services. Importantly, in doing so, they need not 
fear running afoul of First Amendment restrictions, an often-cited, 
but misplaced concern when regulation of charitable choice pro-
grams is at issue. This fear of entanglement has kept state and lo-
cal governments from intruding into religious affairs. While this 
hands-off approach has a long and justified pedigree when churches 
are operating in the private sphere, it has far less justification 
when churches are spending public funds to carry out public pur-
poses. 
The First Amendment Religion Clauses prevent the govern-
ment from advancing or inhibiting religion. The quality assurance 
proposals set forth in this Article implicate neither of these prohibi-
tions. These proposals do not prescribe or proscribe any particular 
method for delivering services. Rather, by merging the principles of 
performance contracting with citizen participation norms, the pro-
posals ensure that all providers-secular and sectarian alike-are 
selected and evaluated according to neutral standards set by the 
community. Ensuring quality does not advance religion; it advances 
successful programs whatever their orientation. At the same time, 
government procurement agencies that set clear standards and fo-
cus on results do not inhibit religion because they do not tell 
churches, or anyone else, how to achieve these goals. Churches that 
do not want to support the underlying secular goals or to be held 
accountable for how they spend government funds can always opt 
out and, as they have traditionally done, provide services with their 
own funds. 
Accordingly, supporters of charitable choice should embrace 
such regulation as a way to demonstrate the effectiveness of faith-
based programs to the public. At the same time, quality assurance 
regulations should provide some comfort to those uneasy with the 
idea of charitable choice, because such regulations provide a 
method for evaluating these programs and for protecting the rights 
of beneficiaries. 
This Article's proposed approach also fits within the Court's 
recent moves towards neutrality in its Religion Clause jurispru-
dence. Recent cases have confirmed that the so-called wall of sepa-
ration between church and state is no longer an accurate metaphor. 
In Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the Court has moved away 
from separationism towards a neutrality approach, under which 
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secular and sectarian are entitled to the same benefits. Tbe Court 
has also used neutrality as a touchstone in free exercise cases, al-
lowing regulatory burdens to fall evenly upon both secular and sec-
tarian groups. Thus, while Religion Clause jurisprudence is ever-
shifting, the current Court would appear to support including sec-
tarian providers in a social service delivery scheme while also hold-
ing them to the same regulatory and accountability standards as 
other providers. 
Spirituality alone is not enough to combat the complex root 
causes of poverty and other social problems. While it may have 
value for some individuals, we know far too little about when, how, 
and for whom spiritually based programs work. We can and must 
debate the constitutional implications of charitable choice, but we 
should not forget the practical realities faced by our neediest citi-
zens. For people who struggle daily to find and hold down jobs, to 
secure decent and affordable housing, to feed and clothe themselves 
and their children, these debates miss the mark. They need services 
that work. 
